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Since the start of telephony and later in broadcasting, the pursuit of universal service has legitimated the ownership and operation of media as 
a public trust. Until the 1980s, this principle was the bedrock for the broadcast-
ing mission and is still a mandated requirement for public media companies 
today. But in practice, the universalism ideal was largely abandoned in the 
1980s as media deregulation promised more competition, innovation, and 
vigorous economic growth. Some of this came true, but at a worrisome cost. 
Growing distrust in media today is partly rooted in the illusion that more me-
dia in more platforms would inevitably ensure better media in all platforms. 
There is now more of everything on offer except social responsibility. This 
collection interrogates the historic universalism mission in public service 
broadcasting and explores its contemporary relevance for public service 
media. Taking a critical perspective on media policy and performance, the 
volume contributes to a much-needed contemporary reassessment that 
clarifies the importance of universalism for equity in access and provision, 
trustworthy content, and inclusive participation in the context of advancing 
digitalisation and globalisation. The collection situates universalism as an  
aspirational quest and inspirational pursuit. Researchers and policy makers will 
find the collection valuable for conceptualisation and strategic managers will 
find it helpful as a principled basis in the pursuit of improved reach and value.  
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This anthology addresses complex, interconnected issues, such as the rise of extremism and terrorism, diver-
sity and minority rights, as well as the situation for freedom of expression in eight different countries, most of 
them with a Muslim majority population. Extremists recruit terrorists through social media, and target minori-
ties as well as freedom loving people by utilizing their freedom of expression to threaten the rights of others. 
This happens not least in countries with a long experience of dictatorship. Journalists face huge challenges 
when reporting on these issues. The contributors are both academics and journalists, conveying their expe-
riences from transnational research co-operation as well as reporting from the ground in conflict areas. Thus, 
this volume addresses itself to journalism students as well as professional journalists and others who need to 
navigate in a world in which both extremists and authoritarian states may stifle gender and minority rights, as 
well as the right to report and express oneself freely.
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INEQUALITIES are the unwanted companions of media and communication. 
Tradi tional analogue mass media were criticized for creating inequalities by  
being biased, serving hegemonic interests, and accumulating far too much power 
in the hands of mighty industrial conglomerates. Under the digital regime, most 
inequalities survived, and new ones occurred. Knowledge gaps transformed into 
digital divides, news journalism is challenged by social networking sites, and 
global corporate monopolies outperform national media companies. Algorith-
mic selection, surveillance, Big Data and the Internet of Things are creating new  
inequalities which follow traditional patterns of class, gender, wealth and educa-
tion. This book revisits old and new media and communication inequalities in 
times of digital transition. It has been written in a collective effort by the members 
of THE EUROMEDIA RESEARCH GROUP.
DIGITAL M
EDIA INEQUALITIES
 POLICIES AGAINST DIVIDES, DISTRUST AND DISCRIM
INATION
 |  JOSEF TRAPPEL
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The Global Audiences of Danish Television Drama 
Following the surprising and unprecedented international export of Danish television 
drama in the early 2010s, this anthology explores the reception of these series among 
global audiences by tracing the travel of the series to seven different countries: Australia, 
Brazil, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Turkey, and the UK. Each contribution differs in terms 
of its theoretical and methodological position and reflects the diverse backgrounds of the 
researchers and types of data collected. As a whole, the anthology provides insights on 
global audience research in an age of multi-platform and multi-directional media flows, as 
well as on the complex nature of contemporary audiences located in different parts of the 
world. The anthology offers a novel contribution to research on Danish television drama, 
the international circulation of audiovisual content produced in non-Anglophone contexts, 
and the phenomenon of Nordic Noir for both students and scholars.
Pia Majbritt Jensen is Associate Professor at the Department of Media Studies and  
Journalism, Aarhus University.
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The RIPE@2018 Conference was a milestone for the initiative as the first confer-
ence hosted and held in southern Europe. The School of Communication at the 
University of Navarra was pleased to host the event, and did so in conjunction 
with CICOM 34, an annual International Communication Conference organised 
by the School. The RIPE initiative is committed to deepening fruitful relations 
between academic researchers and educators and the practitioner community in 
public service media (PSM), especially strategic managers. Our 2018 conference 
was sponsored by Corporación de Radio y Televisión Española (RTVE), Spain’s 
PSM television company. Conference participants visited the new facilities at 
RTVE because the conference was conducted in Madrid. The RIPE leadership 
team and conference participants are grateful for the considerable work and 
investment from the University of Navarra that made the 2018 conference a 
success. 
RTVE’s commitment to sponsor the conference was not exempt from un-
certainty, because a 2018 change in government caused complications. But the 
senior management team of RTVE took care to ensure the conference went 
forward, and RTVE’s professionals added the practical component necessary 
to ground conference discussions in operational reality. The RTVE digital and 
innovation manager, Ignacio Gómez, provided an insightful overview of the 
Spanish media market and the challenges it poses for RTVE in the new digital 
consumption context. The technologic strategic and digital innovation manager, 
Pere Vila, demonstrated RTVE’s leading role in Spain’s digital transformation 
and emphasised relations with audiences and producing new contents for new 
devices. Pablo García Blanco, commissioner for corporate public affairs, clarified 
the European vision of PSM and explained how building support and public 
affairs work. Finally, Roberto Suarez, head of strategy and media intelligence 
for the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), discussed the supreme importance 
of ensuring PSM’s contribution to society to secure the future of the enterprise 
in Europe, taking into account powerful transnational competitors that include 
Amazon, Apple, Disney, Google, and Netflix. The organisers and participants 
appreciate the contributions from RTVE and the EBU. 
The RIPE@2018 Conference theme was universalism and public service 
media. The theme focused attention on challenges and opportunities involved 
with achieving the historic and continuing universal service mission for PSM 
in today’s era of media abundance. The conference theme has been more fully 
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developed in the work undertaken to produce this book, the RIPE@2019 Reader 
– ninth in the series published by Nordicom. In the age of channel scarcity, 
universalism was not easy to achieve, but it was inarguably easier than today. 
As mass media, radio, and television enjoyed universal growth and reach in 
the period of monopolies and oligopolies (depending on the country), the same 
programmes were watched and heard by millions of people in each country at 
the same time. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, broadcasting shortened distances and strengthened 
ties between distant people. Television played a formative role in the univer-
salisation of human relations and the sharing of knowledge. This mission had 
pronounced importance in Europe, because from its start, broadcasting was 
conceived as a public service mandate that included a legal requirement to 
provide a universal service. This was correlated with the pursuit of cultivat-
ing enlightenment, promoting social cohesion, and providing a fair, full, and 
equitable range of media services (UNESCO, 2005). 
Nowadays, the “mass media” of yesteryear has been substituted by “a mass” 
of media channels across an expanding range of digital platforms. Access to 
information, culture, and entertaining as become greater and easier thanks to 
the Internet and social media. Public companies have developed their digital 
departments as online services too. But the Internet is a global media platform 
(Albarran & Goff, 2000) not only because it is connected around the world but 
also because it does not have a specific geographic constituency. In addition, 
more or less any activity of human interest is available on the web and anyone 
can create content to share. That is why the concept of universalism must be 
reconsidered, reimagined, and renewed. 
PSM has been severely challenged by deepening crisis for the past 20 years, 
at least. As Richeri (1994) suggested, the crisis has three dimensions: 1) it is a 
legitimacy crisis because private media can perform many of the same functions 
as public media – this dimension has been compounded by problems for public 
media as nationalist and state media enterprises, cultivating political connota-
tions that are difficult to reconcile with public service; 2) it is a financial crisis 
as growth of competition has led to steep decreases in income and an increase 
in production costs, higher costs for acquisition of rights, and complications 
for human resources that has made financing difficult, especially for managers 
that have had a bureaucratic mindset rather than a business orientation; and 3) 
and it is also an identity crisis, where the commercialism of media systems has 
created market dynamics that are a key driver in managerial decision-making.
The debate on the future of public television features differing solutions, 
but no single option is appropriate for all. Each dimension requires distinctive 
solutions, and all three must be tackled as a package. But the principles that 
legitimate the public service mission for this enterprise continue to emphasise 
universalism, diversity, independence, and distinctiveness. The universal ser-
9
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vice obligation means PSM must somehow guarantee that the majority of the 
population have access to services regardless of geographic and financial con-
straints (Born & Prosser, 2001). Universality refers not only to physical avail-
ability but also to issues of language, understanding, and interest (Sakr, 2012). 
Consequently, they must be diverse, that is to say, the audience targets, types 
of programmes, and subjects taken into account must be broad and varied. To 
do so, they should be independent from political or economic power and not 
biased by any ideological influence. The contributions comprising this collec-
tion treat many of the most important issues related to this set of concerns and 
mandated requirements, and do so with a critical orientation that examines the 
past and future of the concept as a viable practice. 
I want to close by thanking Gregory Ferrell Lowe, a founder of the initiative 
and the RIPE continuity director, for supporting our university, myself, and 
many of my colleagues, in our efforts to organise the 2018 conference in Madrid. 
We are pleased to have contributed to the inaugural effort to expand RIPE’s 
efforts in the southern part of Europe, and beyond. I am personally grateful, 
as well, for the opportunity to participate in editing this volume. Much thanks 
to Philip Savage at McMaster University in Canada, our co-editor, and to our 
colleagues at Nordicom for supporting this publication once again. Finally, we 
thank everyone who contributed to the conference in various roles, especially 
the workgroup chairs, and to the reviewers of the chapters included in this 
RIPE Reader.
Mercedes Medina
Navarra, 21 March 2020
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Chapter 1
Universalism in public service media
Paradoxes, challenges, and development
Gregory Ferrell Lowe & Philip Savage
From the beginning of radio as a social medium in the 1930s, the notion of 
universalism was a foundational principle for legitimating broadcasting as a 
public trust (Barnouw, 1966). Until media deregulation became the preferred 
paradigm in the 1980s, the principle was bedrock to the broadcasting mission 
and a mandate for public service roles and functions (Wu, 2010). Even in the 
US, where commercial financing and private ownership were the preferred 
arrangement for operationalising radio (despite opposition), the Radio Act 
of 1927 required broadcasting to “serve the public interest, convenience and 
necessity” (US Congress, 1925: n.p.). There was near universal agreement that 
broadcasting should serve everyone. 
In the late twentieth century this ideal was deliberately abandoned. Caught 
up in a deregulatory frenzy that impacted many industries, governments 
increasingly embraced the commercial exploitation of broadcasting even in 
countries that had long resisted, as had been the case in Scandinavia (Ala-Fossi, 
forthcoming). Societies were promised more competition, more innovation, and 
vigorous economic growth for media industries. Some of this came to be true, 
but what was lost also matters. The explosive growth of online media enabled 
by advances in digitalisation and sped-up globalisation has unraveled domestic 
efforts to regulate media. 
Today’s growing distrust in media is partly rooted in these dynamics and 
often justified by the illusion that more media in more platforms will ensure 
better media in all platforms. There seems to be more of everything on offer 
except social responsibility. Universalism is no longer much discussed in popular, 
political, or academic circles. When announced as the theme for the RIPE@2018 
conference in Madrid, the response was muted and perplexed. The organisers 
were challenged to secure enough participation because many public service 
media (PSM) scholars consider the topic outdated and reactionary. The initial 
idea had been to focus only on the problems faced by PSM companies in their 
efforts to attract the attention and support of youth audiences. In formulating 
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the theme, we came to see this as one important part of a broader set of chal-
lenges involved with attracting all sorts of people who comprise the publics 
that PSM are still mandated to serve. Essentially, the animating issue is what 
to do with and about the fading prospects to achieve universalism mandates 
for PSM in market-based contexts characterised by media-society relationships 
that are increasingly fragmented and unstable. 
This RIPE anthology interrogates the historic universalism mission and 
investigates aspects of continuing relevance in the enactment of public service 
as a primary purpose of media performance. Our departure point is critical in 
orientation because we do not presume all was cozy and rosy in the bygone 
days of broadcasting monopolies and oligopolies when universalism was a more 
realistic and accepted proposition than it is in the 2020s. But the collection 
recognises the principled importance of universalism as an aspirational quest 
– a project worth pursuing because of the social value its accomplishment can 
provide, even if only ever partial in scope and scale. At best, that quest can be 
inspirational as well.
The quest for universal service involves two key dimensions: reach and genre. 
Its pursuit encourages PSM managers, programmers, and content-makers to 
think about more than markets and to understand programme content as more 
than products created to achieve competitive advantage. Both are important, 
but the pursuit of universalism requires an abiding commitment to provide 
services for publics that address the shared needs people have in a society 
and other communities, which are more than an amalgamation of individual 
preferences and “taste markets”. The pursuit also requires investment in new 
platforms and content that can extend both the reach and range of services 
with due respect for the diversity of needs and the unique affordances that the 
varied platforms can provide. 
The universalism mission has never been easy or entirely fulfilled. There 
have always been considerable difficulties in its pursuit that indicate persistent 
sociocultural biases that must be squarely faced. But the pursuit of universal-
ism matters to the extent that people still value a sufficient degree of cohe-
sion, trustworthiness, fairness, and inclusion that can be partly facilitated by 
media – or not. The latter is the “scary part” because we live in communities 
at multiple levels: national, regional, and local (with implications for PSM in 
all three). To that end, this introductory chapter situates the contributions to 
this volume and provides a grounding for readers to survey and grapple with 
a contemporary discourse about universalism as a principled pursuit that has, 
is, and is likely to remain, both difficult to achieve in practice and in need of 
serious public debate and reconsideration.
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Roots of the universalism ideal in broadcasting
As an ideal, universalism is rooted in the Enlightenment movement of European 
history from the late seventeenth to early nineteenth centuries. The Age of 
Reason, as often described, produced a flowering of philosophy on the nature 
of humanity and the importance of the individual as a rational being possessed 
of “inalienable” rights. This suggests a dialectical tension between the general 
(humanity as a whole) and the specific (individual rights). The Enlightenment 
cultivated much that the Western world has cherished, celebrated, and advocated 
as identity markers – especially democracy, capitalism, and science. 
The chapter from Barbara Thomass within this collection treats the early 
development, background, and application of universalism as “a principle posit-
ing the equal moral worth of all persons”. The ethical nature of the concept is 
normative but, as noted, indicates a dialectical tension. On the one hand, the 
principle posits a shared heritage of presumed universal value in believing all 
people inherit a fundamental set of rights by virtue of being human. Famously, 
the American Declaration of Independence declares that “all men are created 
equal”. The French Revolution proclaimed “liberty, equality, and fraternity” 
for all. Leaving aside the problem of gender bias and demonstrated class bias 
in the periods when Western democracies were constructed, and the thorny is-
sue of colonialism and slavery that remain a festering sore, the essential point 
is that humans have rights that are universal in scope and essential in nature. 
At the same time, however, the universalism principle prioritises the indi-
vidual to varying degrees, depending on constitutions, legislation, policy, and 
other adaptations. In the US, each individual has the Constitutional right to 
pursue “life, liberty, and happiness”. So, universalism is both a shared human 
right and an individual affordance. In other liberal democratic countries, uni-
versalist rights also speak to broadly shared community rights and protections, 
extending the universal right to minority language and cultural communities (c.f. 
Canadian or Belgian minority language rights). And the suffragette movement 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the civil rights 
movement in the US since the 1960s, have significant importance. 
The universalism ideal has been fundamental to the designs and intentions 
of welfare states, also called welfare societies. This is a comparatively recent 
application. According to Renwick (2018), until the late 1800s, most believed 
the welfare of individual citizens was nothing the state should be overly con-
cerned with. Arguments against states “meddling” with the public welfare 
feature themes that are frequently articulated by conservative constituencies 
to this day: The poor should not be “coddled” because they need to own their 
situations to change; the state should not interfere with market dynamics; the 
costs for ensuring a safety net of public services such as education and health 
will bankrupt the national treasury; and so forth. 
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The grim realities of living conditions and life expectancy for the working 
class in Western nations (Renwick focuses on Britain, but the same would 
apply elsewhere) gradually and cumulatively encouraged social movements 
advocating change. The rationale was certainly argued on moral grounds (e.g., 
the unreasonable use of the “poor house” to incarcerate those who could not 
repay debts), but also on pragmatic grounds – the cost of malnutrition, disease, 
and lack of education was a drag on national economies. Positions for and 
against became increasingly volatile around the turn of the twentieth century 
with struggles for unionisation, civil rights, and extending the voting franchise 
to women. This came to a head in the 1930s as a consequence of the economic 
collapse of Western economies during the Great Depression (Domhoff, 2013) 
and was cemented by the scale of need to deal with monumental recovery ef-
forts after World War II. 
In the 1930s–1980s, the scale of social interest, concern, and prioritisa-
tion of universalism paralleled development of the mass society paradigm 
(Buechler, 2013). Even earlier, universalism was trumpeted in the development 
of mass production and distribution in many industries: American Telephone 
and Telegraph (1885), General Electric (1892), General Motors (1908), Radio 
Corporation of America (1919), Universal Studios (1912), British Broadcasting 
Company (1922), and National Broadcasting Company (1926). These familiar 
corporate names emphasise the importance of scale and reach, with an obvious 
affection (or affectation) for national pride. 
Although the mass society paradigm was rooted in fears about potential 
alienation and isolation as a consequence of rapid urbanisation and advancing 
industrialisation, it had a brighter side in reflections on the potential for the 
new media of the day (broadcasting) to elevate public taste, improve general 
education, and strengthen national solidarity. This was especially pronounced 
in the philosophy of public service broadcasting as articulated in 1924 by John 
Reith, the first director general of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), 
in a book he titled Broadcast Over Britain – a curious phrase reflecting both 
an interest in universal reach in Britain and what Reith later described as “the 
brute force of monopoly” (Briggs, 1995: 217), which he considered essential 
to accomplish the public service broadcasting (PSB) enlightenment mission. As 
Hendy (2013: 13) observed, under this rubric broadcasting could be construed 
as a gift economy – something offered to all without the expectation of recip-
rocation with the “hope that in the process ordinary life might be made more 
interesting, more peaceful and more pleasurable”. 
As the chapter by Minna Aslama Horowitz and Gregory Ferrell Lowe il-
lustrates, the principle of universalism was a foundational ideal for PSB and a 
continuing normative mandate assigned to PSM by key stakeholders who dem-
onstrate considerable uniformity in expectations. This is evident in documents 
published by the European Broadcasting Union, the Public Media Alliance, the 
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Council of Europe, and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO). The pursuit of universalism remains a cornerstone of 
the public service mission in media. This being the case, two important questions 
immediately arise: 1) what are the key dimensions of universalism in practice, 
and 2) how achievable is the mission? 
Dimensions and complications in achieving universalism
Peter Goodwin, in his chapter “Universal – but not necessarily useful”, explores 
the history and legacy of PSB in Britain. Much of his discussion enjoys general 
application to other countries where PSB has long enjoyed an important pres-
ence. As elsewhere (if perhaps there first), in the UK universalist principles have 
mainly applied to “geographical universality” and “universality of appeal”. As 
he notes, these are fairly narrow concerns, and their definition has always been 
vague and bounded by numerous caveats. 
This view is supported in the analysis by Barbara Thomass in her chapter, 
“Universalism in history, modern statehood, and public service media”. Her 
analysis extends the dimensions somewhat on the basis of earlier work by Paddy 
Scannell (1989) about operational aspects for doing public service in media. 
Scannell posited four dimensions of universalism in public broadcasting: 1) 
access and reach (corresponding with geographical universality); 2) genres and 
services; 3) relevance and impact (both 2 and 3 are aspects for universality of 
appeal); and 4) financing and attendant obligations. 
The research by Karen Donders and Hilde Van den Bulck confirms these 
as core dimensions of the universalism mission in PSB across Europe. As they 
observe, from their start, public broadcasters have been required to provide 
the same quality and availability of services to every citizen at a national level. 
This legitimates an important asset for PSB, that is the justification to receive 
public funding. But it faces complications that have become critical with the 
growth of international media conglomerates and the splintering of national 
audiences into segmented communities of interest. 
In the analogue era, universal reach was easier than universal appeal. 
Broadcasting companies had monopolies or oligopolies in the era of media 
scarcity. Matters of personal preference and taste publics were never easy to 
accommodate with one or a few generalist channels. This goes some distance 
in explaining the explosive growth of commercial broadcasting in Europe in 
the 1990s. Today, both aspects of universal service are difficult to ensure, not 
only because over-the-air is declining and on-demand is growing, but also 
because many countries have privatised transmission networks (as also noted 
by Goodwin in his chapter). And today’s realities indicate pressing concerns 
about overcoming a stubborn digital divide. 
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As for universal appeal, public broadcasters have primarily addressed na-
tional populations as a collective community – although never entirely and 
typically with a “high rail” bias (Lowe et al., 2016). The need to serve everyone 
on an equitable basis pleased few on a continual basis, but it did ensure a mix-
ture of programmed genres in efforts to serve diverse interests and population 
demographics (Van den Bulck, 2001). The pursuit of universal appeal remains 
relevant for PSM companies but is ever more difficult to achieve in an environ-
ment characterised by media abundance as platforms and channels multiply 
(Donders, 2012). Arguably, the most difficult and costly achievement today is 
producing a mass audience. The value of that has risen sharply as its produc-
tion has become scarcer (Doyle, 2013), one important reason accounting for 
soaring costs to obtain distribution rights for sports programming – one of the 
few genres that can still produce a mass audience (Mahon, 2017). 
The universal service obligation is even more challenging in the digital media 
environment, a reality that is thematic in this collection. As Goodwin notes 
in his chapter, increasingly pervasive distribution of content over the Internet 
has largely undone the principle of geographical universality, and mixed genre 
general channels are no longer very popular due to the proliferation of niche 
options that undermine the universality of appeal. Universalism has fallen out 
of favour in part because it is less achievable.
This suggests problems beyond difficulties, perhaps impossibilities, with 
fulfilling the two key dimensions treated so far, problems that are keyed to 
making the transition from PSB to PSM (Lowe & Bardoel, 2007). This collec-
tion addresses some of critical importance. 
Contextual limitations in the pursuit of universalism
A variety of contextual factors have made it increasingly difficult to pursue the 
universalism mission as historically conceived. Several chapters in this collec-
tion address important contextual factors, including geography and population 
characteristics of a country, the dynamics of media market competition, chal-
lenges related to ex ante evaluation, questions about the public value of PSM, 
and issues related to purview. 
Regarding the first factor, David Skinner analyses the evolution of man-
dated universalism requirements for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) in “Historical dimensions of universalism at the Canadian Broadcast-
ing Corporation: Some implications for today”. The pursuit of this mission 
has persistently challenged the CBC due to its operational context. Canada is 
among the largest and most diverse countries in the world, consisting of 13 
provinces and territories with two official languages (English and French) and 
a broad range of Aboriginal populations that are widely spread and speak as 
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many as 60 languages – representing just under a quarter of million speakers 
(Statistics Canada, 2011). 
Since its origins in the 1930s, the CBC has been legislatively mandated to 
provide programming for all Canadians. Skinner’s analysis highlights limitations 
in the potential to fulfill the universalism mission that hinge on the complex 
interaction of geographic and population characteristics combined with stub-
born financial constraints. Canadian legislation requires the CBC to provide 
comprehensive content that is, among other characteristics: predominantly and 
distinctively Canadian, regionally reflective, culturally expressive, contributing 
to shared national consciousness and identity, multicultural, multiracial, and 
should be widely available (Broadcasting Act, 1991: part 1, section 3m). While 
the universalism principle is comprehensively encapsulated in the legislation, 
and effectively unchanged from the Act’s passing in 1991 to the present day, 
fully realising this mandate in practice has been a nearly impossible mission, 
as is the case for many PSM organisations around the world. The universalism 
mission is especially challenging in Canada due to its enormity in geographic 
territory and the degree of multicultural complexity. Much smaller territories 
like the UK (comprised of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) 
and Germany (with great differences between populations in the east and west 
as well as the north and south) are severely challenged as well. 
Julie Münter Lassen, in “Multichannel strategy, universalism, and the chal-
lenge of audience fragmentation”, tackles complications posed by PSM’s need 
to adapt to competition in commercial media markets, which is another broadly 
characteristic contextual factor today. As she makes clear, PSM companies need 
to achieve competitive success and this has encouraged a range of adaptations 
in approaches and priorities that are characteristic of the private commercial 
approach. In her analysis of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) and 
the Danish media market, she observes that upwards of 45 domestic television 
channels are available for a market of less than six-million people. Every PSB 
company in Europe has added new radio and television channels since the early 
1990s that are profiled to reach targeted audiences that are variously defined. 
Some are intended to appeal to particular age groups, especially children (see 
the chapter by Donders & Hilde Van den Bulck) and teenagers or young adults. 
Some are defined by genre, especially channels for news and sports. And some are 
intended to serve the multicultural interests of increasingly diverse populations. 
As Münter Lassen observes, this explosion of choices seems to “tick the 
box” for improving the potential to achieve universality in reach and appeal. 
But while this has some merit, she critiques “multichannelism” for contributing 
to the fragmentation of audiences and segmentation of publics – a point made 
earlier by Scannell (1990), as she notes. She further observes that the increasing 
focus on PSM instead of PSB encourages a multiplication of channels across an 
expanding array of platforms. 
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While this has potential instrumental value for pursuing the universal mis-
sion, it undoubtedly contributes to an increasing focus on personal tastes and 
individual preferences rather than the raison d’être for PSB, which is to serve a 
general public and society’s collective needs and interests. We again observe the 
embedded dialectic. Her primary concern is whether DR’s strategic response to 
compete effectively by attracting enough audiences to legitimate its importance 
as a PSM provider might not, paradoxically, undermine that very legitimacy. 
She doesn’t see any realistic alternative to offering more channels as a portfolio, 
but encourages deeper thought about how to orient and operate the portfolio 
“as a unified offer or a series of discrete channels”. 
The chapter by Christina Gransow, “A question of value or further re-
striction? Public value as a core concept”, investigates the impact of public 
value testing on five PSM providers in Europe, with a focus on how they 
have implemented new services intended to extend universal provision in the 
digital media enviroment. She shares the concerns of Münter Lassen that the 
multiplication of channels by PSB providers could undermine the universalism 
mission in a paradoxical way because, although intended to reach everyone 
with some channel or channels, their multiplication divides audiences into 
niches that PSM companies are producing. Her assessment of public value 
tests highlights a number of complicated questions: What universal values 
are centrally involved in serving the democratic, social, and cultural needs 
of a society? How are these values measured and by whom? Is the public 
involved, and if so, how much and with what impact? As treated in an ear-
lier RIPE Reader (Martin & Lowe, 2014), PSM is caught in the dilemma of 
being required to serve everyone on an equitable basis without disturbing or 
distorting commercial markets. But as Christiana Grasnow observes in her 
chapter, the universalist mission of public service media must consider larger 
principles; “essentially, the democratic, social, and cultural structure of a 
country is crucial to determining public value”.
Karen Donders and Hilde Van den Bulck have done considerable earlier work 
on ex ante evaluation. In their contribution for this collection, “Universality of 
public service media and preschool audiences: The choice against a dedicated 
television channel in Flanders”, they focus on an important case for Belgium’s 
Vlaamse Radio en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) in its efforts to provide 
services for Flemish-speaking children. They thoroughly analyse the degree to 
which the universalism argument that was made by VRT, to justify whether the 
initiative was considered and treated as credible by the Flemish public regula-
tor. They found the regulator privileged the commercial logic of private sector 
competitors instead, although the opinions of commercial broadcasters were 
not substantiated by evidence. The private sector’s interests disproportionally 
impacted the regulator’s assessment of VRT’s proposal and eventually resulted 
in a negative decision despite evidence from the PSM company that the market 
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impact would be quite limited and the public interest motivation was quite high. 
The authors conclude that although the universalism mandate is highlighted 
in Dutch media policy as a principle, in practice it is not taken seriously and 
decisions are “based on opaque, qualitative assessments of arguments”. In con-
sequence, “overall, the entire process created the illusion of serving the public 
while being an exercise to have public broadcasters serve the media market 
rather than society and its citizens”.
An extreme case of public service, apparently at the service of the market 
but with unitary state incentives to temper both the market interests and the 
non-government public interests, is discussed in the chapter by Olga Dovbysh 
and Tatiana Belyuga: “Whose voices and what values? State grants for signifi-
cant public content in the Russian media model”. Analysing the structure of 
current Russian media funding, this research investigates how forms of state 
support lead to paternalistic effects on media decisions. The research dem-
onstrates that the mechanism of grants itself has some limitations in serving 
public needs. Two main groups of topics were found: typical public-related 
ones (culture, history, etc.) and the topics related to the official agenda of the 
government. The structure of state incentives means that public service top-
ics are defined by journalists in ways that anticipate which topics and angles 
will be relevant to and supported by political officials. As such, they argue, 
only those voices that do not contradict the official political agenda receive 
public funding support.
Finally, as regards issues of purview, we have already touched on constraints 
posed by virtue of PSM’s national purview. Although the ethos and intentions of 
public service provision in media are arguably universal in merit and the sector 
is internationally affiliated through nongovernmental organisations (e.g., the 
European Broadcasting Union and the Public Media Alliance), the operational 
focus and locus of control for PSM is national. International services have been 
provided by several companies, including the BBC in Britain and Nippon Hōsō 
Kyōkai (NHK) in Japan, but recent years have seen sharp declines in investment 
and prioritisation of such services (Plunkett, 2015). Even so, within national 
boundaries, PSB has long struggled to serve local communities on a universal 
basis and with the same quality and variety of services. 
This issue is addressed in the chapter by Aleksandar Kocic and Jelena Milicev, 
“Challenges for public service radio in small nations: Lessons from Scotland”. 
Their analysis of BBC Radio Scotland indicates that the provider offers only a 
limited Scottish news service for regional interests, or perhaps Scotland’s na-
tional interests, depending on one’s perspective in the post-Brexit context. Lo-
cal and community news provision is available only online, which they found 
does not include “local hard news” or “civic affairs news”, which help inform 
the political activity of citizens. Their argument resonates in other countries 
with strong regional identities, diverse languages, and multicultural identities. 
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Such services can be quite popular, as with Radio Suomi – a regional network 
of services provided by Yleisradio Oy (Yle), the Finnish public service media 
company (Finnpanel, 2019). Yle radio overall reaches about one-third of Finns 
on a daily basis and a little more than 50 per cent weekly. Of the total, Radio 
Suomi accounts for 20 per cent of the total daily reach and nearly one-third 
of the weekly. But here, as elsewhere, the risk of dwindling support for local 
and regional PSM is high, as documented in a 2016 report published by the 
European Audiovisual Observatory (Cappello, 2016).
PSM companies have long been criticised for an elitist view of their publics 
and for having a capitol-centric perspective (Lowe & Hujanen, 2003). This ac-
counts for significant investments in regional service operations over the years. 
The justification has been premised on fulfilling the universalism mission at 
regional and local levels. With varying degrees of success and in myriad ways, 
PSB has sought to create a better balance between the national audience and 
regional voices and perspectives. Worrisomely, the resources and efforts to 
continue this have been declining in broadcasting and increasingly pushed to 
online platforms. Kocic and Milicev treat the issues in useful detail. 
Thus far, we have discussed historic challenges and contemporary constraints 
in fulfilling mandates for the universalism mission in PSM. There are also in-
teresting developments that encourage a conceptual reframing of the mission. 
Several contributions in this volume address aspects of growing importance in 
that pursuit. 
New dimensions of universalism in concept and practice
The universalism mission would arguably be better served if public involvement 
were better facilitated across a range of strategic and tactical areas. This is not a 
new insight. Indeed, The Public in Public Service Media was the title and focus 
of an earlier conference and RIPE Reader (Lowe, 2009). At issue here is how to 
stimulate and incorporate proactive public participation not only as a resource 
for content and source of political support, but also in strategic planning practice. 
The chapter by Donders and Van den Bulck calls for a more universal and 
accessible public service orientation in regulatory processes and decision-making 
to create a more open and even playing field for public involvement in the sec-
tor. This touches on a thorny problem that has persisted since the mid-2000s: 
how to ensure a sufficiency of value to a large enough proportion of a national 
public to legitimate the cost of PSM? In principle, the value of services needs 
to be sufficiently universal to justify the expense for the public. Securing suf-
ficiency of value at an adequate degree of universality is no mean feat in today’s 
increasingly fragmented media markets where political support is uncertain at 
best and often antagonistic. 
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The chapter by Horowitz and Lowe emphasises the importance of collabo-
rating with diverse stakeholders to represent a reasonable scope of universality. 
This is important not only to support PSM institutions as such, but to actively, 
effectively, and rapidly respond to threats posed by the proliferation of false infor-
mation, siloed information habits, and growing distrust in the media. These are 
among the most alarming challenges for digital media markets everywhere today 
and indicate escalating complications which the authors treat as “information 
disorder”. These phenomena impact trust in media at all societal levels – global, 
regional, national, and local – and are enabled by the interaction of sociocultural 
and technological transformations that have destabilised media systems. Regaining 
trust must involve a broad cross section of stakeholders, not only PSM organi-
sations and NGOs but also commercial, governmental, and civic agencies. The 
capabilities of PSM organisations to counter these phenomena requires a new 
approach to universalism that prioritises and operationalises collaboration by all.
The good news, they observe, is that in Europe those involved with making 
media policy often mention PSM – and sometimes prioritise it – as a vitally 
important part of the solution toolkit. The bad news is, unfortunately, PSM is 
not strongly supported in most of the world and is taking hits even in Europe 
where the legacy of PSB is comparatively strong. The evidence suggests growing 
ambivalence about public media. The problem of “media capture” by authori-
tarian governments is an added complication. This is why Horowitz and Lowe 
advocate a more inclusive understanding of who is responsible for, and able 
to provide, public services in media. They emphasise perspectives from media 
scholars and policy makers that public services are delivered by varied sources 
and all of them are needed today. Some are PSM organisations that function as 
legally mandated institutions – that is, public service from the de jure perspective 
(in law). But many public services in media are not institutionally designed and 
mandated operations – they are de facto providers. These examples provide 
ample evidence that collaboration can produce effective solutions for addressing 
information disorder and an argument that, in doing so, these providers pave 
a way forward to accomplish a renewed universalism mission.
In his contribution, “Personalised universalism in the age of algorithms”, 
Jannick Kirk Sørensen addresses the paradoxical relationship between the uni-
versalism principle in the analogue era of media scarcity with personalisation 
in the digital era of abundance. He wonders how the principle of universalism 
can be maintained as a core value proposition given a sweeping “return” to 
individual communication, which actually characterised early intentions for 
radio that did not materialise. Sørensen argues that today we have a “globalised 
technical universalism” – a form of universalism subject to algorithmic program-
ming and protocol rules that are outside the control of PSM content creators, 
and mostly also for national regulators. The language of coding and for web 
and app design interfaces provide the rules that are the most truly universal 
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things in media today. This, he argues, means that “the contents and services 
offered on popular platforms can only be universally accessed if they adhere to 
the general coding and design requirements that pertain to a platform”, most 
of which are commercial. 
Sørensen proposes the pursuit of “personalised enlightenment” as having 
universal value for individuals to improve collective understandings and encour-
age mutual respect. He observes the need for a shared platform offering a range 
of content and formats that facilitate participation at diverse levels of educa-
tion. This seems a worthy objective for PSM institutions, but as he observes, 
one problem that needs resolution is a tension between “professionals who 
are responsible for creating meaning by producing programmes” and platform 
operators who are responsible for “optimising the potential for exposure – that 
is, data scientists, data curators, and marketing departments”. This problem has 
become increasingly evident inside PSM organisations in their efforts to become 
tri-media companies, and is a cross-sector complication because content makers 
and digital network operators are not in the same “business”. 
The chapter by Lizzie Jackson rounds out our collection. In “Datafication, 
fluidity, and organisational change: Towards a universal PSM 3.0”, she reviews 
a range of organisational structures that are now necessary to deliver datafied 
and nuanced content to a variety of taste publics and audience formations. 
Today, digital content must be capable of delivery to mass audiences, to groups 
of various size in varying types, and to individuals to accommodate personal 
preferences in the on-demand environment. Her chapter draws on the results 
of 150 interviews in an international four-year funded study about PSM in the 
digital environment. (2015–2019). The project explores for the first time the 
internal organisational cultures and knowledge exchange mechanisms of ten 
high-technology clusters in North America and Europe, including Toronto, 
which his highlighted in her chapter.
Analysis of the level of engagement between high technology firms and 
“in proximity” PSMs was included in the study, which strongly supports 
understanding the importance of PSM on the basis of maintaining the fluid-
ity needed to evolve in a highly unstable and dynamic set of media industries. 
This is essential for achieving visibility and building relevance for the broadest 
cross section of publics as audiences and users. In this view, universalism in the 
digital environment can be operationalised by embracing three strategic priori-
ties: 1) datafication to enable the automated nuancing of content; 2) increased 
collaborative production via networked technologists; and 3) creating more 
agile organisational structures that are not only less rigid internally, but with 
porous boundaries to encourage robust external involvement. 
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Conclusion: Paradoxes, challenges, and development
This anthology provides a timely discourse on the universalism mission in the 
twenty-first century, making a case for continuing relevance while acknowledg-
ing an enormous range and degree of complication in realising the mission in 
practice. Far from being an anachronistic conceit, the mission has both ethical 
and instrumental importance today. It has ethical importance for the normative 
justification of the public service orientation in the digital media environment. 
It has instrumental importance for pursuing every reasonable avenue for ena-
bling that orientation to achieve legal mandates to ensure every citizen is fairly 
served by contemporary media systems. This is especially important given the 
downgrading of social responsibility as a principled priority in media systems 
as whole. 
Thematic to the collection is an essential paradox we have highlighted 
in this introductory chapter as a persistent tension between collective needs 
and individual rights – between the societal and the individual. The two are 
inseparable in practice and can thus be described as a dialectical tension. The 
contributions to this anthology treat that paradox from varied perspectives that 
are useful for developing theory and supporting practice; the first in normative 
conceptualisation and the latter in strategic legitimation. 
At the same time, the collection makes clear that the universalism mission 
is more than an idea – it is an ideal, a conceptualisation of something most 
suitable, even perfect. As such, the universalism mission has never been as fully 
achieved as ideally conceived and desired. That does not lessen its importance. 
The pursuit of universal public service is aspirational, and for those who em-
brace this, it is also inspirational. 
Universalism is a complex ideal, a complicated pursuit, and a considerable 
challenge – more so today than before the digitalisation of media systems and 
products. It is also a new frontier ripe for redevelopment in both conceptual 
and operational terms. 
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Chapter 2
Universalism in history, modern statehood, 
and public service media
Barbara Thomass
Abstract
Starting from a brief explanation of universalistic thinking, this contribution inves-
tigates the philosophical origins and dimensions of universalism and its historical 
development. It reveals contradictory implications of the concept and shows how 
it became a significant influence in philosophy about the state. It sketches the 
development from the Greek polis and the Roman Empire, via the philosophy 
of Enlightenment and the French Revolution to the twentieth century and the 
debate about universal human rights. The concept of universalism is presented 
as one of the grounds for welfare state policies. This establishes a background 
and framework for understanding the universal service obligation that remains 
fundamental to the legitimacy of public service media.
Keywords: human rights, Western values, Enlightenment, universal service obliga-
tion, particularism, welfare state 
Introduction
“One Policy, One System, Universal Service” was the claim made by AT&T 
(American Telephone and Telegraph) in 1907 (Lasar, 2011). In return for mo-
nopoly status, AT&T promised that every user of a telephone device would be 
able to reach anyone else with a telephone device. Universal access and service 
– for a price, of course. Use did not require membership in several networks. 
The rationale and approach has a background that points in two directions: to 
the past and to the future. To the past because the principle of universal service 
hearkens back to a complex philosophical realm about the concept of universal-
ism. In its practical and broadly statutory implementation, the universal service 
obligation became the role model for many services the modern welfare state 
provides citizens. The universal service obligation is both a challenge and an 
open question for today’s digital society. 
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This contribution investigates the philosophical origins and dimensions of 
universalism and its historical development. It reveals contradictory implications 
of the concept and shows how it became a significant influence in philosophy 
about the state. The concept is one of the grounds for welfare state policies. 
This establishes a background and framework for understanding the universal 
service obligation that remains fundamental to the legitimacy of public service 
media (PSM).
What is universalism?
Universalism is derived from the Latin word universalis, which means “general”. 
This ideal indicates an assumption and claim that all the diversity of reality as a 
whole can be traced to a single principle or law of order. From this, it follows, 
that ideas, ideals, rights, and obligations apply in principle to all human beings. 
Universalism is therefore a perspective that prioritises the whole of an entity 
above singularity, and generality above specificity. The concept contends that 
some principles and norms are valid for all human beings. 
In societal application, universalism is operationalised in rules and practices 
that have general widespread value. To work properly, these rules must be 
generally accepted by society and internalised by its members. When effective, 
universally applicable rules are a proper basis for the pursuit of justice and 
provide clarity about conditions and obligations that apply to each and all. 
Good relations are secondary to fairness and equity. Exceptions to the rules 
are resisted. 
Universalism can be observed in individualistic societies, as is clearly the case 
for many Western societies. The prevailing emphasis on social justice, maintain-
ing order, and being able to plan in a thoughtful, rational way are based on 
respect for values that are presumed to be universal and are considered positive 
and beneficial for the welfare of all. The disadvantages are keyed to degrees of 
inflexibility and rigidity in patterns of required adherence to values and rules. 
Defenders of universalism have been accused of ignoring cultural differences 
and promoting Western values, which indicate an attitude of ethnocentrism 
(Benhabib, 1994; Donnelly, 2003; Marko, 2012; Namli, 2018; Vattimo, 2007). 
This brief overview of universalism hints towards a complex development 
of thinking about “the universal” that spans from ancient Greece to the French 
Revolution and beyond. The ideal that some fundamental things are universal 
and should be respected as such is cornerstone to significant codifications per-
taining to the rights and liberties of free peoples. This is evident, for example, 
in the American Declaration of Independence that claims “all men are created 
equal”. Thus, the context of universalism has been usefully applied from the 
broadest and most fundamental claims of universal rights to technical systems 
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of communication, transportation, and other matters of social welfare. It is 
timeless in principle because universalism claims that, once identified, universal 
values are all-encompassing and always valid. 
Today such claims are less often accepted as valid and are often challenged. 
The all-embracing pretension of universalism has been challenged by its con-
ceptual counterpart: particularism – the attitude that underlines the specifics of 
single cases, the uniqueness of a given culture, or the individuality of a person. 
The degree to which universalism is universal is arguable. The claim has limits 
because in application the practice excludes certain groups – typically minorities 
– and the disadvantaged in various ways. The principle is more transcendent 
than the practice. As hinted in the American claim above, the universalism of 
human rights excluded women until they won their rights through struggle. 
After this short explanation of the concept of universalism, we will see how 
the development of universalist thinking became an influential intellectual 
abstraction about the nature and value of the human being that has inspired 
political philosophers and the political shaping of societies. 
How did universalism emerge and develop?
Universalism emerged not as a fact in the real world but rather as an intellectual 
reality or construct. The principle of quod semper, quod ubique, quod omnibus 
(Toennies, 2001) – forever, everywhere, for everybody – postulated that, from 
a distanced viewpoint, all human beings are equal. This thought became a 
manifestation of material power.
In their search for principles for the good conduct of living, Plato and 
Aristotle articulated guidelines for a fair and just government. These Greek 
philosophers were early advocates of universalism. They constructed views of 
an ideal state in which every free man (only) is empowered and appointed to 
discuss and decide public affairs in open debate. The Greek polis corresponds 
to this phenomenon that contains a germ of universalism. 
The Roman philosopher Seneca addressed the tension between those included 
in the universal and those excluded: “Although everything is permitted against 
a slave, there is something that is not permitted by the common right of every 
living being against a human being, because he is the same nature as you” (as 
cited by Toennies, 2001: 66). Later in ancient Rome, there was a fundamental 
shift in their legal system. The legal rights of the paterfamilias – the head of a 
greater family – were extended to every Roman citizen, to the effect that every 
man was at liberty to act on his own rights. This grounds a point that Talcott 
Parsons stipulated: “Modern society originated only in a single evolutionary 
arena, the West, i.e. essentially in Europe, which inherited the legacy of the 
western half of the Roman Empire” (Parsons, 1971: 10). This aligns with the 
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views of Max Weber (1930) who, in his work on The Protestant Ethic, posited 
that cultural phenomena occurred on the soil of the Occident which were of 
universal significance and validity in a developmental direction.
This strand of philosophic history suggests a noble ideal, but also indicates 
good reason for associating universalism with the critique of imperialism. All 
too willingly, Western thinking has claimed for too long and too exclusively 
advances in human progress for itself, and has relegated other societies and 
cultures as backward and in deficit by its own self-acclaimed standards. While 
valid, any outline of the history of universalism requires acknowledging the 
significance of the Greek polis and the Roman empire.
Toennies describes the origins of universalism as endeavouring to legitimate 
the claims of a group (i.e., the particular and not all groups), amid competing 
claims by other groups in differentiating society (Toennies, 1995). This aligns 
with Schweppenhaeuser (1998) who claims that early stages of bourgeois self-
knowledge were characterised by the will to assert oneself as a particular social 
group fighting for the preservation of their prerogatives against the central 
power of a community and the nobility of a given time.
The idea and ideal of unalienable individual rights emerged in the Enlight-
enment, which created the basis for the modern notion of universalism that 
is based on a recognition of the power of the human spirit. Since the reign of 
Cromwell in Britain, individual rights were articulated in this modern sense. 
Locke articulated an understanding of universalism as the constitutional right 
of all individuals. These and other philosophers of Enlightenment, including 
Hobbes, aimed to identify general laws for all mankind and to follow them 
as such.
All of this explains why universal is not manifest in the material world, but 
is an influential intellectual abstraction about the nature and value of the hu-
man spirit. The French Revolution converted these intellectual claims into a 
basis for real power in the timeless triad of “liberty, equality, and fraternity”. 
The proclamations of a revolutionary bourgeoisie, especially the Declaration 
of Human and Civil Rights of 1789 and the French Constitution of 1791, 
transformed the particular bourgeois interest into a universal human interest. 
The constitutions of modern societies almost universally believe citoyens in 
democracies have the same freedom rights and the right of self-preservation.
Nonetheless, the foregoing has already noted the persistent problem that 
universalistic thought, since its inception, has never referred to everyone in 
practice but always to select groups. Beyond this privileged selection, the same 
“universal” rights were not accorded to large groups of people: slaves, women, 
colonised peoples, children, and so forth. Societies have made corrective pro-
gress, however, and today the universalism principle is being extended to the 
idea of animal protection, the rights of animals, and also the rights of nature. 
The universal is becoming more universal than before. 
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But the underlying problem persists. François Noël Babeuf, an agitator 
during the French Revolution and founder of the Conspiracy of the Equals, 
was among the first to point out the inherent contradiction of universalism – a 
philosophic claim of rights for all that in practice excludes many. He took the 
French Revolution’s idea of equality to a radically serious degree and, with 
his notion that all people are factually equal and should enjoy equal rights 
and conditions also in economic terms, created the first attempt to realise the 
concept of a classless society in political practice (Buonarroti, 1909). Later 
socialists referred to him. 
Karl Marx, author of the seminal Capital: A Critique of Political Economy 
and of the political pamphlet The Communist Manifesto, defended the idea of 
a classless society in which no one should have privileges resulting from posses-
sion of the means of production. While he had claimed to turn the philosophical 
thinking of Hegel upside down – which means to ascribe to it a material base 
– we can state that Marx has turned universalism upside down, as he spelled 
out the material prerequisites of equality.
Universalism in the twentieth century
In the twentieth century, individual rights as a universal enfranchisement were 
codified in the International Declaration of Human Rights. This was the result 
of a long process in which the idea of human rights gained a symbolic and 
politically fundamental significance for thinking about how to create a more 
peaceful world order. The profound crises experienced in the international order 
during the second half of the twentieth century inspired reflection on how to 
create a fairer world order.
These crises include the devastation of World War II, independence for former 
colonies and the often messy aftermath, an awareness of the interdependence 
of states that spread in the 1970s, and the dissolution of Soviet power with 
the collapse of socialist states in the 1990s. Also important, after 1945, was 
the question of how to organise the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals. 
This revived the debate as to whether there were inalienable rights that would 
validate the intervention of the international community. The judgments handed 
down in the Nuremberg Trials were based on the conviction that individuals 
– regardless of respective national legislation – had a range of universal rights 
that warranted the conviction of war criminals on this basis (Sands, 2016).
The creation of the United Nations (UN), whose founding documents include 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was a grandiose step forward in the 
codification of universal rights and the confession that they apply universally 
to all individuals on earth. This did not emerge from a vacuum. In the 1920s, 
international law scholars and internationally oriented lawyers had given 
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thought to the meaning and possibility of international human rights. From 
1948 onwards, the concept has been a persistent and foundational aspect of 
the human rights system that grounds the UN. This establishment of the UN 
was linked to the question of how more effective mechanisms of international 
security and peacekeeping could be established (Eckel, 2019). This was fol-
lowed by the confirmation of a human rights regime in the Council of Europe, 
adopted as a corresponding convention in 1950.
The leaders of anti-colonial struggle relied on the promise of human rights to 
legitimate their cause, but did not shy away from noting the persistent problem 
of a hypocritical Western deception which they had experienced for centuries. 
Human rights were not universal in the practice of the colonial masters (Nk-
rumah, 1962). In the United Nations General Assembly, in which the former 
colonial states had the same voting rights as all members, past human rights 
violations were discussed. In escalations of the Cold War, the culprits of the 
most violent abuses of human rights were accused. This also contributed to 
the instrumentalisation of human rights discourse for respective international 
interests (Westad, 2007). 
Significant advances are evident in the Declaration on the Grant of Independ-
ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960, the inclusion of the right to 
self-determination of peoples in UN rules in 1966, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1965 (Jensen, 2016). These 
are milestones on the road to universal rights in the international order (UN, 
1994). The attempt of the former colonial states to wrest the commitment to a 
new world economic order from the industrialised West in the 1970s was also 
based on the idea of human rights and their universality. Although this did not 
bring any immediate result, and was hotly contested by the US in particular, a 
right to development was proclaimed in 1986 (OHCHR, 1986).
In the 1970s, there emerged a new and growing awareness of environmental 
hazards caused by humans as a consequence of industrialisation. The impor-
tance of resource management and the need for sustainability has grown in the 
decades since, accompanied by the idea of a universal claim across generations 
to an intact environment (Kaiser & Meyer, 2016; Macekura, 2015).
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process in 
Europe, the activities of opponents of dictatorship in Latin America, and dis-
sidents in Eastern Europe, as well as the growing emphasis on human rights in 
the Global South, dramatically demonstrate the diversity of national, cultural, 
and historic contexts in which protagonists of universal rights operate. These also 
demonstrate the volatility and difficulty of advancing a unified political project. 
Nevertheless, universal human rights have become a persistent issue and is now 
a foreign policy reference point for many Western governments (and beyond).
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of dictatorships in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, the Philippines, and South Korea, as well as Greece, Portugal, 
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and Spain, and the fall of the apartheid regime in South Africa, have given 
rise to the hope that universal human rights could be enforced worldwide. At 
the 1993 UN Human Rights Conference, 171 states declared their support 
for the universal application of human rights (OHCHR, 1993). The question 
is not in the principle but rather the practice: How should and would this 
be implemented, and should international interventions to enforce rights be 
universally recognised? That is the subject of ongoing debates in the face of 
diverse conflict situations.
In postmodern thought, universalism is subject to a variety of criticisms. 
The most far-reaching critique is drawn from the impossibility of achievement 
because the world and its inhabitants are too diverse to be subsumed under a 
universal view. Another powerful critique from the cultural perspective links this 
to the problem of relativism. Perhaps less is universal than particular because 
everything is relative to varying degrees. Moreover, who are the protagonists 
of Western societies that they should be allowed to proclaim their values as 
having general validity? European human rights concepts arise from a specifi-
cally European civil, liberal, and secular historical project, as earlier indicated 
in our brief look at Greek and Roman philosophers. Therefore – so the argu-
ment goes – they cannot easily (or at all!) be “transferred” to other cultures.
Another serious critique stems from a multiculturalist perspective. As Juergen 
Habermas keenly observed, “behind universalistic legal claims are concealed the 
particular assertiveness of a particular collective on a regular basis” [translated] 
(Habermas, 1997: n.p.). Habermas believes the moral universe extends to all 
natural persons, however, and in that light has been regarded as perhaps the 
most famous living “universalist” (Koehl, 2003).
The fact that all existing societies do not grant universal rights to all people 
does not make the idea obsolete or invalid. The problem in the formulation of 
human rights, and especially in their establishment as rights for all humans, 
hinges on factors that prevent their realisation, and these are constitutively 
inscribed (Schweppenhaeuser, 1998). Property, security, and freedom are the 
central criteria of universal human rights but also equated with individual 
rights, especially in antagonistic competitive societies that do not question 
the appropriateness of a capitalist orientation. This creates a contradictory 
situation: The foundation of human rights – which has a universal claim to 
validity – and the worldwide establishment of social conditions that would not 
only permit this formulation, but almost require it, at the same time blocking 
their realisation. 
The continuation of freedom and property rights based on universal human 
rights has enormous implications for the media sector in democratic societies 
and for democratic rights as such, which are also based on universalism but 
are in conflict. I address this next. 
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Universalism in modern statehood  
and its significance for public service media
The step from universalism as a philosophical tradition of thought to the uni-
versal claim of citizens to certain state services of general interest is enormous. 
It is generally explained with reference to the construction of a welfare state. 
The principle of equality, which is so important for democratic states, has never 
been fully realised, as noted above. This is mainly due to prevailing owner-
ship structures and discrepancies between rich and poor citizens. In an ongo-
ing struggle over conflicting ideas on how to reconcile freedom and equality, 
modern democracies have increasingly set themselves the task of providing at 
least equal opportunities for all citizens to live in dignity and have an essential 
degree of social security.
This is how the modern welfare state was created, with the essential task of 
subsidising certain meritorious goods that the market does not or cannot provide 
due to the need for profitability. Perhaps some degree of supply is provided 
by the market, but not to a sufficient extent in relation to the need for these 
goods. Such merit goods include education, security (including social security), 
public infrastructure, and culture. These are services that benefit everyone in 
a society, that is, the public at large. Hence, they must be provided as public 
services. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, mediated social 
communication was defined as a merit good.
The principle that media are merit goods that can and should be made 
available to every citizen to the same extent and at the same quality is the core 
value of the universal service obligation. The obligation implies a universal 
human right and requires societies to provide an adequate infrastructure for 
their delivery and performance. Everyone should be reached by postal services, 
everyone should be supplied with electricity, everyone has a right to clean water 
and air, and all people need access to a telephone connection – and today, access 
to the Internet. People who are not able to access online media suffer a “digital 
deficit” that puts them, and their life chances, at risk, compared with people 
who have access. This is especially true for the citizen’s right to be informed. 
Golding (2017) argues that despite the abundance of information available 
online, there is a growing inequality of access to quality information. This 
deficit of access to high quality online services can, when it comes to deficits 
of quality of information, translate into a citizen detriment (Thomass, 2019).
The debate about the implementation of universal services has always cen-
tred on the scope and quality of service. Today, for example, the question in 
modern industrial societies is not only whether Internet access exists, but also 
whether it meets the requirements of broadband connection.
The invention of public service broadcasting (PSB) had its origins almost 100 
years ago and was established in many countries that were structured by policy 
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and practice to provide universal services as social welfare states. This orienta-
tion recognises a valid demand for universality of infrastructure, culture, and 
social communication via media as an institution whose central characteristic 
and obligation is the pursuit of universality of service. In 1986, the then London-
based think tank Broadcasting Research Unit defined PSB with the following 
characteristics, in which the notion of universality has a central place (1986):
 • Universality (geographic) – broadcast programmes should be available to 
the whole population.
 • Universality (of appeal) – broadcast programmes should cater to all in-
terests and tastes.
 • Universality (of payment) – one main instrument of broadcasting should 
be directly funded by the corpus of users.
 • Minorities, especially disadvantaged minorities, should receive particular 
provision.
 • Broadcasters should recognise their special relationship to the sense of 
national identity and community.
 • Broadcasting should be distanced from all vested interests, and in particular 
from those of the government of the day.
 • Broadcasting should be structured so as to encourage competition in good 
programming rather than competition for numbers.
 • The public guidelines for broadcasting should be designed to liberate 
rather than restrict the programme makers.
Universal availability plays a central role and has social, technical, and economic 
components. Universalism is fundamental to the provision of broadcasting as 
a merit good in the public interest. The other essential element is a broad spec-
trum of different programmes, formats, genres, and so forth on a channel –in 
short, diversity (Scannell, 1992). In this light, the principle of universalism has 
four dimensions in broadcasting: 1) access and reach; 2) genres and services; 
3) relevance and impact; and 4) financing with attendant obligations. Provid-
ing universal service has been and remains a legal requirement for PSB and, 
more recently, PSM. This has crucial importance for the potential of media to 
cultivate enlightenment, encourage social cohesion, and provide a fair, full, and 
equitable range of media services.
There is another line of important argumentation that still legitimates uni-
versalism in media that has significant implications today. This is the argument 
for media responsibility – the social responsibility of media – to strengthen de-
mocracy. Universalism is a prerequisite for realising that mandate as a project of 
addressing universal rights. From this perspective, citizens’ communication and 
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information rights are the focus of discussion: “The logic is simple. Democracy 
needs citizens who are equally informed; thus, they must be guaranteed equal 
access to all relevant information” (Nieminen, 2019: 58). This makes the case 
for citizens’ communication and information rights explicit. The basic elements 
are derived from, among others, international treaties and conventions such 
as the UN Declarations of Human Rights, the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union (Nieminen & Aslama Horowitz, 2016). Nieminen proposes five areas 
of communication and information rights, which all refer to the universalist 
claim of rights: rights to access, availability, critical competence, dialogue, and 
privacy (Nieminen, 2019: 58).
Mandates for mediated social communication via PSM that is accessible to 
all citizens acquires its special significance and legitimacy as a subsequent effect 
of the principles of freedom and property. The freedom – by no means given 
to everyone – to express and disseminate one’s opinion through the media has 
led, in the absence of effective media concentration regulations, to enormous 
media conglomerates dominating the content and flow of information and en-
tertainment. This threatens comprehensive, freely accessible information from 
a wide variety of sources. PSM is needed as a counterweight and to enforce the 
principles of universalism in media supply.
Conclusion
PSM is not conceivable without the encompassing idea of universalism. The 
history of the concept is an ongoing attempt to determine what is universal for 
all people and to embed that in norms. Since the Enlightenment, universalism 
has been fundamental to Western state constitutions, later adopted by many 
countries around the world. Universalist claims to validity, however, have al-
ways been criticised because of the presumption of comprehensive applicability, 
especially when the application has excluded so many who are also entitled to 
claim the right. As articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
universalist ideas have become the model for the international order. An essen-
tial component of human rights, the freedom of communication has achieved 
decisive importance for the media order of pluralistic states. PSM are based on 
universalist ideas because they want to make the accessibility of information and 
social communication equally available to all citizens. However, as the promise 
of human rights freedom also refers to the right to property, and this right has 
enabled the emergence of media conglomerates in global media markets, PSM 
are also an attempt to preserve universal freedom of communication.
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Chapter 3
Universal – but not necessarily useful
Peter Goodwin
Abstract
This chapter scrutinises the universal service aspect of public service broadcasting 
historically. It argues that it was always limited to two quite narrow principles: 
geographical universality and universality of appeal. Both principles were, from 
the beginning, vague or ambiguous in definition and operated with caveats and 
exceptions. Even in the rough and ready fashion in which they did operate, both 
principles have become increasingly irrelevant in practice. Therefore, the universal 
service mission is an anachronistic starting point for addressing the very real chal-
lenges and opportunities that advocates of public service media must address today.
Keywords: public service broadcasting, communication history, universal service, 
BBC, geographical universality, universality of appeal
Introduction
The aim of this collection, and the conference from which it stemmed, is to 
examine challenges and opportunities in achieving the universal service mission 
for public service media (PSM) in the era of media abundance. Underlying this 
aim is, I presume, the assumption that the universal service mission has always 
been an important pillar of public service broadcasting (PSB) and therefore 
advocates of PSM today must address how to maintain that pillar. This chapter 
takes issue with this assumption, arguing,
 a) the universal service aspect of PSB was always limited to two quite narrow 
principles;
 b) both of these principles were, from the beginning, vague or ambiguous 
in definition and operated with all sorts of caveats and exceptions; 
 c) but even in the rough and ready fashion in which they did operate, both 
of these principles have become increasingly irrelevant in practice; 
Goodwin, P. (2020). Universal – but not necessarily useful. In P. Savage, M. Medina, & G. F. Lowe (Eds.), Universalism in 
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 d) therefore, the universal service mission is an anachronistic starting point 
for addressing the very real challenges and opportunities that advocates 
of PSM must address today.
Public service and universalism
Tight definitions of what the “public service” in public service broadcasting meant 
have been notoriously difficult to come by. Writing in the mid-1980s, the Brit-
ish Committee on the Financing of the British Broadcasting Corporation (more 
commonly known as the Peacock Committee, after the name of its chairman), 
bemoaned, “but what is public service broadcasting? We found that there was 
no simple dictionary definition. This is not surprising, since previous committees 
have found it difficult to define this concept” (Peacock Committee, 1986: 6).
As their report went on to make clear, the Committee was going to define 
(or at least operationalise) “public service broadcasting” in a considerably 
narrower sense than had been traditionally held to be the case. For the Com-
mittee, “public service broadcasting” was to be effectively the residuum that 
might be collectively desired after commercial provision had satisfied the sum 
of individual consumer wants (Goodwin, 2016; Peacock Committee, 1986). 
The Peacock Committee was, nevertheless, right about its predecessors (Annan 
Committee, 1977; Pilkington Committee, 1962).
The Broadcasting Research Unit (BRU) provided the Peacock Committee 
with one apparently precise exposition of public service broadcasting, whose 
eight principles embodied the PSB idea. The Peacock Committee (1986) sum-
marised this in their report, although they ended up effectively disagreeing with 
them. The BRU definition was produced with the awareness that the political 
climate surrounding the appointment of the Peacock Committee extolled market 
mechanisms in broadcasting now that spectrum scarcity was or was about to 
be overcome by cable and satellite. The BRU argued in the pamphlet expanding 
its points the burden of its eight principles: 
The purposes served by the main provisions of public service broadcasting 
in Britain go far beyond the policing of shortage, serve far more important, 
democratic aims, and that, though the structure we have is not perfect nor 
perfectly operated, in general it has served us extremely well. (BRU, 1986: i) 
However, while many outlets or delivery systems were brought into existence, 
the BRU continued, these aims of PSB could not be ensured simply by market 
mechanisms, and they needed to be kept.
The BRU described its work as defining “those main elements of public 
service broadcasting as it has evolved in Britain which, it is argued, should be 
retained” (BRU 1986: i). Its method was to invite a number of people “from 
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various backgrounds, but all known to be interested in the idea of public service 
broadcasting, to set down briefly what they think are its essential elements” 
(BRU, 1986: ii; the people participating in the exercise are listed on p. iii). The 
eight elements distilled by the BRU were those “most commonly proposed by 
the writers” (BRU, 1986: ii). 
One might quibble about the methodology, and one might debate whether 
the BRU definition was a normative exercise or an inspired (but little evidenced) 
sketch of the traditions and then current state of British analogue terrestrial 
television and radio broadcasting in the mid-1980s. The BRU itself concluded 
that its analysis “has something of the character of an ideal type” (1986: 23). 
But whatever the quibbles, few appear to have quarrelled with that second 
descriptive side of it (even if, like Peacock, they wanted to change the norma-
tive side). Michael Tracey (who, as director of the BRU at the time, may well 
have had some hand in the original) later generalised the eight-point defini-
tion beyond the UK in his 1998 book The Decline and Fall of Public Service 
Broadcasting (Tracey, 1998). 
So, in the BRU document and in Tracey we have the two concrete “universal 
service missions” of PSB precisely formulated in a way in which no-one else had 
seemingly been able to do. True, they were initially formulated about the UK 
and later reformulated by a British academic (although one who, by that stage, 
was based in an American university). Would any public service broadcaster or 
supporter of PSB in the 1980s or 1990s have rushed to dispute them? Although 
it may well turn out other parts of the BRU definition are more useful as a guide 
to current policies, for our immediate purposes the two most important of the 
BRU’s eight principles are the first two:
 1. Universality (geographic) – broadcast programmes should be available to 
the whole population.
 2. Universality (of appeal) – broadcast programmes should cater for all 
interests and tastes.
We will discuss each in turn.
Geographical universality
As far as television and radio were concerned, the principle of geographical 
universality (or as Tracey calls it, universality of availability) meant that the 
reception of broadcast services was to be provided for everyone within a certain 
universe (generally the nation – but more on this later) regardless of the cost 
of doing so. To the best of my knowledge, in the UK this was never written 
in either legislation or in the Charter of the BBC – it was accepted as a given. 
The Committee on Broadcasting 1960, chaired by Harry Pilkington, observed:
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The concept of the comprehensive service applies not only to programme 
content, but also to the geographical range or coverage of the transmissions. 
It has never been accepted that services of broadcasting should be available 
only to those for whom they can be provided easily or economically. Both 
the BBC and the ITA regarded it as their duty, as public corporations, to see 
that their existing services are as nearly as possible available to everybody in 
the whole of the country. (Pilkington Committee, 1962: 9)
ITA was the Independent Television Authority – the public corporation then 
broadcasting and overseeing commercial television in the UK. A decade and a 
half later, the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting, chaired by Lord An-
nan, reiterated the message: 
The Pilkington Committee […] noted that in Britain the broadcasters con-
sidered it to be their duty to make available the same services to all parts of 
the country, so far as was possible, and not merely to the urban areas where 
services can be provided cheaply. (Annan Committee, 1977: 9) 
This was something that Lord Annan took as read for broadcasting as a public 
service – and remember that in the UK in 1977 all broadcasting, both BBC and 
ITV, was legally a public service. Public service broadcasters (PSBs) didn’t stop 
at a few transmitters in large urban areas, each of which could cover millions 
of people, they built transmitters to reach even thousands in remote rural ar-
eas – something which a purely commercial broadcaster would not have found 
financially worthwhile.
For anyone who wants to trace the roots of this principle back to the begin-
nings of PSB, the evidence is provided in the book Broadcast over Britain that 
John Reith, the BBC’s first director general wrote in 1924 when the BBC was 
still the British Broadcast Company and supported by the radio equipment 
manufacturers (it became the British Broadcast Corporation at the beginning 
of 1927):
The country was to be served by broadcasting, and eight stations were origi-
nally considered sufficient, and this was all that the Company had undertaken 
to provide. These stations were soon in working order, but naturally large 
tracts of the country were left with facilities only available to those who were 
in a position to buy comparatively powerful, and therefore expensive, appa-
ratus. The company early announced its willingness to extend its operations 
so as to make that which was broadcast receivable in the greatest possible 
number of homes. Here is a very important principle, and involves a radical 
departure from the original scheme, and on this account it was not altogether 
appreciated by certain sections of the trade, their manufacturing and selling 
programmes having already been planned on the old basis, involving high-
powered apparatus. (Reith, 1924: 61–62)
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Geographical universality is a concept with other important applications in 
communications – above all in postal services and telephone networks. Each 
application is worth briefly examining for the light they shed on geographical 
universality as it applied to PSB.
The reforms undertaken in the British postal service by Rowland Hill from 
1839 most famously resulted in the first postage stamps (the Penny Black in 
1841). But more important for our purposes was the introduction in 1840 of 
a uniform penny postal service whereby a letter could be sent from anywhere 
to anywhere in the UK for the same low price (as against previous arrange-
ments which involved charges relating to distance). This was the principle of 
geographical universality (although no one then called it that) at work eighty 
years before the birth of broadcasting (Robinson, 1953).
The first use of the actual term universal service in the context of communica-
tion is generally attributed to Theodore Vail – President of American Telephone 
and Telegraph (AT&T) from 1885–1889 and again from 1907–1919 – in the 
context of AT&T negotiations with the US Federal Government to secure a 
publicly regulated private monopoly. Vail probably meant something different 
(universal interconnectivity – preferably to AT&T, if one were to be cynical) 
from what the phrase later came to mean. It took on its more modern meaning 
in 1934 with the establishment of the FCC (Federal Communications Commis-
sion). Horwitz (1989: 132) observed:
In return [for effectively granting AT&T a monopoly in long distance PG], 
regulation was able to “extract” from telephone companies the public inter-
est obligation of service to all – “universal service”. Universal service meant 
that telephone service must be made available to and generally affordable 
by everyone. 
The term became part of the debate on the re-regulation of former state and new 
telecom services in the last decades of the twentieth century. It is in that context 
that Nicholas Garnham (1997: 199) offered a slightly sceptical explanation:
There is now widespread agreement on a definition of universal service in 
telecom which in the words of OFTEL [the then UK telecom regulator] in 
the UK, is the provision of “affordable access to basic voice telephony or its 
equivalent for all those reasonably requesting it, regardless of where they live”. 
The problem for the regulator is that neither affordability nor reasonableness 
are terms that can be defined with scientific precision. They remain a mat-
ter for subjective judgement by the regulator. The EC Draft Interconnection 
Directive defines universal service more narrowly as “the provision of service 
throughout a specified geographical area, including – where required – geo-
graphical averaged prices for the provision of that service,” but introduces 
the additional concept of common tariffs. 
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As Garnham continues, the term could also be extended more widely to other 
services considered socially desirable, such as public payphones.
So, the concept of geographical universality has a serious pedigree in other 
forms of communication. But that pedigree also illustrates a number of prob-
lems with the concept which have relevance to the principle of geographical 
universality as applied to broadcasting. Four, in particular, are worth noting.
First, although universal service in broadcasting has been generally inter-
preted as meaning free service, that is certainly not the case in either post or 
telephony. Both were charged for, although in the case of the early postal service 
in Britain conscious efforts (the universal penny post) were made to bring the 
basic cost of a letter within the budget of a worker, and in the US (unlike much 
of the rest of the world) local (but not long-distance) calls were free.
Second, although the service might be provided universally, ability to afford 
the equipment to take advantage of that service was far from universal. So, 
in the US and most other high-income countries (not to mention low-income 
ones), a large proportion of the population did not have a domestic phone 
until the 1970s. Similarly, in the early decades of radio and television, a large 
proportion of the population did not have a radio or a television set; these 
were expensive items for many working-class people. Interestingly, it was only 
authoritarian regimes (e.g., the Nazis) which subsidised them – presumably 
with a propaganda purpose in mind.
Third, universal service was only provided where “reasonable”, and what 
was considered reasonable was distinctly subjective (or financially or politically 
determined). What was clear was at the extremes: If you lived at the end of a 
peninsula or on an island in a sparsely populated rural area, you would not get 
a landline or perhaps a daily postal delivery, and if you happened to live behind 
a mountain you would probably not get an adequate terrestrial broadcasting 
service. In Britain, during much of the period of public service dominance, ter-
restrial signals were sufficiently bad in some areas for hundreds of thousands of 
people to enable a lucrative commercial cable industry based on retransmission 
of good signals (and a cheaper receiver). Furthermore, no one suggested that 
it was unreasonable for some parts of the (generally national) “universe” to 
wait for new services during roll out – something which might take decades.
Fourth, the “universe” of universal service was always assumed to be the 
nation. If you were sending a letter outside the UK in the nineteenth century it 
cost more, and similarly if you were phoning outside the US in the twentieth 
(in that case much, much more). Similarly in broadcasting, the BBC’s universal 
service was one provided in the UK. Outside their own country, PSBs might 
broadcast for “soft-power” reasons (funded by their government) or to earn 
extra money for their domestic operations, but no one suggested the geographi-
cal universe of geographical universal service extended beyond national borders.
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Universality of appeal
This second universality principle was limited to broadcasting and has no clear 
parallels in previous communication technologies. That is, quite simply, because 
it is about content. Broadcasters provided content; postal and telephone services 
did not – for these media, each user provided her or his own content. What has 
later been termed universality of appeal was present from the start as part of 
the argument for broadcasting as a public service, again made most notably by 
John Reith. Reith’s approach is neatly summed up by Andrew Crisell (2006: 19):
[The BBC’s] output was intended to be universal both in consisting of a com-
prehensive diet of information, education and entertainment created to the 
highest possible standard, and in being targeted at everybody in the nation 
who wished to listen, irrespective of their status or location. It would take 
the form not of branded or streamed output but of mixed programming – a 
miscellany of genres in which every listener could find his or her particular 
interests. […] The company also aimed to introduce an element of serendipity 
and thus expand the interests of the individual listener. 
It should be noted that this goal of producing “something for everyone” was 
not a goal of providing something that everyone actually wanted. Rather it 
should be understood alongside Reith’s famous pronouncement that “few 
know what they want, and very few know what they need. […] In any case it 
is better to over-estimate the mentality of the public than to under-estimate it” 
(Reith, 1924: 34).
A more prosaic early articulation of this public service universality of ap-
peal principle, and a clear indicator of some of the problems inherent in it, 
was provided by the BBC’s (and Reith’s) first organiser of programmes C. A. 
Lewis (1924: 48): 
What, then, is the general policy by which our programme organisation is 
run? Broadly speaking, I think it is to keep on the upper side of public taste, 
and to cater for the majority 75% of the time, the remainder being definitely 
set apart for certain important minorities. 
Many of the problems of what universality of appeal actually amounts to shine 
out from Lewis’s pioneering remarks. This was catering for “the majority” most 
of the time (not quite the same as everyone!), and not always what the majority 
wanted, but what was good for it. Lewis (1924: 48–50) amplified:
What is meant by the “upper side” of public taste? Well we strive, as far as 
possible, to avoid certain things, desirable or undesirable according to the 
point of view, which are readily or more fully obtained elsewhere. Such things, 
for instance, as sensational murder details, or unsavoury divorce cases […]. 
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Of course, we could probably increase the number of our subscribers in a few 
weeks by changing our policy on these things, but it would leave us open to 
attack from many quarters. 
So, the notoriously Reithian viewpoint of giving the listeners what was good 
for them rather than what they wanted seems from the outset to have been 
inseparable from universal appeal. As for the “certain important minorities”, 
who were they? What made them “important”? And why 25 per cent? All this 
smacks of course not only of an easily personalised “Reithianism”, but of the 
more general elite assumptions of the interwar period. By the 1970s, in Britain 
and elsewhere, these were being questioned even in elite circles – for instance 
in the UK by the Annan Committee in 1977. 
But what we should also note is that these “universalist” injunctions are 
about running a single broadcast channel – and much of them applied whether 
that channel was public service or not. Broadcasting, both radio and televi-
sion, developed as a mass, popular medium with a limited number of channels. 
Whether funded by advertising or public funds, whether state owned, heavily 
regulated, or unregulated, radio and television broadcasters appealed to the mass 
(to the “majority of the population” with provision for “significant minorities”). 
Whether public service or commercial, broadcasting for most of the twentieth 
century was most certainly not a niche medium. Public service or commercial, 
the characteristic form of radio in its early days, and even more of television, 
was the generalist channel with a carefully planned schedule covering a mix 
of genres. That became particularly clear after the arrival of commercial com-
petition to previously public service television monopolies, where PSBs often 
simply mimicked their generalist commercial rivals (Achille & Miege, 1994).
When more than one channel was available to PSB, then the universality of 
appeal approach became increasingly stretched. This can be seen even when 
PSB still had a monopoly. During the World War II, the BBC (which until the 
mid-1970s had a monopoly of radio broadcasting in the UK) shifted from pro-
viding one (high-minded but “universal”) radio network by supplementing it 
with a second, more “popular” network called the Forces Programme (Crisell, 
2002: 59). After the war, the multi-channel approach was consolidated in a 
division in BBC radio between three radio networks: the (middlebrow) Home 
Service; the Light Programme (repurposing the more popular approach of the 
Forces Programme); and the (distinctly highbrow) Third Programme. Andrew 
Crisell (2002: 67) observes:
This tripartite system was an attempt to respond to popular tastes and provide 
the listener with an element of choice without sacrificing the old Reithian se-
riousness of purpose […]. Like its predecessors it would provide “something 
for everyone” – but across the entirety of its networks rather than within 
any one of them. 
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But that had consequences, as Crisell (2002: 68) explained: 
The failure to cater for the full range of interests within any single network 
meant that the second and perhaps more important of Reith’s original aims – 
to provide “everything for someone” – was being dropped […]. Henceforth, 
thanks to stratified programming the listener would be exposed to no more 
surprises. 
It should also be added that if “something for everyone” really was being 
provided by the new tripartite arrangement, it was being done by dividing 
the population into three “intellectual” categories: highbrow (the Third Pro-
gramme), middlebrow (the Home Service) and populist (the Light Programme). 
Leave aside the tenuous nature of this sort of division, there were plenty of 
other ways of slicing the “universal audience” into three.
In television, PSBs faced this sort of dilemma immediately when they gained 
more than one television channel, which happened in analogue terrestrial televi-
sion from the sixties onwards. From their first acquisition of an extra television 
channel, one response of PSBs was to keep their main channel more “popular” 
– often competing directly with the leading commercial rival – while the extra 
channel (or channels) was more “highbrow” (Achille & Miege, 1994). So, just 
as with the division of BBC’s radio output in the 1940s, although it might be 
claimed that the channels in totality provided “something for everyone”, as we 
have just seen in Crisell’s observation about BBC radio, from then on in public 
service television too there would be no more surprises. And that developed 
even more with the arrival of still more channels, particularly as a result of 
the advent of digital terrestrial broadcasting from the 1990s onwards. Now, 
“something for everyone” was being provided across a range of channels cater-
ing not merely for the low-, middle-, and highbrow, but for arts enthusiasts, 
young (our youngish) people, children, news junkies, and so forth. 
By describing these developments, I do not want to in any way disparage any 
of the many new channel initiatives taken by PSBs over the last 60 (and even 
more in the last 20) years – although some may indeed have turned out to be 
misjudged. What I want to stress is that over this long period, decisions have 
been made (and have had to be made) which had nothing to do with observ-
ing some sort of principle of universality of appeal. These decisions were by 
public broadcasters about broadcast distribution. They predated the primacy 
of Internet distribution.
The end of the two universality principles
What I have discussed suggests that the only two universality principles which 
had a real bearing on PSB had some very serious issues – both logical and prac-
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tical – from the start. But each stood up, in a rough and ready way, so long as 
PSB was confined to a limited number of channels broadcast terrestrially. That 
time is long past. So, what does that mean for these two universality principles 
today as implications for PSM?
If we take as read that PSM is already, and will increasingly be, distributed 
over the Internet, then there is nothing left of the principle of geographical 
universality. Any content which any PSM organisation (either an established 
legacy PSB or a newcomer) cares to put on the web can in principle be received 
by anyone anywhere. Of course, one might argue that some areas have less 
adequate broadband or mobile reception than others, that to access different 
types of content adequately requires expenditure on reception equipment that 
is beyond the budget or expertise of many of the population, or that the new 
devices or forms of reception for which the PSM content is being aimed are, 
as yet, of limited take up. But, as we have seen, all these arguments applied 
to geographical universal service from the earliest days of broadcasting, and 
before and alongside that, in telephony. 
The one difference from the present is that for much of their history, PSBs 
were responsible for their own distribution infrastructure, but today PSM are 
not. Perhaps they should be, or to me more obviously, perhaps that infrastructure 
should be a general public responsibility and publicly provided. And perhaps 
the income inequalities which lead to some people not being able to afford the 
devices (and expertise) necessary to participate fully in the digital world should 
be eliminated. I would completely agree – but that takes us into a quite differ-
ent (although in my view centrally important) argument about the relationship 
between PSM and public provision and social structure in general. 
Regarding the second principle of universality – universality of appeal – as 
we have seen from the very start this presented serious problems of both (elitist) 
assumption and operationalisation – or at least in justifying that operationalisa-
tion by reference to any principle. In practice, it meant a mixed-genre channel 
with a rather subjectively judged “something for everyone”. And that was not 
that different from what commercial radio – or even more, what commercial 
television – did with their single channels. What distinguished PSBs was not 
primarily their universality of appeal (commercial ones were pretty good at 
that, and they weren’t niche broadcasters) but PSB’s extra and quality news and 
current affairs, challenging drama, stimulating children’s programmes, and so 
forth (although we should not necessarily romanticise what they did on these 
scores, both under the pressure of conservative establishments and commercial 
competition).
In that light, are either of the only historically established two universal 
service missions likely to provide meaningful guidance to PSM practice today?
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Chapter 4
Universality of public service media  
and preschool audiences
The choice against a dedicated television channel  
in Flanders
Karen Donders & Hilde Van den Bulck
Abstract
In 2017, Flemish public broadcaster Vlaamse Radio en Televisieorganisatie 
(VRT), that serves the approximately 6.5 million people of the Flemish commu-
nity in Belgium, proposed launching a separate television channel for preschool 
children, making use of existing brand Ketnet Jr. VRT argued such a service was 
necessary given the different needs of preschoolers compared with older children, 
and the limited reach of their online offers within certain social-political strata. 
A universality rationale thus underlined VRT’s plans. This chapter analyses the 
process, contents, and outcome of the public value test procedure applied to this 
proposal. The focus of the analysis is on whether universality arguments were 
seriously taken into account by the regulator and government, or made subordi-
nate to competitors’ logic. Our document analysis makes it clear that the opinion 
of commercial broadcasters, rarely substantiated by evidence, disproportionally 
impacted the regulator’s assessment, and eventually resulted in a negative deci-
sion on a service of which the market impact was in fact limited and the public 
interest motivation high.
Keywords: public service media, public value test, preschool television, children’s 
television, universality
Introduction
Public broadcasters across Europe have the task to reach all citizens. Most 
are obliged to pay attention to special groups like children, next to a large 
quantity of animation that is available and valorised through transnational 
media markets. Compared to this commercial content, the children’s offer of 
public broadcasters such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the 
Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO, Dutch public broadcaster), and Vlaamse 
Radio en Televisieorganisatie (VRT, Flemish public broadcaster) tends to be 
more varied in terms of genres offered and highly valued by both children and 
their parents. 
50
KAREN DONDERS & HILDE VAN DEN BULCK
In 2017, VRT, that serves the approximately 6.5 million people of the Flem-
ish community in Belgium, proposed launching a separate television channel 
for preschool children, making use of the existing brand Ketnet Jr. VRT argued 
such a service was necessary given the different needs of preschoolers compared 
with older children and the limited reach of their online offers within certain 
social-political strata. A universality rationale thus underlined VRT’s plans. A 
public value test was carried out by the Flemish independent media regulator, 
Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM), that resulted, essentially, in neutral 
advice. Subsequently, the Flemish government, solely competent in this field, 
took a negative decision. In a highly commercialised market for children’s 
television content, that outcome was odd – to say the least – yet unsurprising 
given the fierce lobbying from commercial media such as Nickelodeon and 
Flemish commercial broadcaster Medialaan (now DPG Media). While, in 
the end, VRT managed to introduce a partial Ketnet Jr. channel on one of its 
other linear channels for several hours per day, the original decision warrants 
close attention, as it points to the impact of regulatory (European Commission 
driven ex ante test for new services’ requirements) and decision-making pro-
cesses (multistakeholderism) on actual policymaking in crucial areas of public 
service media (PSM).
In this chapter, we analyse the decision-making process that resulted in 
the dismissal of Ketnet Jr. as a linear television channel. We focus, on the one 
hand, on the inclusion of a variety of stakeholders in the process as a proxy 
for how universality is reflected in multistakeholderism. On the other hand, 
we analyse the extent to which universality of audience reach was a relevant 
factor in the regulator and Flemish government’s assessments of the proposed 
service. To this end, we develop a theoretical framework that discusses recent 
trends in (media) policymaking and multistakeholderism and the historic role 
of PSM organisations in providing content for young children as part of the 
goal of universality. These sections result in more operational, specific research 
questions. After describing our methodology, we present the findings of our 
analysis.
 A case study such as this can only say so much as it involves just one event 
(the attempted launch of a children’s channel) in one community (Flanders) at 
a particular point in time (2017). Yet, it is this combination of a substantial, 
spatial, and temporal limitation that gives meaning to a case study, as it allows 
an understanding of very specific processes and functions through detailed 
de- and re-construction. Furthermore, the findings provide insights that have 
relevance beyond understanding the particulars of this case for several reasons. 
First, VRT’s position and media context is prototypical for many public broad-
casters in Europe and beyond, caught between strict demands for added public 
value and a government and commercial competition doubting their legitimacy 
and role. Second, the ex ante test for new PSM services is an EU-wide phenom-
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enon. While the particularity of procedures differs between member states, the 
principle in itself – the issues that surround it and the implications for PSM’s 
functioning in the contemporary media ecology – goes beyond this case. Finally, 
the issues and problems involved in PSM’s role in providing content for very 
young audiences transcend the Flemish, and even a European, context. For all 
these reasons – which will be elaborated on throughout the text – we believe 
our single case study has relevance for anyone interested in the contemporary 
functioning of PSM institutions.
Trends in the process of media policymaking
In Europe, structures and processes in contemporary policymaking – in the 
area of media in general and PSM in particular – have changed following the 
growing interference of a common European policy framework and of national 
governments’ move to new public management and public value (Donders, 
2012; Van den Bulck, 2015). This has resulted in a number of key changes. 
First, governments have externalised policy and watchdog roles, introducing 
independent policy advising, regulatory, and controlling bodies. While this 
has led to professionalisation and, sometimes, to more evidence-based poli-
cies, these bodies have been criticised for being insufficiently independent from 
government, non-transparent, too focused on economic considerations, and 
not enough forward-looking (Barnett, 2003; Klimkiewicz, 2013; Meier, 2007). 
This raises the research question: Has VRM played its role as an independent 
regulator in the process assessing Ketnet Jr.? That is, how evidence-based was 
its advice? Did it engage in a transparent process? Did it make conclusions in 
an independent manner? 
Second, and related, governments are embracing multistakeholderism, that 
is, involving a range of stakeholders in developing media policy and regulation 
(Donders & Raats, 2012). Deliberation based in stakeholder participation is 
regarded as a key building block of a successful democratic process (Gutmann 
& Thompson, 2004). The underlying assumption is that “systematic attempts 
to include those affected by government policies in defining problems, collecting 
data and identifying possible solutions, results in more responsive and sustain-
able policymaking” (Donders et al., 2018: 2; see also Hintz & Milan, 2009; 
Walter, 2009). As such, the trend towards multistakeholderism is considered a 
positive, inclusive development. However, earlier empirical analysis (Donders 
et al., 2018) of instances of multistakeholderism in media policy development 
suggests that this is not unproblematic and, in fact, emerges as a new façade 
behind which old power relations remain dominant. This results in the research 
question: Did the adoption of a multistakeholderism approach bring about 
more inclusive decision-making? 
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Finally, specific to PSM organisations, there has been a shift in the fora these 
institutions are to account for and a growth in accountability arrangements and 
measures (Van den Bulck, 2015). Most notable is the so-called ex ante test as a 
requirement for expansions of public media services (European Commission, 
2009: para. 84). Every significantly new service, before being introduced, must 
be evaluated for its public value and market impact. The test must be executed 
by a body independent from the public broadcaster; the consultation with re-
gards to Ketnet Jr. is an instance hereof (Donders, 2012; Van den Bulck, 2011). 
Studies of ex ante testing for new public broadcasters’ services show, in many 
cases, that these tests come down to greater interference from, and compliance 
with, demands from commercial players in the media market (see contributions 
in Donders & Moe, 2011). This results in the research question: Did the ex ante 
test favour priorities of commercial competitors over an inclusive consideration 
of all stakeholders’ views?
The fragility of children’s television
VRT’s plans for a linear television channel for preschoolers must be understood 
in the context of public broadcasters’ long history of children’s programming 
as part of the goal of universality. As Born and Prosser (2001) show, notions of 
public service changed over time, yet certain key normative criteria survived – 
including the notion of universality. The concept of universality originated as a 
multilayered ideal (Van den Bulck, 2001) referring to “universal access”: Public 
broadcasters’ services must be available to every member of the community, 
regardless of economic, social, or geographical position. In the analogue era, this 
mainly referred to the availability of the signal in the far corners of the country. 
Today, it is interpreted against the background of persistent digital divides and 
the provision of services for those left behind in commercial digital media markets 
(cf. Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018). Universality also refers to “universal appeal”: 
Public broadcasters must provide a wide range of informative, entertaining, 
cultural, and inspirational programmes that appeal to the diverse interests of the 
young and old and the highly and less-educated across the community, allowing 
all members of the community to take part in a shared culture and identity (Grip-
srud, 2002). Traditionally, this is achieved by providing a mix of information, 
inspiration, and entertainment for every age and social group (Van den Bulck, 
2001), an interpretation adhered to up until today, despite pressures towards a 
market-failure approach (Donders, 2012). At the same time, universal appeal 
implies catering to every specific taste, even outside of the mainstream – that 
is, to minority interests, including high culture and educational programmes. 
This is reflected in public broadcasters providing various radio and television 
channels and online platforms to accommodate all tastes.
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From the beginning of PSM, children’s programming was very much part 
of this notion of universality – in various ways. Children’s programmes were 
considered a legitimate and necessary part of the diverse programming of pub-
lic broadcasters, and within the category of children’s content, the aim was to 
provide a wide range of genres and programmes for all ages. Even in the early 
days of television, when technical and financial means were limited, most public 
broadcasters, including VRT, provided a diverse range of children’s programmes 
for the very young and the somewhat older, covering entertainment, news, 
and education (Van den Bulck, 2001). Crucially, a majority hereof consisted 
of original programming in the children’s own language and cultural context, 
presented in a non-commercial context. As television grew in popularity in the 
1970s, so did concerns regarding the negative impact of commercialism, inter-
nationalisation, and homogenisation of children’s content. For a long time, these 
concerns confirmed the need for children’s programmes created from a public 
service perspective, outside of the commercial market (Fisch, 2004; Huston et 
al., 1989; Lesser, 1974), with a mix of linear and post-linear offerings to ensure 
reaching all children (cf. Rutherford & Brown, 2013). 
Contradictory, growing academic and public concerns about how the 
growing dominance of a few major international players strengthened the 
homogenisation and commercialisation of content for children, especially for 
preschoolers (Borzekowski, 2001; Coon & Tucker, 2002), coincided with the 
undermining of the legitimacy of public broadcasters’ position within this market 
by budget cuts, lobbying from commercial competitors, and general assaults 
on PSM (Steemers, 2010, 2013, 2016; Steemers & D’Arma, 2012). As a result, 
children’s television is increasingly steered by consolidation of a few commer-
cial providers of children’s content. This results in the research question: Was 
universality, in terms of reach and appeal, an important consideration when 
evaluating the Ketnet Jr. proposal?
Methodology
The case discussed in this chapter is the analysis of the public value test car-
ried out regarding the proposal of Flemish public broadcaster VRT to launch 
a linear television channel for children up to six years old. It focuses on four 
questions, identified in the preceding sections:   
 1. Has VRM played its role as an independent regulator in the process as-
sessing Ketnet Jr.? 
 2. Did the adoption of a multistakeholderism approach bring about more 
inclusive decision-making? 
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 3. Did the ex ante test favour priorities of commercial competitors over an 
inclusive consideration of all stakeholders’ views?
 4. Was universality, in terms of access and appeal, an important considera-
tion when evaluating the Ketnet Jr. proposal? 
The data gathered concern the period from proposal submission (mid-December 
2016) until its rejection by the Flemish government (September 2017) and 
largely consist of the following documents: All documents submitted by VRT; 
all available documents submitted by stakeholders to the Flemish Regulator 
for the Media on Ketnet Jr. (n = 45); all assessment documents of VRM (n = 9); 
and the Flemish government’s decision (n = 1). Complementarily, both authors 
informally discussed the case with a variety of stakeholders involved directly 
or indirectly in the procedure. One of the authors was part of the VRT team 
negotiating the Ketnet Jr. proposal and, in that capacity, had insight into internal 
discussions and external relations with stakeholders, the Flemish government, 
and the Flemish Parliament. 
The document analysis is based on a descriptive quantitative part and a 
combined descriptive and interpretative qualitative part. The former is mainly 
concerned with the numeric use of stakeholder input by VRM; the latter with 
the nature of the arguments made by VRM and the different stakeholders, 
and the way in which universality of access and appeal was (not) considered 
a relevant argument. 
VRT’s Ketnet Jr. proposal
Before presenting our findings, we elaborate on the proposal of VRT to launch 
Ketnet Jr., an additional children’s television channel next to the existing Ketnet 
channel. At the time of the Ketnet Jr. proposal, Ketnet’s market share was 21.2 
per cent, reflecting a five-year decline. Other children’s offerings included local 
commercial channels VTMKzoom and Kadet (Medialaan Group) with a market 
share of 5–5.6 per cent, and Studio 100 Television (just under 5%), the free-to-air 
television channel of a major, Flemish-based but internationally active children’s 
production company. Bigger than these local companies are Nickelodeon and 
Disney, taking just over 20 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, of the Flemish 
children’s television market through multiple channels, differentiating between 
preschoolers and older children. The international channels mainly offer fic-
tional content and animation, mostly dubbed in Dutch by voice actors from the 
Netherlands (i.e., not Flanders). They generate income from advertising revenue 
collected by local, commercial broadcasters. Medialaan, for example, is in charge 
of Nickelodeon’s advertising sales. Few of these companies have an extensive 
online presence. In contrast, as a multiplatform brand, Ketnet offers audiovisual 
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content across platforms – including app-based – in a safe, advertising-free en-
vironment with guidance from Ketnet staff and parental involvement. Ketnet’s 
social media environment is highly popular, teaching children not yet allowed 
on Facebook how to deal with social media. The brand is reputable, as most 
people appreciate its educational yet fun programming and inclusive approach. 
The value of Ketnet is addressed on a regular basis, for example, in newspaper 
articles on new initiatives and programmes (VRT, 2016). 
VRT’s proposal to launch a linear channel in a digital age stems from a 
combination of market, pedagogy, universality, and wider public-value related 
factors. First, VRT showed concern regarding its reach of a diverse audience 
(cf. universality of PSM offers, as explained above), based on the observation 
that nearly 25 per cent of the target audience (children up to six) do not have 
regular access to the Internet or a device (e.g., a tablet) that enables them ac-
cess. These children can watch Ketnet, but this channel mainly targets older 
(6–12) children. It has some Ketnet Jr.–branded blocks of preschool content 
but, according to VRT, parents find this confusing in terms of brand position-
ing and want a more stable, full-day offer of public service programmes. While 
Disney Jr. and Nick Jr. offer preschool content, according to VRT, these mainly 
broadcast animation, de-localised and dubbed in Dutch by voice actors from 
the Netherlands. Ketnet aspires to offer various genres, making use of “real 
people” that speak Flemish Dutch and cover local habits, customs, and issues, 
thus fitting requirements relating to pedagogy and public added value of their 
children’s programming. Should the additional channel be approved, VRT 
promised to invest additional means in local production.
In line with the principle of technology neutrality, some VRT managers 
argued that, since Ketnet and Ketnet Jr. were already existing PSM brands, 
an extension of Ketnet Jr. from some linear television offerings and an online 
video player to a full linear television channel was covered by the existing 
management contract. The latter contains all obligations of VRT for a five-
year period (Vlaamse Gemeenschap & VRT, 2015). However, part of VRT’s 
Board of Directors, in charge of strategic issues and made up of political rep-
resentatives, disagreed, resulting in a push for a public value test, supported 
at governmental level. 
The lengthy public value test process in Flanders
VRT submitted its Ketnet Jr. proposal in mid-December 2016 and published 
it online. There were no guidelines on what had to be included, other than the 
vague stipulations in the Flemish media decree to assess new services vis à vis 
their contribution to Flemish society, culture, and market development, taking 
into account technological and international evolutions. The regulator refused 
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to provide additional instructions. VRT’s proposal focused on the ways in which 
Ketnet Jr., as a linear television channel, would further public interest objectives 
for all preschool children and also elaborated on what they considered a limited 
market impact. According to VRT, Ketnet Jr. would offer a public-service driven 
alternative to commercial channels Disney Jr. and Nick Jr. for preschoolers. 
In collaboration with a Ph.D. in children’s psychology (employed full-time by 
VRT), a schedule for the linear television channel was developed, providing a 
mix of programmes made for preschoolers and contributing to social, political, 
and cultural citizenship. These were designed to interact closely with digital 
offers to encourage children to move flexibly between the television and digital 
offers of Ketnet Jr., aiming to lessen the digital gap. Content would largely be 
Flemish (gradually increasing to 80% of broadcast volume), spoken in Flemish 
Dutch and relating to Flemish culture (such as the use of Flemish children’s 
literature). The channel would be advertisement free. The VRT thus wanted to 
offer a service distinct from commercial offerings and societally relevant from a 
public interest point of view. Not surprisingly, they argued that market impact 
would be limited, estimating a modest (below 1% decrease of market share) 
loss of advertising revenue for commercial competitors. 
The media regulator never provided any details on how it analysed VRT’s 
proposal. At the end of January 2017, VRM published an open consultation 
structured around the identification of the respondent, the market economic 
situation of the Flemish media, changes in the media offers in the market, 
changes in technological evolutions, changes in international trends, protec-
tion and promotion of Flemish culture and identity, and the expectations and 
needs of media users. The general public was not consulted. Respondents could 
provide arguments (with or without evidence) and, at the end of each section, 
tick one of two boxes; that is, whether they – “yes” or “no” – supported the 
service. No other option was provided. From a methodological perspective, the 
regulator’s questionnaire was problematic on three counts. First, questions were 
worded in very legalistic language, making it hard to understand them. In fact, 
after its publication, VRT received several questions from certain stakeholders 
complaining they were unsure how to approach things. Second, the elements 
covered by the questionnaire, while reflecting the areas indicated by the media 
decree, were not distinguished according to type of issue. Several elements (e.g., 
state of play of the Flemish media market, technical evolutions, and international 
trends) are contextual whereas Flemish culture and identity, market impact, 
and expectations of media users refer to expected impact of the service. This 
distinction was not made nor explained. Third, forcing respondents to give a 
final yes-or-no answer suggests a world divided into proponents and opponents 
of a PSM proposal, setting the debate in binary, oppositional terms. 
The regulator decided to score all topics on a scale: - - (very negative); - 
(negative); 0 (neutral); + (positive); ++ (very positive). It did not elaborate on 
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how a score was determined, though. It appears that decisions were based on 
opaque, qualitative assessments of arguments in favour or against the service. 
For example, the regulator assumed a negative impact on other broadcasters 
saying, “the regulator has difficulties in accepting that the introduction of an 
additional, linear children’s channel would have no negative impact on the 
market shares of the other children’s channels”, (VRM, 2017: 20) without 
providing evidence of how it came to that conclusion. 
The outcome of the procedure was that VRM stated it could not reach a 
conclusion. It decided neutral on all aspects except two: market impact, for 
which it concluded a negative impact on broadcasters; and Flemish culture, for 
which it observed a likely positive impact. It did not weigh arguments towards 
a final conclusion but, instead, left this to the Flemish government. 
Analysing an assessment that was not a real assessment
We conducted an analysis of the regulator’s advice, focusing on the attention 
in the advice devoted to the different aspects, the stakeholders mentioned, and 
the consideration of universality as an argument for or against Ketnet Jr. as a 
linear television channel. 
First, there is a clear imbalance in the amount of attention (in terms of space) 
devoted to each of the various issues. Topics related to the market received 
notably more attention (33 pages) than topics such as protection and promo-
tion of Flemish culture and identity (eight pages). The latter, by the way, is the 
only exclusively public interest related criterion the regulator looked at. Two 
annexes to the advice also concern market economic aspects. This suggests 
a disproportionate attention to market economic aspects to the detriment of 
public interest considerations, despite VRT’s proposal elaborating on them 
quite extensively. 
Second, analysis of how often VRM uses input from particular stakeholders 
reveals that considerably more attention is devoted to the opinion of stakehold-
ers with a distinct interest in blocking the proposal, that is, commercial broad-
casters that offer children’s television. Furthermore, the regulator itself reached 
out to several stakeholders to submit an opinion (VRM, 2017), including to six 
advertising agencies, six author rights’ agencies, eight distributors of television 
services, nine civil society organisations, three broadcasters, ten educational 
organisations, nine production companies, and some interest groups or sector 
organisations. Stakeholders such as youth movements, schools making use 
of the Ketnet offer, organisations involved in preschooler’s care, or academ-
ics, amongst others, were not invited. The consultation was, of course, open 
to anyone who wanted to submit something but, as said, many stakeholders 
perceived the technicality of the questionnaire as an obstacle. 
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A total of 45 stakeholders submitted a response, 20 of which were on their 
own initiative rather than the regulator’s invitation, suggesting considerable 
involvement from stakeholders other than those on the regulator’s radar. 
Overall, more “market stakeholders” submitted a response than stakeholders 
motivated by public interest. All broadcasters and most television distributors 
submitted a response. Broadcasters such as Medialaan and Nickelodeon were 
opposed to the launch of Ketnet Jr. while SBS was somewhat more prudent. 
All production companies were in favour of Ketnet Jr. except for Studio 100, 
which was somewhat conflicted since it produces content for VRT but also 
has its own broadcast channel Studio 100 TV. Educational publisher WPG 
Uitgevers submitted a response in favour of Ketnet Jr., while author rights’ 
organisations emphasised the need for being compensated for an additional 
channel. Television distributors mainly argued that the additional space required 
in their package for a new channel would reduce their revenue if Ketnet Jr. was 
granted a must-carry status and claimed there was no legal agreement between 
them and VRT to transmit such a channel. The regulator used the latter as an 
argument against the children’s channel even though, clearly, it would be odd 
and possibly unlawful for VRT to have signed distribution contracts before the 
service was approved. Amongst the stakeholders with a public interest orienta-
tion that responded to the questionnaire, the main educational organisations’ 
responses expressed very explicit support for Ketnet Jr. While not supporting 
television viewing in general, they considered the public service project of Ket-
net and Ketnet Jr. as beneficial to preschoolers and older children. All other 
stakeholders with a public interest orientation supported VRT’s plans, as did 
the four experts, two of whom were academics, that submitted a response.  
Next to stakeholder identification, we analysed the relative weight of stake-
holders’ responses in the regulator’s decision. To this end, for each issue we 
identified which stakeholder was referred to by the regulator when making a 
particular argument in favour or against Ketnet Jr. Results show that the regu-
lator’s (negative) evaluation of the market economic situation and the impact 
of Ketnet Jr. mentions the opinion of eleven stakeholders, two public interest 
(Screen Flanders and Kom Op Tegen Kanker), and nine (out of 26 submitted) 
market stakeholders. Interestingly, VRM refers to production companies (al-
though without identifying them) but does not follow their – mostly positive 
– evaluation, as VRM dismisses VRT’s suggestion that Ketnet Jr. will result 
in more investments in children’s content (VRM, 2017). Medialaan, VRT’s 
closest competitor in the Flemish market, gets four mentions in this section. 
Medialaan and Nickelodeon both are negative with regards to market impact, 
as are distributors who fear the potential must-carry status of the new channel. 
The second assessment criterion of impact on children’s television offerings 
in the media market was evaluated by the regulator as neutral. Several public 
interest–oriented stakeholders, specifically those occupied with children’s 
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wellbeing, argued for a preschool channel without advertising and with lo-
cally produced content. They observed such a channel is not present in Flan-
ders and, hence, would be a positive addition to existing offers. Broadcasters 
Medialaan and Nickelodeon, as well as advertising broker Transfer (working 
for international children’s channels like Disney targeting the Flemish media 
market), argued against, saying VRT exaggerated the difference between 
commercial and public service television for children. On the basis of these 
conflicting arguments, the regulator concludes there is neither a negative nor 
a positive impact on the Flemish media market for children’s programmes. 
So, not only does VRM not evaluate claims made, it also treats as equal the 
assessment of the distinctiveness and public value of this offer by commercial 
competitors that only offer animation of American origin, on the one hand, 
and by academic experts and civil society organisations that argue in the public 
interest, on the other hand. 
The section on technological trends is very brief. Several stakeholders main-
tained that a linear channel is not innovative and that children increasingly can 
be reached on-demand. VRM refers to competing broadcasters and distribu-
tors that – unsurprisingly – are in favour of a paying, on-demand model. The 
regulator does not accept the argument of digital exclusion, making reference 
to studies that claim up to 90 per cent of children have regular access to new 
media devices. Young children indeed have access to, for instance, Netflix, yet 
that does not provide domestic children’s content and, overlooked by VRM, 
the YouTube Kids app that broadcasters referred to was not available in Flan-
ders at the time. The regulator further mentions specialised children’s channels 
developed by commercial broadcasters and claims public broadcasters have 
no incentive to do so since they are not driven by commercial motives (VRM, 
2017). There appears a flawed logic: Commercial channels are allowed to 
make more targeted children’s channels because they can earn money in doing 
so. Public broadcasters cannot make money with a more specialised offer that 
could benefit preschoolers and other children and, therefore, should not offer 
more than one children’s channel. This logic goes against public broadcasters’ 
aim for universal access and appeal. 
The section on international trends is based entirely on the regulator’s own 
assessment. No reference to stakeholder submissions is provided. The regula-
tor largely goes against the assumption that the market for children’s television 
is internationalising. Nonetheless, a 2017 study of the European Audiovisual 
Observatory, concerning most EU Member States, clearly shows the interna-
tionalisation – and, notably, the Americanisation – of the children’s television 
market (Ene, 2017). 
Not surprisingly, the regulator concludes that the impact of the service 
on Flemish culture and identity is positive. The channel offers a considerable 
amount of domestic programming; there is a commitment of VRT to increase 
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the share of local content investments in local content from the independent 
production sector. The channel is also embedded in the local context and can 
relate to societal issues in Flanders better than international channels. The regu-
lator concludes on a + and not a ++ because several commercial broadcasters 
argued that they, too, invest in local content and that VRT exaggerated the 
difference between public service and commercial content. Interestingly, the 
regulator claims that commercial broadcaster Studio 100 TV is more Flemish 
in nature than VRT’s Ketnet channel, as it broadcasts nearly 85 per cent of 
Flemish programming whereas Ketnet broadcasts less than 50 per cent. To 
put this in context: Studio 100 produces a considerable amount of content 
for Ketnet and re-broadcasts this content on its own television channel. More 
importantly, most of its programming consists of music videos, thus providing 
a limited variety of programme genres. It is worth noting that the regulator 
refers to market stakeholders when discussing the public interest parameter of 
Flemish culture and identity, whereas for market impact, virtually no reference 
is made to opinions of public interest–oriented stakeholders, even though they 
commented on it. By and large, they claimed that market-driven arguments 
should not drive any decision regarding the approval of a children’s channel. 
The regulator refers to none of these arguments. 
Finally, the section on audience’s needs and expectations makes little 
reference to stakeholder opinions. The two academic experts supported the 
proposal. They argued that too much television viewing may not be healthy 
for children, but television viewing within a safe environment and setting out 
from a clear pedagogical project is better than commercial offers. The regulator 
mainly refers to studies advising against television viewing below the age of 18 
months. However, Ketnet Jr. targets preschool children until the age of six. The 
regulator is unclear about the added value of the channel for children aged 18 
months to six years. The regulator, furthermore, dismisses the fact that there is 
a commercial offer for preschoolers, also for the group below 18 months, and 
that this target group makes use of this offer. This is surprising, as that offer 
suggests that the issue is whether a public service offer has its place next to (or 
is to be preferred over) a commercial, animation-dominated offering. 
Analysing an advice that was not really an advice
It remains by and large unclear what tools and benchmarks the regulator used to 
analyse stakeholder claims (several hundreds of pages in total). Why was some 
information aggregated? Why was the opinion of some stakeholders singled out? 
The reasons why the regulator analysed opinions A and B to come to conclusion 
C are not (made) clear. No independent assessment of claims is made. Instead, 
the regulator seems to rely on an intuitive weighing of arguments, going against 
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its rhetoric of adhering to evidence-based policies reflected at several points in 
the advice in statements such as the following: 
Ketnet Jr. will, according to VRT’s proposal, be an offer not yet available 
in the Flemish children’s television market. One can assume, in line with 
the agreements made in the management contract between the Flemish 
government and VRT, that the channel will comply with certain quality 
requirements. Ketnet Jr. will not consist of a completely new offer, but will 
make the current offer for preschool children more accessible. VRT gives no 
information on how the offer on the regular Ketnet channel will evolve as a 
consequence. They merely say that some preschool offer will remain available 
on Ketnet, mainly with an eye on smoothening the transition for children 
from Ketnet Jr. to Ketnet. The commercial channels say that the difference 
between their offer and the offer of VRT is exaggerated. They fear that the 
introduction of Ketnet Jr. will weaken their own Flemish content offering. 
On the basis of these arguments, the VRM assigns the following score for 
the parameter “general media offering in Flanders”: neutral [translated and 
emphasis added]. (VRM, 2017: 33)
On several occasions, the regulator seems overly reluctant to accept a positive 
impact of the new service on the market, relying on disclaimers such as “difficult 
to believe”, “plausible”, “unlikely”, and “logical”. There are few indications 
of checking, testing, and critically evaluating claims. For example, “the VRM 
has difficulties to believe that the introduction of a new linear channel would 
not have a negative impact on the market shares of other children’s chan-
nels [translated and emphasis added]” (VRM, 2017: 20). And, “even if some 
production companies assert that revenues increases are possible, it seems not 
very plausible that the introduction of Ketnet Jr. will have a positive impact on 
all production companies and faciliatory companies [translated and emphasis 
added]” (VRM, 2017: 20). 
Next to poor argumentation and random use of stakeholder input, the 
advice stands out for its inconsistency. According to VRM, the initiative is 
characterised by its contribution to Flemish culture and identity, yet would 
not constitute a significant change in the market offerings. Moreover, there 
are indications that the regulator did not fully analyse the information 
provided, as arguments are accepted as factual or reasonable quite easily. 
For example, the reference to YouTube Kids – a service not offered in the 
Flemish market – as a viable alternative for Ketnet Jr. is considered a reality. 
Medialaan’s investments in children’s content are treated as a given, while 
several production companies say the commercial broadcaster hardly invests 
in Flemish children’s content. 
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What universality?
This final part analyses the consideration of universality in the public value test. 
VRT started from the observation that it did not reach all preschool children with 
its public service offer and assigned it to the target group’s fragmented nature. 
In essence, these elements relate to universality from a perspective of access and 
appeal as discussed in the theoretical framework. VRT argues that its remit is to 
deliver its content to all children, not only to those with a tablet and high-speed 
Internet access. For VRT, this is part of its remit to provide such an offer because 
the preschool group in Flanders is targeted only by non-local, commercial chan-
nels Nickelodeon and Disney. At the time of the proposal, VRT’s Ketnet Jr. app 
reached about 8,500 children and the Ketnet website had about 38,000 unique 
visitors per day. These numbers are considerable, but less than the reach of its 
linear channel, which is above 90,000 daily viewers. Moreover, VRT research 
shows that less than 50 per cent of Flemish children use their parents’ smart-
phone to watch television, while this amounts to just 33 per cent for computers 
and 75 per cent for tablets. This means that considerable amounts of preschool 
children do not use the devices necessary to access Ketnet Jr. online. For Ketnet 
television, the penetration rate is 97 per cent. So, from a universality perspective 
– and knowing that the intensity of use (1.9 hours a day for 2–5-year-olds via 
television vs. 0.6 hours per day for tablets [VRT, 2016]) is higher for television 
than for other devices – VRT states it makes sense to provide for preschool audi-
ences that are now reached by a separate, international, and commercial offer. 
The regulator dismisses this idea, referring to studies that mainly deal with 
access to technologies, and dismisses that these studies point to 10–15 per 
cent of preschoolers that have no access to new technologies. According to 
the regulator, this group will be included in the future, adhering to a rather 
technologically optimistic view. Interestingly, while the regulator argues for 
Ketnet Jr. as a digital-only service, it refers to increased penetration rates of 
new technologies to forecast a negative impact of a Ketnet Jr. linear channel on 
commercial broadcasters. This would be unlikely in the regulator’s own logic of 
an expected drop in linear viewing, as the impact of the new channel on other 
channels would be limited. 
Next to universality of access, VRT (2017) argues in favour of a linear Ket-
net Jr. channel based on universality as content geared to special groups. VRT 
argues that the needs of the preschool audience are completely different from 
children over the age of six regarding storytelling, graphical issues, language 
use, and so forth. Content for older children is not necessarily suitable for a 
preschool audience because it is more complex, targets different development 
goals, adopts more advanced language, and has a different format and dura-
tion. However – and despite the distinct public service logic underlying it – the 
regulator’s advice completely ignores this argument of content universality. 
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The Flemish government’s decision not to approve
Faced with an advice that, essentially, was not an advice, the Flemish govern-
ment had to decide on the service itself rather than on the regulator’s evalu-
ation. The largest political party in Flanders, the Nationalist New Flemish 
Alliance (N-VA), was opposed to the idea from before the actual procedure, 
supporting Flemish commercial broadcaster Medialaan. The Liberal Party 
(Open Vld) that provided the minister of media had an ambiguous position 
and, to the surprise of the production companies, decided against the service, 
but only after the advice of the regulator. Christian Democrats (CD&V) were 
in favour before, during, and after the procedure of the regulator and when 
the Flemish government wanted to reject the service before the 2017 summer 
recess, they managed to postpone the decision until after recess, hoping public 
broadcaster VRT could intensify its lobbying activities and convince (at least 
one of) the other parties. 
Regardless, in October 2017, the Flemish government rejected Ketnet Jr. 
In its decision, the government argued digital trends would ensure all children 
would be able to access Ketnet Jr.’s online offer. Hence, there was no need for a 
linear preschool channel. The government did not elaborate on market or public 
interest effects, ignoring the considerable body of research that shows children 
from specific sociocultural and socioeconomic groups are excluded from regular 
use of the Internet, have no regular access to tablets or other devices, and lack 
the skills to use them. Universality did not feature in the government’s decision, 
in the sense that the government denied a problem in this area.
Discussion and conclusions
This chapter set out to answer four research questions. First, did the VRM 
act in its capacity as an independent regulator? The answer to that question is 
not a simple yes or no. The analysis shows that the regulator was essentially 
unprepared to do the ex ante test, unable to adopt objective methodologies to 
evaluate the contribution of the service to public interest and market objectives. 
It was confronted with opposing views from the public broadcaster and its 
main competitors and, in the end, was unwilling to provide any advice to the 
Flemish government. The fact that the regulator came to the conclusion that 
the contribution to Flemish culture was positive, to the market negative, and on 
all other elements neutral, suggests that the regulator was hesitant, to say the 
least, to come to an advice that would be difficult for the Flemish government 
to put aside. This is not to say that the regulator and the Flemish government 
agreed on the contents of the advice; there is no scientific evidence for that, but 
insights into the procedure suggest some kind of collusion. 
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Second, was the multistakeholderism approach of VRM inclusive in nature? 
The answer to that question is no. Even though, in principle all stakeholders had 
an opportunity to submit an answer to the open questionnaire, the regulator’s 
use of legal and technical language in the survey created a real disadvantage for 
several less professionalised organisations and for stakeholders with less means 
or expertise in the field of media law. It discouraged several stakeholders from 
submitting answers. Moreover, the analysis of the regulator is not transparent 
about how stakeholder submissions were used. 
Third, were concerns of economic stakeholders prioritised over public inter-
est considerations? The answer is complex, as it appears that the interests of a 
specific group of economic stakeholders were prioritised over the interests of 
other economic stakeholders and stakeholders taking a public interest approach. 
As said, commercial broadcasters and distributors were mentioned significantly 
more and had more impact on the negative, positive, or neutral score. Compet-
ing broadcasters opposed the service, fearing children and their parents would 
prefer Flemish, advertising-free content over their offer of predominantly 
Anglo-Saxon children’s content with advertising; distributors were unwilling 
to include another must-carry channel in their offer. Other economic interests 
were ignored. Most notably, production companies were very positive about 
the proposal, arguing that the public broadcaster is, in fact, the only company 
investing in local children’s content. Their support was dismissed as abstract, 
with the regulator considering it unlikely that VRT would invest extra in lo-
cal content. These doubts were expressed by politicians during the procedure, 
resulting in VRT publishing a paper to make explicit how much additional 
money it would invest on top of its ongoing engagement in children’s content. 
The regulator refused to accept this document in an ongoing procedure and 
continued to insist that VRT’s dossier was unclear on this point, despite not 
having provided VRT with any guidance regarding what elements to discuss 
in its application. Civil society opinions were included only in the part on the 
contribution of Ketnet Jr. to Flemish culture. Several stakeholders were not 
mentioned at all, even though they submitted elaborate responses on the edu-
cational and inclusive approach of Ketnet. From this follows that VRM valued 
opinions of certain stakeholders over those of others, aggravated and even 
enabled by a complete lack of an analytical, objectifying tool for evaluation. 
Fourth, was universality an important consideration when evaluating the 
Ketnet Jr. proposal? No. The argument of digital exclusion was not accepted. 
Ignoring all scientific evidence regarding the remaining divide between “haves” 
and “have nots”, also within younger age groups (Livingstone & Helsper, 
2007), the regulator and, later on, the government, said that an online offer 
was sufficient to meet the demands of the youngest children and their parents. 
A linear channel was a thing of the past. Again, if that were the case, then why 
the fierce opposition from competitors? Why, during the Covid-19 crisis three 
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years later, the rushed government policies to give laptops and Internet access 
to a significant amount of children, if the digital divide was supposed to have 
been resolved? 
The entire ex ante test and its outcome demonstrates a gap between the theory 
and reality of multistakeholderism in PSM policymaking. First and foremost, 
the idea of inclusive policymaking is an illusion (Donders et al., 2018). While 
VRM provided a list of nearly 50 stakeholders that submitted an answer to 
its questionnaire on Ketnet Jr., it does not refer to or quote over half of these 
stakeholders in its advice. In particular, its assessment rarely mentions argu-
ments of educational organisations and individual professionals working with 
children in favour of commercial stakeholders’ considerations. Furthermore, 
the regulator appeared driven by an attempt to find simplistic opposing views, 
as its questionnaire only provided opinions in favour or against the preschool 
channel. There were no questions asking stakeholders what conditions or modi-
fications would make the VRT’s proposal more or less desirable (VRM, 2017). 
Overall, the entire process created the illusion of serving the public while being 
an exercise to have public broadcasters serve the media market rather than 
society and its citizens. Needless to say, such an approach and ideology forces 
public broadcasters away from their mission to serve all parts of the audience 
with a public-value driven offer. 
Ironically, VRT now offers Ketnet Jr. on one of its other linear channels, 
which otherwise broadcasts information and current affairs, culture, docu-
mentaries, and other more highbrow programs after 8 p.m. So, from 6 a.m., 
Ketnet Jr. is now a reality on that channel. This initiative met with no political 
discussions or protests whatsoever. No public value test was carried out. Com-
mercial competitors remained utterly silent on the issue. 
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Chapter 5
Historical dimensions of universalism at the 
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
Some implications for today
David Skinner
Abstract
This chapter explores the ways in which the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) has embraced the idea of universal service. While the CBC was not legis-
latively mandated to elements of universality until 1968, throughout its history, 
Canada’s public broadcaster has striven to provide what are seen today as key 
elements of this ideal. But the large size of the country, coupled with its small 
population, the regional, linguistic, and heritage diversity, the vagaries of funding, 
and relations with the private sector, have made meeting those goals challenging. 
Today, however, the shifting technologies and fragmenting audiences that charac-
terise the digital media environment present perhaps the biggest challenge yet to 
the role of the CBC within the system and its pursuit of the principles associated 
with universalism. Understanding the lessons that past struggles in this regard 
may have for the challenges currently facing public broadcasting in Canada is 
the purpose of this work.
Keywords: public broadcasting, public service media, universality, Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, CBC
Introduction
This chapter explores the ways in which the public broadcasting in Canada 
– and, in particular, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) – has em-
braced the idea of universal service. While universal service is often seen as a key 
goal of public broadcasting, it wasn’t until 1968 that the CBC was legislatively 
mandated to elements of this ideal. Throughout its history, however, Canada’s 
public broadcaster has striven to provide what might be seen as seen as key 
dimensions of universality. But the large size of the country, coupled with its 
small population, the regional, linguistic, and heritage diversity, and the vagar-
ies of funding, have made meeting those goals challenging at best. At the same 
time, since the inception of public broadcasting in Canada, the system has been 
comprised of both public and private elements (Canada, 1991) and, from the 
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beginning, the public broadcaster has struggled with private broadcasters over 
access to the system’s resources and audiences. Hence, a key element of this 
analysis is the influence the private sector has had on the pursuit of universal 
service within the system.
Today, the shifting technologies and fragmenting audiences that characterise 
the digital media environment present perhaps the biggest challenge yet to the 
role of the CBC within the system and its pursuit of the principles associated 
with universalism. Understanding the lessons that past struggles in this regard 
may have for the challenges currently facing public broadcasting in Canada is 
the purpose of this work.
Defining universality
While there is no consensus on a definition of universality in the context of 
public broadcasting, a number of writers have attempted to develop a working 
definition. For instance, Tracey identifies eight principles underlying the project 
of public broadcasting, two of which directly address universalism. The first is 
universality of availability. Key features of this principle include ensuring that 
“signals are available to all” and that “no one should be disenfranchised by 
distance or accident of geography” (Tracey, 1998: 26–27). The second principle 
is universality of appeal. Here the concern is that public broadcasting should 
“provide programmes which cater to the many different tastes and interests 
which constitute a society’s life” (Tracey, 1998: 26–27). 
Focusing on the history of British public service broadcasting, Born and 
Proser (2001) identify three key elements of universality. The first is technical 
and geographical universality. Similar to Tracey’s first principle, the key here 
is the provision of high-quality technical service “regardless of geographic or 
social location” (Born & Proser, 2001: 676). The second principle is social and 
cultural universality. Recalling Tracey’s second principle, the focus here is on 
“the provision of programming that caters for and reflects the interests of the 
full social and cultural diversity of Britain and its minorities, as well as the aim 
of enhancing social unity through the creation of a ‘common culture’” (Born 
& Proser, 2001: 676). The third principle is universality of genre and mode 
of address. Expanding on Tracey’s second principle, here the aim is to have 
“programming that includes the entire range of broadcast genres” (Born & 
Proser, 2001: 676). Here, the idea is that public service broadcasting “should 
be truly popular, both as a value in itself […] and, more instrumentally, to 
draw audiences across different and unforeseen kinds of programming” (Born 
& Proser, 2001: 676).
Providing a somewhat broader definition, the 2018 RIPE Conference Call 
for papers states that, “The principle of universalism has four dimensions: 
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1) access and reach, 2) genres and services, 3) relevance and impact, and 4) 
financing with attendant obligations” (Lowe, 2018: para. 2). On the face of it, 
the first three principles appear to echo the ideas discussed above. Financing 
with attendant obligations adds a new dimension that might refer to the ways 
in which the organisation either perceives or is mandated to allocate available 
resources to its responsibilities.
As we shall see, from its inception in Canada, public service broadcasting 
has been framed and animated by principles similar to these. However, within 
the context of the peculiarities of the Canadian state, these principles have both 
developed and been realised in particular ways.
Setting the stage
Broadcasting began in Canada in 1919, but for most of its first decade, develop-
ment investment in radio markets was focused at the local level and was both 
weak and parochial. Signals from high-power American transmitters flowed 
freely across the border, often overpowering those of the smaller Canadian 
stations, and hefty transmission fees on telegraph lines made networks all but 
impossible except under special circumstances (cf. Weir, 1965).
Set against the growing dominance of American stations and programming in 
Canada, the federal government struck the Royal Commission on Radio Broad-
casting (Aird Commission) in 1928. The commission conducted an extensive 
survey of broadcasting in both the US and Europe and held a series of public 
hearings across the country (Canada, 1929b). In its report, the Commission 
found public opinion unanimous on one “fundamental question – Canadian 
radio listeners want Canadian broadcasting” – and that the “potentialities of 
broadcasting as an instrument of education […] providing entertainment, and 
of informing the public on questions of national interest” had been impressed 
upon them (in Bird, 1988: 43). They posited that “broadcasting will undoubt-
edly become a great force in fostering a national spirit and interpreting national 
citizenship” but observed, “[at] present the majority of programs heard are 
from sources outside of Canada [and have] a tendency to mould the minds of 
the young people in the home to ideals and opinions that are not Canadian” 
(in Bird, 1988: 43). 
The Commission went on to recommend that an independent, state-owned 
broadcasting company be established and “vested with the full powers and 
authority of any private enterprise, its status and duties corresponding to 
those of a public utility” (in Bird, 1988: 44). The technical backbone of the 
system was to be seven high-powered broadcasting stations, with perhaps a 
few low-powered undertakings supplementing their service in locales that were 
“ineffectively served”. All other stations would be closed down. Financing for 
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the system would come from license fees, indirect advertising, and government 
subsidies. 
While not explicitly stated, these recommendations reflected a number of the 
core principles of universalism described above. Informed by a nationalist vi-
sion, the Commission was convinced that private investment was not adequate 
to the task of building (e.g., access and reach) and programming (e.g., genres 
and services) a national system. They were concerned that the system should 
eventually cover all parts of Canada but that private broadcasters requirement 
that programmes develop large audiences to garner advertising revenue resulted 
“in the crowding of stations into urban centres and the consequent duplica-
tion of services in such places, leaving other large populated areas ineffectively 
served” (e.g., universality of availability) (in Bird, 1988: 43–45). Based upon the 
observations that only a minority of Canadians owned radios and that a high 
licence fee would be “burdensome to those of limited means” (e.g., universality 
of availability), the commissioners were also concerned that the public would 
not support a system financed solely by licence fees or government subsidy (e.g., 
financing with attendant obligations). Consequently, broadcasting’s “educa-
tive value” and “importance as a medium for promoting national unity” (e.g., 
relevance and impact) made it appear “reasonable” to the Commission “that a 
proportion of the expenses should be met out of public funds” (e.g., financing 
with attendant obligations) (in Bird, 1988: 50). In other words, the Commission 
envisioned public broadcasting as providing a universally available service with 
a comprehensive range of programming, financed in a way that spread the cost 
between a range of stakeholders. However, how these principles would play out in 
the peculiar circumstances characterising the emerging system remained to be seen.
Moreover, while advertising is sometimes seen as antithetical to the purposes 
of public broadcasting, here it was an important part of the equation, as it was 
seen as a means for alleviating the cost of the system to the public and meet-
ing with concerns of Canadian commercial interests who argued that a ban 
on advertising would leave them at a disadvantage to American companies in 
Canadian markets. 
Early radio broadcasting, 1930–1948
From the fall of 1930 to the spring of 1932, public debate on nationalising 
broadcasting was heated and government lobbying extensive. In the face of 
opposition, advocates for nationalisation allowed that stations serving local 
markets might be privately owned and locally programmed. And, in an effort 
to address both the popularity of American programmes and the concerns of 
station owners and advertisers that Canadian audiences would actually tune 
in to the proposed network instead of the American radio networks, selected 
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programmes would be obtained from foreign sources. These concessions il-
lustrated the power of entrenched private interests and presaged the struggles 
between the private and public sectors that would characterise regulation for 
decades to come. At the same time, however, with the financial hardship of the 
Great Depression, the private profit-oriented interests were loath to undertake 
further responsibilities toward building a national system (Peers, 1969).
In May of 1932, Prime Minster R. B. Bennett gave a speech introducing the 
legislation in Parliament that clearly outlined its nationalist purposes and con-
text. First, he argued that “this country must be assured of complete control of 
Canadian broadcasting from Canadian sources” (Bird, 1988: 112). Without it, 
[broadcasting] can never become a great agency for communication of mat-
ters of national concern and for the diffusion of national thoughts and ideals 
[…]. It can never be the agency by which consciousness may be fostered and 
sustained and national unity still further strengthened. (Bird, 1988: 112)
Second, Bird (1988: 112) claimed, 
no other scheme than that of public ownership can ensure to the people of this 
country, without regard to class or place, equal enjoyment of the pleasures of 
radio broadcasting. Private ownership must necessarily discriminate between 
densely and sparsely populated areas […]. Happily […] under this system 
there is no need for discrimination; all may be served alike. 
Thus, from the outset, public broadcasting was envisioned as a national, uni-
versally available service for communicating Canadian ideas and perspectives 
and enhancing social unity; in other words, as having many of the hallmarks 
of universality. 
The regulatory organisation which was created by the 1932 Radio Broad-
casting Act – the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC) – was 
not well equipped to mould the broadcasting system into the “great agency” 
envisioned in Bennett’s speech. The CRBC’s relations with the private sector 
were focused more toward regulation than eventual ownership, and its relation-
ships with Parliament were structured more like those of a government depart-
ment than an independent organisation (Canada, 1932). The Commission was 
unable to borrow money or raise capital publicly, and it was dependent upon 
Parliament for releasing funds collected from licence fees – its main source 
of revenue. Moreover, nowhere in the Act were either Parliament’s aims for 
broadcasting or the national purposes of broadcasting specified, leaving the 
Commission without a clear mandate. It was, however, equipped with limited 
powers on two fronts: 1) to regulate and control broadcasting in Canada, and 
2) to “carry on the business of broadcasting”. In terms of the latter, it was 
empowered to both “originate programmes and secure programmes from 
within or outside Canada”. Toward distributing programmes, the Commis-
74
DAVID SKINNER
sion was given full power over network broadcasting and “to make operating 
arrangements with private stations for the broadcast of national programs” 
(Canada, 1932: n.p.).
While Aird’s recommendations originally envisioned that the public broad-
caster would buy up the existing local private stations, funds for this purpose 
were never forthcoming. Consequently, equipped with a handful of stations 
of its own in major centres, the CRBC, and later the CBC, set their sights on 
building and programming a national network and relied upon private stations 
to distribute much of their programming at the local level. Private stations 
were generally fickle partners, however. With their sights clearly set on the 
profit motive, they generally had to be paid to carry the public broadcaster’s 
programming and, where contracts and requests in this regard conflicted with 
more profitable alternatives – such as American programming – they refused 
carriage (CRBC, 1936). At the same time, where regulations were seen as in-
terfering with their bottom line – such as in the case of content and commercial 
regulations – they complained, which often resulted in favourable changes. In 
the midst of the Depression, the Commission’s programmes were quite popular 
with private stations (CRBC, 1936). But, as economic conditions improved and 
commercial formats that attracted large audiences were developed, the public 
broadcaster’s programming quickly lost favour, forcing the public broadcaster 
to develop its own modes of distribution. However, through subsidising their 
operations with both free programming and payments, the CRBC played a key 
role in helping the majority of Canadian stations weather the tough economic 
climate of the Depression.
Consequently, animated by a discourse of nationalist purpose, and faced 
with the intransigence of private broadcasters, public broadcasting began to 
take up residence on the commercial margins of the system. Here, focused 
at the national level, what might be seen as universalism began to take on a 
particular form. Working in conjunction with the private sector, the public 
broadcaster created programming and supplied distribution services that the 
private sector was loath to undertake. Early on, the CRBC’s nationalist focus 
also ran up against another peculiarity of the Canadian state. To meet with 
what were seen at the time as Canada’s two major linguistic groups, the CRBC 
started out distributing programming in both English and French side-by-side 
in its programme formats. But in the face of protests from English Canada, 
the service was soon divided into English and French components, mirroring 
what were seen as the two cultural solitudes of the Canadian state (Weir, 1965). 
Meanwhile, profitable local programming, audiences, and services were largely 
left to private interests.
A new Broadcasting Act legislated in 1936 did away with the CRBC and 
gave rise to the CBC – an independent crown corporation. But while the CBC 
was granted more autonomy than the CRBC, there was still no clear direc-
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tion or mandate for the corporation’s activities, and its regulatory powers and 
own finances remained heavily circumscribed by parliamentary authority (cf. 
Canada, 1936). 
Following the lead of its predecessor, network services and programme 
production were the CBC’s main activities. After a judicious reorganisation of 
its financial relationships, the CBC doubled its investment in infrastructure, 
building a series of high-power transmitters similar to those envisioned by Aird 
(CBC, 1939). By May of 1939, the CBC claimed its signal reached 84 per cent 
of the population (cf. CBC, 1939; Canada, 1938; Weir, 1965).
Expanding programming increased demand for advertising. However, in 
partial response to criticisms by private radio stations and newspapers, the 
CBC adopted a “commercial acceptance policy” that limited advertising to 20 
per cent of gross revenue and turned away hundreds of thousands of dollars 
in revenue per annum through the 1930s and 1940s (Peers, 1969: 226–230; 
cf. Weir, 1965). Thus, one avenue for helping finance the unique services of 
the CBC was voluntarily circumscribed.1 At the same time, in the face of the 
escalating struggles of the World War II and led by its concerns for providing a 
comprehensive programme service, the CBC felt compelled to increase its news 
coverage and, working with newspapers, pioneered a national news service. 
Soon after, it also launched an international short-wave service. Consequently, 
set against evolving financial constraints and in the spirit of universalism, the 
CBC continued to provide an expanding range of programme genres and ser-
vices at the national and international levels.
Meanwhile, private stations pressed the CBC for the unencumbered right 
to create their own networks. But because the CBC was concerned that these 
would be largely used to air American programmes and leave out many sta-
tions that were too small to attract national advertisers, these requests were 
often denied. Instead, in order to maximise coverage, the CBC included these 
stations in its network. Hence, as a regulator, the CBC worked to impose uni-
versalist principles on the system as a whole. As a result, both advertisers and 
small stations benefited from CBC network affiliation. These arrangements 
were not designed to be lucrative for the CBC, nor were they as profitable for 
large stations as independent arrangements might have been (Weir, 1965; cf. 
Malone, 1962).  Consequently, in urban areas where advertising was readily 
found, private stations balked at these arrangements and often failed to meet 
even half their network commitments (Canada, 1938). 
However, under the shepherding of the public broadcaster, the private sec-
tor prospered, and by 1948, their revenue was almost twice that of the CBC 
(Canada, 1951). This prosperity spurred lobbying efforts of private stations; 
key among their demands were the unencumbered right to construct radio 
networks and, fuelled by growing resentment that they were being regulated 
by a competitor, the institution of an “independent” regulatory board. While 
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parliamentary committees reviewing broadcasting continued to endorse the 
public purposes of broadcasting and its use as a nationalist instrument, these 
hearings also became forums for enhancing the reach and legitimacy of the 
private sector, fuelling its growth. Consequently, as the system developed, the 
CBC had to increasingly depend on its own resources for distributing its pro-
grammes, as well as contend with a growing range of private sector competitors 
and fragmented markets and audiences. This expansion effectively sounded the 
death knell for the primacy of the public sector within the system. 
Television arrives
In the late 1940s, American television signals crept across the border, giving 
60 per cent of Canadians access to them. Faced with this onslaught, the CBC 
began to make plans for the introduction of Canadian television in 1949. Just 
as American programmes had been employed in the CBC’s radio schedules 
to offset the cost of production and improve broadcasting’s popularity, the 
Corporation planned to deploy American programming in its television sched-
ules to the same ends. The CBC was charged with building transmission and 
production facilities in six centres across the country and began broadcasting 
in September 1952. The federal government decided, however, that licences 
for stations in places other than these cities would be open to applications 
from the private sector. 
Saddled with the cost of developing television, the CBC began operating at 
a deficit in 1949 (cf. Anderson, 1976). But as sales of television sets took off 
in 1952, manufacturers began to complain that many people were purchasing 
those sets in the US, where economies of scale brought them to market at a 
lower cost. To discourage such cross-border shopping, in April 1953 the govern-
ment imposed a 15 per cent excise tax on television and radio sets and parts. 
The proceeds of this tax were made available to the CBC (Anderson, 1976). 
With the CBC pouring money into the system, television broadcasting 
in Canada grew at an extraordinary rate, and by March 1958, there were 8 
CBC stations and 36 private outlets (Ellis, 1979).2 As Weir (1965: 331) notes, 
“During the first three months of the life of most private stations 85 percent of 
their programs were supplied by the CBC without cost to them”. As stations 
became viable and acquired programmes of their own, the CBC still “made no 
charge to private stations in the case of sponsored or unsponsored programs” 
(Canada, 1957: 185). And when the affiliates carried the national network’s 
sponsored programmes, the CBC shared the revenue with the private stations. 
Consequently, as with radio, public broadcasting’s push for universality helped 
spur the growth of the private sector while leaving it dependent upon their 
cooperation for distributing programming. 
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The system divided
In the context of the post–World War II development of consumer society, it 
quickly became clear that commercial television was going to be quite lucra-
tive, and the private sector stepped up their campaign against CBC regulation. 
A newly installed conservative government provided a sympathetic ear, and in 
1958, a new Canadian Broadcasting Act was legislated. While the government 
argued that the broadcasting system remained a single system, the 1958 Act 
recognised that system as being comprised of both public and private elements 
and set both reporting to an independent regulatory board – the Board of 
Broadcast Governors (BBG). With this shift, the CBC lost any hold it had over 
private broadcasters and was forced to appear before the regulator for both 
licence renewals and to compete with the private sector for new licences and 
other privileges within the system. 
Fuelled by applicants’ heady promises of big contributions to the production 
of Canadian programming, the BBG licensed a large number of private stations 
and a private television network – the Canadian Television Network (CTV). 
However, recognising that private broadcasters would find it much more prof-
itable to import American programming than to produce their own, the BBG 
also introduced Canadian content regulations to help ensure that a percentage 
of broadcast time would be devoted to Canadian content. 
While the protected commercial environment afforded by regulation gave 
extra impetus to the growth of the private sector, it provided little solace for 
the CBC. As the market for television sets became saturated, proceeds from 
the excise tax fell off sharply and the federal government began to subsidise 
the CBC with an annual grant in the late 1950s. But, because the grant was 
provided on a yearly basis, long-term planning was difficult at best. And as 
private investors rushed to cash in on the expanding television market, the CBC 
was at a clear disadvantage in the competition for new licences. Consequently, 
just as had happened in radio, the growing dominance of private investment at 
the commercial heart of the system began to force the CBC to its commercial 
margins. As the CBC (1960: 9) itself noted, “The problem is one of economics 
[…] where economically feasible privately-owned stations are filling the gaps 
through the establishment of satellite stations. But in most areas, because of 
economics, Canadians are looking to the Corporation for service”.
With the growth of the private sector pushing the CBC toward the system’s 
commercial margins, the Corporation laid out what it believed to be the purpose 
of public broadcasting the following year: 1) “to be a complete service […] 
bringing things of interest, value, and entertainment to people of all tastes, ages, 
and interests”; 2) “to link all parts of the country” through both a wide range 
of programming and extension of service to “as many Canadians as finances 
allow”; 3) “to be predominantly Canadian in content and character”; and 4) 
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“to serve equitably in the two main language groups and cultures” (CBC, 1960: 
n.p.). Thus, in the face of successive governments’ failure to provide the public 
broadcaster a mandate, it created one for itself. However, with this move, the 
principles of universalism “officially” became the responsibility of the CBC, 
rather than the system at large.
While this mandate was modified as it was entrenched in ensuing legislation, 
to a large part the principles have remained the same. These principles are very 
similar to those espoused by the Aird Commission, illustrating that despite the 
travails faced by public broadcasting through the development of radio and 
television, universality remained the guiding principle. However, the question 
of how to operationalise these principles in the face of limited organisational 
resources and ever escalating private investment would continue to dog the CBC. 
On one side, as the organisation strove to serve the broadcast needs of a grow-
ing set of diverse social and geographic interests across the country, it would 
divide its resources between a range of competing demands (just as Canada’s 
two main language groups and cultures had already forced a division within 
the Corporation). On another side, as private interests increasingly took hold 
of the commercial centre of the system, and began capitalising and investing 
profits in those aspects of the “national system” from which they might ex-
pect to turn a profit, the CBC’s mandate would continue to relegate it to those 
aspects of development that provided little or no commercial return. Thus, if 
private investment could not be controlled through regulation and turned to 
“uneconomical” national purposes, without a consistent and growing source 
of revenue, this mandate would leave the Corporation vulnerable to engaging 
with an increasing range of necessarily uneconomical responsibilities. The BBG 
was not always helpful in protecting the interests of the public broadcaster 
and, on several occasions, seeing the CBC as one element in the larger “single” 
broadcasting system, attempted to force the CBC to relinquish programming 
and broadcast time to the commercial network (Peers, 1969). But as the system 
developed and particular types of programming – such as sports – became more 
popular (and profitable), the private sector began outbidding the CBC for the 
rights to these programmes (Peers, 1969).
Following trends in the US, the television system grew sharply, and by 1965, 
92 per cent of Canadian homes were considered television households (Canada, 
1965). As with radio, advertising was the primary source of income within the 
system, and American programmes were key to providing it. Equipped with its 
mandate, the public broadcaster worked to turn such revenue to the production 
of Canadian programmes and the extension of broadcast service. For the private 
sector, however, producing domestic programmes entailed a double jeopardy. 
Not only was Canadian programming more expensive to produce than foreign 
programmes were to purchase, if a Canadian programme was scheduled to 
replace a foreign programme – even if it drew as large an audience – any return 
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on investment would be severely reduced if not lost altogether unless the cost 
of the Canadian programme was roughly equivalent to that of the imported 
program. Given that the cost of Canadian rights was generally a fraction of the 
cost of production, this was rarely the case. Consequently, the BBG constantly 
struggled to get private broadcasters to meet with their content obligations 
(Babe, 1979). This problem continues to haunt broadcast regulation. 
At the same time, the CBC’s push for universalism put it at a disadvantage 
in the emerging commercial environment. To maximise advertising income, the 
American programming offered by the private stations was designed to attract 
as large an audience as possible and carry that audience through the evening 
programme schedule. However, in striving to meet a diverse range of tastes and 
interests, the CBC deliberately focused on constructing different types of audi-
ences from timeslot to timeslot through the evening (cf. Miller, 1987). These 
scheduling practices seemingly encouraged viewers – whose tastes were not met 
by the upcoming programme – to switch channels. Once they switched to another 
station, they became wrapped in a programme schedule that was deliberately 
devised to hold large, diverse audiences through programme changes or to capture 
a portion of a competitor’s audience at programme breaks. Consequently, in 
the face of growing competition, by 1967, the CBC held just 50 per cent of the 
Canadian audience, and as the number of channels multiplied, the CBC’s audi-
ence share continued its downward spiral (CRTC, 1979; cf. Rutherford, 1990). 
Fuelled by concerns that the broadcasting system provide Canadians with 
the best service available, throughout the 1960s, the CBC continued to ride the 
leading edge of technology, experimenting with FM radio in 1960, proposing 
satellite distribution in Canada in 1961, and introducing colour television in 
1966.
In radio, licencing on both AM and FM frequencies foregrounded the 
American popular music format throughout the system and, as national adver-
tisers moved to television, declining revenue and pressure from private stations 
induced the CBC to abandon commercial radio broadcasting. Through this 
period, CBC radio continued to clearly differentiate itself from private sta-
tions and, based upon the principles of universalism espoused in its mandate, 
establish a relatively large and loyal share of the radio audience that continues 
to tune in to this day. 
Meanwhile, entrepreneurs began building co-axial cable television (CATV) 
systems in Canadian cities. With their ability to import large numbers of distant, 
mainly American, signals, these systems threatened to flood the broadcasting 
system with foreign content. Because cable did not utilise the radio spectrum, 
these systems were outside the jurisdiction of the BBG, and the board stood 
helplessly by. 
Partially in response to the cable problem, the federal government legislated a 
new Canadian Broadcasting Act in 1968. For the first time, both the nationalist 
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goals of the system and the mandate of the CBC were enunciated in legislation. 
But while the Act stated that the broadcast undertakings within the system 
constituted a “single system”, two elements were defined: a national broadcast-
ing service and a private element. Following the lines set out in the CBC’s self-
proclaimed mandate, the public broadcaster was charged with the presentation of 
“a whole range of programming”, extension of service to “all parts of Canada”, 
“contributing to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information 
and entertainment”, and contributing “to the development of national unity and 
provid[ing] for a continuing expression of Canadian identity” (Canada, 1968: 
section 2.g). The private sector, on the other hand, was given the more modest 
responsibilities of issuing a programme service providing “reasonable and bal-
anced opportunity for the expression of differing views […] of high standard, 
[… and] using predominantly Canadian creative and other resources” (Canada, 
1968: section 2.d). In the case of conflict between the two elements, “paramount 
consideration” was to be given to the “objectives of the national broadcasting 
service” (Canada, 1968: section 2.h). Moreover, while there had originally been 
provision for a five-year funding formula for the CBC, by the time the legislation 
reached the House, annual appropriations were still the rule. 
With this legislation, the dual economic systems that had underwritten 
broadcasting development since its inception were enshrined in regulation. 
Similarly, reflecting its historical position within the system, the CBC was 
defined as a “national” broadcaster – not a “public” broadcaster. The CBC’s 
new “mandate” also reflected the difficulties in forging private investment to 
the larger interest of public communication, and left the Corporation with 
the larger purpose of constructing programming that reflected the diversity of 
interests of Canada’s different communities while, at the same time, attempting 
to forge these interests to the larger national purposes of unity and the expres-
sion of a “Canadian identity”.
Despite shifting technologies and markets, over the next 30 years the public 
and private elements would follow much the same paths as they had always 
followed. Private broadcasting would continue its attempts to capitalise only 
those elements of the system that presented a potential for profit, while the 
public sector would continue to pursue the more ephemeral goals of extending 
service and programme production into areas where private investment was 
loathe to tread.
The Canadian Radio-Television  
and Telecommunications Commission
In the hope of increasing Canadian programme production, the Canadian 
Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) expanded the 
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private sector and admonished the CBC to be less commercial and schedule 
more Canadian programming. But, as the private sector expanded and audiences 
were fragmented, the CBC lost audience share, and advertising revenue fell from 
21.9 per cent of total income in 1969–1970, to 16.7 per cent in 1975–1976 
(Babe, 1979). At the same time, private broadcasters began to consolidate their 
holdings to take advantage of economies of scale. But harnessing the private 
sectors’ profits to Canadian programme production proved difficult for the 
CRTC and, between 1968 and 1979, the amount of Canadian programming 
the CTV network scheduled from 8:00 p.m.–10:30 p.m. fell from 22.8 per cent 
to 5.7 per cent (CRTC, 1979; McFadyen et al., 1980). Still, led by its mandate, 
the CBC continued to press ahead with new distribution technologies, renting 
three channels from the newly launched government-owned Anik satellite in 
1972 for radio and television distribution, introducing a stereo radio network, 
and developing an accelerated coverage plan to bring its service to northern 
and underserved communities. 
In the 1970s, footprints of American broadcast satellites began edging into 
Canada and attracting viewers. In the face of these incursions, the government 
began to press the CRTC to introduce pay television as a way to keep audi-
ences tuned to Canadian services. The CRTC was loath to do so for fear that 
it might fragment audiences. But the Commission’s efforts to hold back the 
tide of technological change soon proved for naught. With economic tremors 
from the end of the post-war boom rocking the economy, the federal govern-
ment developed a new policy vision to spur the growth of the communications 
sector in the early 1980s. 
Set against the impending threat of foreign satellite broadcasters, privately 
owned CATV distribution networks were positioned as the “cornerstone” of a 
new system that would carry a wide array of new information services (Canada, 
1983b). As the government stated, in this new “multi-channel broadcasting 
environment […] the Canadian broadcasting system as a whole, rather than the 
CBC, [would] provide a balanced and comprehensive programming service” 
(Canada, 1983a: 12). But the CBC would still play “key” role that “comple-
ments” the private sector and helps spur programme production (Canada, 
1983a: 12). Toward this end, the CBC’s Canadian content targets were raised, 
and it was charged with contracting 50 per cent of its programming from 
private producers. But, as a new conservative government came to power in 
the mid-1980s, one of its first actions was to pare about 10 per cent from the 
CBC’s budget (Raboy, 1996; Winseck, 1995). 
In the face of this shifting environment, a task force was appointed to re-
view broadcasting policy (Canada, 1986). The ensuing investigation became 
the backdrop for the legislation of a new Canadian Broadcasting Act in 1991. 
Running counter to government concerns for restraint, many of the task force’s 
recommendations looked to strengthen and expand the place of the public sec-
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tor within the system and were reflected in the ensuing regulation. Toward this 
end, both community and aboriginal broadcasting were given particular men-
tion, and a new set of cultural concerns were enunciated. However, these were 
never followed up with strong policy action and, for instance, while aboriginal 
broadcasting managed to obtain a degree of independence, the CBC continued to 
carry large responsibilities in this area, particularly in the north. For the CBC’s 
part, their mandate reiterated the necessity of continuing to provide a range 
of programming that “informs, enlightens and entertains”, that the majority 
of its programmes be “distinctively Canadian”, and that extension of service 
“throughout Canada” remain a key priority (Canada, 1991: section 3.l & m. 
i, vii). Extending these service and programming responsibilities, the CBC was 
also charged with: actively contributing to the “flow and exchange of cultural 
expression”, contributing to “shared national consciousness and identity”, 
and “being made available throughout Canada by the most appropriate and 
efficient means […] as resources become available” (Canada, 1991: section 3. 
m. iii, vi, vii). 
With the changes introduced by the new Canadian Broadcasting Act and the 
increasing number of pay and specialty television channels – or “discretionary 
services” as they would come to be known, covering topics from history to sci-
ence and sports to nature – being launched, the scope of the Corporation’s once 
singular responsibilities was, to a degree, reapportioned amongst new players 
in the system. In the face of these changes, the CBC floated a “repositioning” 
strategy in the early 1990s that would have strengthened the Corporation’s 
representation of regional issues and concerns (at the time, a noticeable gap in 
the system), as well as creating some economies through centralisation. But the 
plan was cut off at the knees by the CRTC’s refusal to allow the Corporation 
to solicit “local” advertising for “regional” service (CRTC, 1991: 423; Raboy, 
1996). A litany of budget cuts followed, and by 1998, the CBC’s full-time staff 
was reduced to half of its 1984 level. In the wake of these cuts, local news and 
public affairs programming were heavily cut back. At the same time, the con-
servative opposition party began to call for privatisation of the CBC (Canada, 
2003). Despite these setbacks, however, the CBC continued its efforts to expand 
the dimensions of broadcasting service. In 1990, it began to quietly experiment 
with digital audio broadcasting, and in 1993, the first CBC radio programmes 
were made available on the emerging Internet (Patrick & Whelan, 1996).
With the increasing number of television channels, audience fragmentation 
accelerated through the 1990s. Although the CBC and conventional “over-the-
air” stations were all carried on the growing cable and satellite distribution 
services, this fragmentation saw the English CBC’s share fall from 12.9 per cent 
in 1993 to 7.1 per cent in 2003. The share of conventional stations fell from 
44.1 per cent to 35.1 per cent, and the new discretionary channels rose from 
6.2 per cent to 16.4 per cent during the same period (CRTC, 2004). Private 
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operators moved to cope with these events by reassembling audiences through 
mergers and acquisitions. The new discretionary channels offered opportunities 
for private broadcasters to both cross-promote and rebroadcast programming. 
However, the CRTC regularly refused the CBC’s request to develop discretion-
ary channels where it might accomplish similar ends.
Still, throughout this period the CBC remained the largest single source of 
Canadian television programming. In 1995, the CBC announced it was going 
to “Canadianise” prime time by 2000–2001. On the English side, 90 per cent of 
programming during peak viewing hours (7:00 a.m.–11:00 p.m.) was Canadian 
content, while the private conventional stations averaged less than 25 per cent. 
On the French side, Canadian programming averaged 88 per cent, while the 
private French networks averaged about 50 per cent between them. Moreover, 
during peak viewing hours, 93 per cent of viewing time on CBC’s English tel-
evision was devoted to Canadian content, while on the private conventional 
networks, it accounted for less than 15 per cent (Canada, 2003). The CBC also 
continued to innovate on the emerging Internet, and in 2000, it launched Radio 
3 – an online music archive directed toward youth. Hence while the CBC was 
further marginalised within the system through the 1980s and mid-1990s in 
terms of both regulation and audience share, following principles of universal-
ism remained a key driver of cultural production within it. 
Through the late 1990s, media policy continued to accent market liberalisa-
tion. Key was a convergence policy that allowed media industries once kept 
separate through regulation – such as broadcasting, telecommunications, and 
newspapers – to consolidate, thereby creating new economies of scale and 
scope. But, as the private sector consolidated to take advantage of efficien-
cies in programme production and delivery, both local and broadly popular 
distinctively Canadian programming were increasingly left out of this mix. 
Driven by universalist principles, the CBC felt increasing pressure to fill these 
gaps. Meanwhile, in May 1999, the CRTC announced that the Internet did 
not fall under the purview of the Canadian Broadcasting Act and thereby it 
would not be regulating Internet content under the terms of the Act (CRTC, 
1999). In time, this would unleash a whole new set of pressures on both the 
CBC and the system at large, as digital streaming services began to undermine 
the objectives of regulation. 
Into the new century
Over the last two decades, the CBC’s place within the system has been a mat-
ter of continuing controversy. Following a two-year study of the broadcasting 
system, the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage’s 2003 report succinctly 
outlined the questions that still haunt the CBC: 
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The conundrum [is] clear – how does one situate a publicly funded broad-
caster in an era of increasing choice and fragmented audiences? What is its 
role? What should its mandate be? What should it be doing? Can it still be 
justified? And how should it be funded? (Canada, 2003: 208) 
While the Committee found no clear answers to these questions, it went on to 
reiterate the central importance of the CBC to the system at large and recom-
mended stable funding, more focus on regional and local programming, and 
amending the Canadian Broadcasting Act to reflect the importance of new 
media services to the future of the CBC. Other studies that reached similar 
conclusions followed (Canada, 2006). 
Building on the recommendations of these studies, The CBC announced a 
five-year strategic plan in 2011 (CBC, 2012). Among the promises were to boost 
Canadian content in prime time, develop more online services, and add local 
radio stations. These were places where broadcasting services were flagging at 
the time. The two growing gaps signalled in the 1990s were particularly ap-
parent at 1) the local level, as the private broadcasters had begun to abandon 
small- and medium-sized markets where, in the multichannel universe, local 
programming is no longer profitable, and 2) the “national” level where, due 
to the economies of scale, distinctively Canadian programming was simply 
unable to compete financially with American programmes. The CBC stepped 
up in both these areas, initiating both new radio and online services, as well 
as developing a growing number of popular weekly television programmes. 
To meet with emerging mobile markets, the CBC also introduced a number 
of new online services including a music platform for showcasing Canadian 
artists (CBC, 2012). 
In late 2013, however, the public broadcaster was dealt a serious blow when 
broadcasting rights to its flagship hockey sports programming were purchased 
by a private media company. Professional hockey had been a mainstay of CBC 
programming since the early days of radio. But under the public broadcaster’s 
management, it had grown to command highly valuable audiences, and coupled 
with the promise of greater profits from new media markets – like other sports 
programming the CBC pioneered – the broadcast rights to those games grew 
beyond the financial reach of the Corporation (Shoalts, 2014). Thus, another 
field of programming that the CBC had nurtured and developed was effectively 
spun off to the private sector for further exploitation.
In 2014, the CBC released a five-year strategic plan titled “Strategy 2020: A 
Space For Us All”, outlining directions for development. In the face of shrink-
ing resources, a central feature of the plan was further investment in online 
resources:
This strategy will reduce our fixed costs and shift investments from support 
services, real estate and traditional broadcast infrastructure, to providing high 
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impact Canadian content, including news and current affairs, progressively 
adapting to audience preferences through an even greater focus on digital and 
mobile across all genres. (CBC, 2014: 1) 
Here, the principles of universalism might be seen as attenuated through the 
financial pressures of the day.
Meanwhile, in October 2015, a new liberal government took office. After 
years of budget cuts under the conservatives, the liberals promised to increase 
the CBC’s appropriation by more than 10 per cent annually. Soon after, the 
government also announced that the Department of Heritage would undertake 
a public consultation on “Canadian Content in a Digital World” – an effort to 
develop a policy to forward the interests of Canada’s cultural, or “creative”, 
industries (Canada, 2017).
The CBC’s submission to the consultation continued to draw upon the 
nationalist vision of public broadcasting developed in the early twentieth cen-
tury as well as accenting the Corporation’s commitment to digital expansion. 
In this regard, the document described four priority areas that would guide 
their future work and investments: “1. Digital innovation; 2. Contributing 
to a shared national consciousness; 3. Creating quality Canadian content; 4. 
Promoting Canada to the world” (CBC, 2017: 3). At the same time, responding 
to concerns over continued growing gaps in local broadcasting services, it also 
promised that the CBC would be “More local than ever before” (CBC, 2017: 
12). Here, the CBC demonstrated that, to a large extent, the founding principles 
of public broadcasting in Canada – programme production and distribution 
– still drove its operations. However, as the Corporation noted, in the face of 
declining advertising revenue, it was at a disadvantage with the private sector in 
that, unlike “vertically integrated broadcasting distribution companies”, it did 
not have “other sources of revenue” to “mitigate the impact of these changes” 
(CBC, 2017: 17). Consequently, in the face of declining revenue and increasing 
pressure from the private sector, in exchange for a guaranteed annual income, 
the CBC also floated the idea of going advertisement-free (CBC, 2017). 
Meanwhile, the private sector was already coveting the CBC’s digital assets. 
With more than 14.8 million views of CBC’s website in 2015–2016, and more 
than 3 million views of Radio-Canada’s digital offerings in Quebec during the 
same period, the CBC/Radio Canada was the online leader in Canada (CBC, 
2017). Hungrily eyeing this online news audience, a 2017 report written by 
a panel of news industry experts recommended that the Corporation give up 
news advertising revenue and refocus its news production to more local and 
less profitable forms of news – in other words, surrender much of the news 
field they had developed over the last 60 years to the private sector (Public 
Policy Forum, 2017).
The 2017 report of the Department of Heritage’s creative industries consul-
tation reaffirmed the CBC’s universal mission: 
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The expectations for CBC/Radio-Canada are high, but reflect what Canadi-
ans expect: a CBC/Radio-Canada that showcases the best of Canada to the 
world; that reflects the country’s diversity, including Indigenous cultures, on 
multiple platforms, from coast to coast to coast; and that continues to provide 
an essential local service to Canadians in all regions of the country, and in 
both official languages. (Canada, 2017: 32)
However, there were no commitments of support other than to state that the 
government would work with the CBC to “renew” its mandate in the context 
of an upcoming review of the Broadcasting Act and Telecommunications Acts. 
In the interim, the CBC remains by far the largest single producer of Canadian 
programming as well as the largest distributor of Canadian content across a 
growing array of digital platforms (CRTC, 2017). 
Summary and conclusions
Invested with nationalist purpose and led by both implicit and explicit man-
dates reflecting universalist principles (as well as pushed by both regulators 
and private operators), public broadcasting in Canada has been located on the 
ever-shifting commercial margins of the system. In this position, the CBC – as a 
“national” public broadcaster – has operated as a kind of development vehicle 
– at times subsidising the growth of the private sector, but primarily taking up 
elements of production and distribution that the private sector was unwilling 
or unable to undertake. The character of this role has shifted through time – 
across different technologies; between the national, regional, and local levels; 
and between different language and cultural groups – but it is a position the 
CBC has occupied since its inception. 
Here, the principles of universalism have helped guide public broadcasting 
to areas, audiences, and services that have been underserved by private, profit-
oriented broadcasters. At the same time, however, hampered by both lack 
of funding and the support of regulators in developing new services, public 
broadcasting has continued to hover on the margins of the system in terms of 
audience reach and the services it provides. Meanwhile, in the shifting economic 
currents of the system, the CBC is being pressured to both backfill local services 
abandoned by the private sector and relinquish some of the online audiences 
it has developed to them.
While historically the private sector has often worked to flood the system 
with foreign programming, led by universalist principles, public broadcasting 
in Canada has well served the public interest in the system, striving to provide 
both universally available broadcasting services and a wide range of content 
to fill them. Given this history, providing the CBC more latitude in meeting 
its universal objectives would help fulfil the larger objectives for the system set 
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out in the Canadian Broadcasting Act at a time when new digital technologies 
threaten to overwhelm the system with foreign programming.
One of the first steps in this direction might be to establish predictable 5–7-
year funding for the Corporation. This has long been a recommendation of 
enquiries and studies. Stable funding would allow the Corporation to undertake 
meaningful long-term planning. A second step would give the CBC priority 
to license new services that complement existing operations. Too often such 
licensing requests have been turned down in favour of private sector applicants. 
The effect has been that the private sector has been able to develop efficiencies 
in their operations that have eluded the CBC. Finally, on a more controversial 
note, while the CBC and many of its supporters are currently calling to make 
it “advertising free”, giving the Corporation free reign to solicit advertising 
where it sees fit would provide some flexibility toward developing new income 
streams and, consequently, new services. As pointed out by Leonard Brock-
ington, one of the first chairs of the CBC, unlike the private sector, every cent 
that the Corporation takes in is set to the purpose of developing programming 
and services for Canadians. Moreover, as we have seen, led by a universalist 
mandate, traditional concerns about the impact of commercial imperatives upon 
the character of media programming don’t impact the CBC in the same way as 
they do the private sector. On the contrary, they might spur the development 
of popular, recognisably Canadian programming, something private investment 
has shunned historically. 
In conclusion, while the universal principles upon which public broadcasting 
was founded in Canada have at times been subverted to support the growth and 
profits of private interests within the system, they have also worked to focus 
the public broadcaster on elements of content production and distribution that 
might have otherwise gone untended. 
Notes
 1. It is interesting to note that at this juncture, CBC management saw little conflict between the 
carriage of advertising and the purposes of public broadcasting. For instance, when asked by 
a parliamentarian, “what real good argument is there against a certain amount of advertis-
ing on the [CBC’s] programs?” the CBC’s chairman, Leonard Brockington, replied, “At the 
present time I should say there was none” (Canada, 1938: 32). And, when pressed on the 
point that the CBC’s advertising practices presented unfair competition for private stations, 
Brockington reminded the committee of how the Corporation converted this revenue to public 
purposes: “It is sometimes forgotten that every cent taken in by the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation is used for the building up of something for the benefit of the Canadian listener. 
It does not go into the profits of shareholders. It does not go to build up private operators’ 
profits. It is held in trust for the people of Canada” (Canada, 1938: 33). 
 2. The CBC contributed substantially to this growth, and between 1952 and 1957, the Corpora-
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Multichannel strategy, universalism, and  
the challenge of audience fragmentation
Julie Münter Lassen
Abstract
Technology and the political climate made it possible for the Danish public ser-
vice media institution, the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR), to expand its 
television channel portfolio from two to six channels between 2006 and 2009. 
For a decade, DR has been operating one primary television channel and five oth-
ers with relatively narrow profiles. This chapter considers whether DR might be 
undermining its own legitimacy as a provider of a universal service by pursuing 
this multichannel strategy. Although the entire population can access all of DR’s 
content, the multichannel strategy positions DR as part of a development that is 
fragmenting the public into discrete taste groups. Through a qualitative study of 
DR’s scheduling strategies, the chapter investigates the extent to which DR seeks 
to unite its channel portfolio, thus avoiding running six separate channels. In the 
conclusion, political development of media in Denmark elucidates the changing 
conditions of DR’s activities.
Keywords: legacy mass media, personalisation, curation, linear and non-linear 
television, content diversity, Nordic media
Introduction
If a Danish television viewer wanted to change channels in the beginning of 
the 1990s, there were few domestic options. Danish viewers could choose be-
tween three national television channels: the Danish Broadcasting Corporation 
(DR), TV 2, and TV3. Today, the Danish television market features about 45 
television channels that are enabled by technological, political, economic, and 
user-behaviour developments. For viewers, the large number of television chan-
nels means more choice. For television companies, those developments mean 
increased competition and – following this – a need to develop marketing and 
scheduling strategies to both capture and retain the attention of viewers. DR 
has felt the increased competition, but for public service media organisations, 
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this development raises a question of balance. On the one hand, they must take 
care of the special tasks that are their raison d’être by providing the public with 
a diverse programme offer, catering for minorities, and strengthening the na-
tional culture and language of Denmark. On the other hand, they must ensure 
that viewers, listeners, and users actually make use of their offers. Otherwise, 
public organisations lose relevance and legitimacy.
This chapter focuses on DR, the Danish public service media institution (pre-
viously named Denmark’s Radio), to consider how it has developed its television 
operations between 2005 and 2015. During this period, DR transitioned from 
operating two television channels with mixed profiles for general audiences to 
six channels, one primary and five with distinctive and rather narrow profiles. 
The extended channel portfolio gives viewers more programmes and channel 
options to choose between. Distinctive profiles have enabled DR to retain a high 
reach and share, including young audience groups who are typically leaving 
linear television. The development also means strategic and scheduling tasks 
have changed radically in a relatively short period.
Everybody in Denmark can access DR’s television channels and online 
streaming service. These channels are free-to-air and the streaming service does 
not require an account. From this perspective, DR’s television service is a uni-
versal service. However, with six profiled television channels, DR contributes 
to the general trend in media development to cater to individual preferences. 
The previous “mass audience” is fragmented into a series of non-integrated 
niche audiences. The pros and cons can be argued, but the aim here is to discuss 
whether by doing so DR might undermine its own legitimacy as a universal 
service provider as it metamorphoses into a multichannel provider. It is reason-
able to question whether this development is a better way of serving viewers, 
and whether DR has any alternatives. To this end, the chapter sheds light on 
the degree to which DR is operating its television channel portfolio as a unified 
offer or as a series of discrete channels. This is done through analyses of the 
development of the intersections between channels during prime time and the 
continuities at 8:00 p.m. Continuities are here understood as the visual and 
auditive elements played between or in the programmes to inform viewers of 
(up)coming programmes or otherwise brand the television channel or company 
in general. The empirical material for these two analyses consists of recordings 
of the range of programmes on all DR’s television channels, and the analyses 
draws methodologically on Bruun (2016), Ihlebæk and colleagues (2014), and 
Johnson (2013b). One week from the autumns of 2005, 2010, and 2015 were 
chosen for the study because these years represent key stages in DR’s develop-
ment as a provider of a multichannel portfolio.1 
After a short introduction to DR and the Danish television landscape, the 
chapter continues with a discussion of the notion of a channel and how a 
universal and diverse television service is to be understood. In the conclusion, 
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the media political development in Denmark is incorporated to demonstrate 
a reinterpretation of DR’s public service mission and tasks. The chapter deals 
solely with DR and the circumstances in Denmark, but aims to contribute to the 
broader discussion about the future role of legacy public service broadcasters 
in a media landscape characterised by multiple channels and platforms, which 
Ellis (2002) described as the era of plenty, and which Ihlebæk and colleagues 
(2014) refer to as the era of proliferation.
DR’s public service activities
DR is the Danish Broadcasting Corporation. It was founded in 1925 as the first 
broadcaster in Denmark. From the start, DR was given the status of a public 
service institution. In the first 25 years of its history, DR was the sole provider 
of radio services. From 1951, the institution broadcast television services as well, 
and in 1996 DR launched its first web page that was solely for news content. 
The year 2001 was the first time that DR provided live-broadcast television 
online in conjunction with the Eurovision Song Contest the company hosted 
that year. Today, programmes can be watched as catch-up services online, there 
is a streaming service and several apps that provide content and services for 
children and news, and so forth.
DR is an independent public institution managed by an executive board and 
a management board in accordance with the Danish Radio and Television Act 
and DR’s successive public service contracts. These contracts are agreements 
between DR and the Minister for Culture. Until 2019, DR’s public service activi-
ties were financed by an annual licence fee. Between 2019 and 2022, the licence 
fee will be gradually replaced by a tax, thereby making the budget of DR part 
of the general public financing system (The Danish Ministry of Finance, 2018).
This chapter focuses on the television activities of DR, which is not the 
only provider of public service television in Denmark. TV 2/Denmark also has 
public service obligations, and the same applies to eight regional TV 2 televi-
sion stations. Of these public institutions, DR is by far the largest in size and 
in the number of channels and platforms. The television channels of both DR 
and TV 2/Denmark are popular among viewers; in total, 63 per cent of televi-
sion viewing in Denmark is devoted to public service channels (The Agency for 
Palaces and Culture, 2019).
The television channel in theory
“Broadcasting”, in the original sense of the word, referred to the scattering of 
seed corn that a sower cast in all directions. In relation to electronic media, the 
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term is allegorical for the universal transmission of programme content from a 
central sender to everyone as a mass audience. This contrasts with the concept 
of “channel”, which the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines as “a path along 
which information (such as data or music) in the form of an electrical signal 
passes” (Merriam-Webster, 2002: n.p.). Whereas “broadcasting” describes the 
broad provision of unspecified content, “channel” characterises targeted com-
munication where the sender directs the content to receivers. This distinction 
is interesting to keep in mind when describing how the television channel went 
from being merely a technical distribution platform to becoming a carefully 
profiled means for addressing a specific target group within the broad mass of 
potential audiences.
Drawing on Ellis (2002), Johnson describes the circumstances under which 
television channels began in the medium’s formative period:
In the early decades of television broadcasting the number of television chan-
nels was determined by the restriction of the electromagnetic spectrum. As 
a consequence, the broadcast era (roughly from the 1930s/40s to the 1980s) 
is often one characterized by a scarcity of television channels. (Johnson, 
2013a: 276)
Due to spectrum scarcity, it was both costly and difficult to operate a broad-
casting network that was mandated to reach even the most remote residents 
of a population. Scannell (1990) describes how it became a task for national 
governments to distribute the sparse number of frequencies amongst broadcast-
ers, the armed forces, emergency services, telecommunications, and so forth. 
Because of restricted supply but great demand, public broadcasters in Europe 
had one or two channels (Mortensen, 2008; Scannell, 1990). The channel was 
primarily understood as a technological means for distributing content to an 
entire population. As cable and satellite technology made it cheaper to launch 
and operate television channels, more were launched, and the single channel 
went from being a platform of distribution to a way of addressing specific target 
groups – in other words, niche audiences.
One reason for this development was new financing techniques that paral-
leled developments in distribution technologies. While a public broadcaster 
financed by a universal licence fee is required to serve the entire population, and 
a channel financed by commercial advertisements must have a high reach in its 
target group to be attractive to advertisers, cable and satellite technologies gave 
the possibility of establishing pay-per-view and subscription services. Johnson 
(2012) describes how channels were profiled to help persuade viewers to pay 
for their content. Despite the large supply of television channels, most viewers 
watch between five and eight according to Johnson (2012). Therefore, it was 
“increasingly important not only for broadcasters to stand out in an ever more 
crowded marketplace, but also to try to position themselves as one of the few 
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regular channels for television viewing” (Johnson, 2013a: 283). One way to 
stand out was, according to Johnson (2013a), to launch niche channels directed 
at narrowly defined target groups or with uniform content – thematically or in 
genres. Thus, profiled channels are targeted to niche interests. However broad 
or narrow, niche is the opposite of universal. 
Although public service broadcasters are not subject to market mechanisms 
in an economic sense (at least for those that are non-commercial), the intensi-
fied competition that followed the arrival of so many new television channels 
meant that public media institutions have needed to address viewers more di-
rectly to stand out in the competition. A general tendency emerged in European 
television markets during the 1990s that encouraged profiling each channel 
(Johnson, 2013a; Light, 2004). Among others, Light (2004) characterised the 
development of today’s multichannel system as a transition from broadcast-
ing to narrowcasting (see also Goodwin, 2018; Negroponte, 1995), which is 
to say, from transmitting programmes intended for an entire population to 
transmitting programmes directed to narrow viewer segments – that is, target 
audiences. A broad mass audience is eroded when viewers are spread across 
an array of niche channels.
Universality: From a question of access  
to a question of content and presence
Constituent in the development of today’s multichannel television landscape, 
the notion of a universal service has widened. Syvertsen (1999: 6) argued that 
public service broadcasting was initially understood as a public utility, and 
that within this understanding, “the prime criteria of success are signal qual-
ity, efficiency of operations and a distribution network that provides universal 
access”. Later, Syvertsen (2003) applied this understanding to the mission of 
European public broadcasters as an obligation to guarantee universal coverage 
as a service for an entire population. Thus, universality was a matter of develop-
ing a network the entire national population could access. Jakubowicz (2006) 
and Van den Bulck and Moe (2018) broadened the definition of universality 
to focus as well on content.
Given developments in television markets and the emergence of new distri-
bution platforms in recent years, Jakubowicz (2006: 12) worried that a new 
understanding of universality concerned with “the use of thematic services, and 
even more so of personalized ones, can be seen as undercutting what has always 
been regarded as a distinguishing element of PSB, i.e. universality of content 
and access”. Van den Bulck and Moe focus solely on the content aspect in their 
description of universality as a dual ideal. It refers to universal appeal because 
“PSM must provide a range of programmes that inform, inspire, entertain and 
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appeal to the diverse interests of the young and the old, the higher and less 
educated, across the community” (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018: 877). At the 
same time, universality can be interpreted as “the idea that PSM must cater to 
every specific taste, even outside the mainstream” (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018: 
878). This combination of programmes with mass-appeal and services tailored 
for specific audiences is also evident in Jakubowicz’s (2006) understanding of 
universality of content.
Universality is not mentioned explicitly in DR’s legal framework or public 
service contracts; however, a number of DR’s obligations reflect the universal-
ity ideal in both access and content. In the current public service contract, 
DR is obliged to ensure that the entire population has access to important 
and independent information, as well as cultural programming and space for 
debate (DR, 2018b: 2). By law, DR is also required to endeavour to provide 
versatility and diversity in its overall programme supply. The Danish Radio 
and Television Act (2014) specifies a number of genres DR must provide, in-
cluding news, information, educational programmes, art, and entertainment. 
DR’s public service contract for 2019–2023 enlarges on how DR must handle 
its obligations within news, educational programmes, content for children and 
young people, Danish drama, music, art, and types of sport. 
There are several reasons for DR’s obligation to provide a diverse supply 
of genres. First, a broad range of genres ensures the population is well-in-
formed about topics deemed important to the society. Second, the obligation 
sets the public service institution apart from commercial competitors that 
are more specialised in their content provision. Third, a diverse supply of 
genres can better ensure that the content of DR is able to cater to “every” 
specific taste.
Everybody in Denmark can access DR’s services and content. Thus, regarding 
universality as a matter of access, DR is without debate providing a universal 
service to the public. However, the development described by Jakubowicz 
(2006) is characteristic of the way DR has evolved over the past decade. As 
DR’s multichannel portfolio offers viewers more content to choose between, 
the extension of channel choice entails a challenge for the public service media 
organisation from a universality perspective. The comprehensive channel and 
programme choice means there are fewer programmes viewers have in com-
mon, which means fewer shared experiences and less common knowledge. In 
addition, the multichannel portfolio has made a diverse reception more difficult 
because viewers can choose between several rather narrowly profiled channels, 
and therefore more easily avoid less-popular genres.
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The diverse programme output and its reception
There is a sticking point: “On its own, diversity of supply cannot secure diversity 
of reception, but it is a necessary condition for this”, McQuail observed (1993: 
157). The viewers’ exposure to a diverse programme supply is part of the de-
bate about the obligation of the public service institution to provide a versatile 
and diverse programme output. It is important to note that DR has never been 
required to ensure a diverse reception, nor has the Danish broadcaster been 
asked to have equal programme output across genres. Such demands would 
curtail the flexibility needed to respond to changing current events, relevant 
platforms, and the preferences of audiences. However, there is an implicit ex-
pectation that a diverse supply can stimulate diversity of reception, including 
genres typically seen as important to society in a broader perspective (e.g., news 
and current affairs especially).
This view was expressed by Scannell (1989: 138) when he argued for “the 
supply of mixed programme services […] i.e. a wide range of different kinds of 
programmes delivered on a single channel”. Scannell feared a segmented British 
television market and the implications for the broader public: 
Generic programming fragments the general public that is still constituted 
in today’s four national UK television channels into particular taste publics 
whom advertisers are increasingly keen to target. In so doing it destroys the 
principle of equality of access for all to entertainment, informational and 
cultural resources in a common public domain. (Scannell, 1989: 139)
Scannell considered universal access and appeal to have key importance for 
the democratisation of society. According to Scannell, the consequence of 
segmenting viewers across numerous niche channels could be problematic for 
a society as a whole since individual interest would replace a shared common 
interest. This prediction was made 30 years ago, but in Denmark, the viewing 
habits have to some extent developed as foreseen. In Denmark, a country of 
approximately 5.8 million inhabitants, the number of programmes with more 
than 1 million viewers has declined from about 1,000 in the 1990s to about 
100 in 2017 (Knudsen & Svenningsen, 2018). And today, we not only have a 
wide range of segmented television channels to choose between – several online 
services foster personalised media consumption. 
Because all viewers are not well-resourced, some will opt out of the more 
challenging programme genres they would have otherwise met on a channel 
with a mixed range of programmes, writes Scannell (1989). This can also be 
said about well-resourced viewers who do not seek out a mixed range of pro-
grammes. According to Scannell, the absence of equal access to a broad and 
mixed programme service erodes the democratic principles on which public 
service broadcasting rests. 
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On the one hand, Scannell is right in identifying the challenges the multiplied 
and individualised television market entails for the public service mandate, 
especially to what degree we can still talk about a universal service of benefit 
for society. We shall get back to this discussion seen from a Danish perspective 
at the end of this chapter.
On the other hand, Scannell romanticises the general public in the UK and 
exaggerates the abilities of public media to be community creators. A mixed 
programme supply on a single channel directed to an entire population does not 
take into account different preferences in genres and styles that cause viewers to 
switch off the television or – in a multichannel system – to choose other channels. 
Neither does he acknowledge, for instance, that when children’s programmes 
are being broadcast, other age groups may switch off or to another channel 
(see also Ytreberg, 2002). Light (2004: 249) is among those upbraiding the 
view Scannell expressed: 
One has to ask at this stage whether such a vision of genre diversity still has 
any validity or whether it is just a vestige of public service broadcasting his-
tory. It rests on the assumption that proximity still works as a means to lure 
audiences to flow from a more popular programme to a less popular one. 
According to Light (2004), flow scheduling of diverse channels might have an 
effect in a system with limited options, but when viewers can switch between 
many channels in a few clicks on the remote control, it is more likely that a 
viewer will change channels than stay and watch a programme that does not 
create immediate interest. 
The contributions of Scannell and Light must be read against the background 
of the times in which each was written. The late 1980s was characterised by 
deregulation when public television monopolies were ended in many European 
countries and commercial competition became notable. Scannell (1989) accentu-
ates media development in the US as concerns arose about the consequences of 
fragmented channels with low-cost repeats and narrow ranges of content within 
channels. He described how economic and political forces were pressing for 
a similar development in Europe. When Light wrote her dissertation in 2004, 
the segmented channel landscape was a reality. Although viewers now have 
numerous channels to choose among, that does not mean Light was right in her 
assumptions of viewer behaviour. According to interviews with key staff in DR’s 
programming department I carried out, flow scheduling still has a measurable 
effect (Lassen, 2018). This indicates that viewers can still be motivated to stay 
with a channel despite numerous alternatives.
Unlike Scannell, both McQuail (1993) and Hellman (2001) argued that di-
versity is (also) a question of choice in the viewing options. McQuail described 
two forms of versatility: internal and external diversity; Hellman formulated this 
as vertical and horizontal diversity. The idea is much the same: a single channel 
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can offer a versatile and manifold range of programmes, described by Scannell 
as a mixed programme supply. This would be internal or vertical diversity. 
But diversity can also be found across channels in a portfolio or even an entire 
channel system. This would be external or horizontal diversity. 
On this type of diversity, Hellman (2001: 185) writes, “although individual 
channels may have become less mixed, the audience may be better served today 
than they were yesterday”. DR’s channel portfolio offers an example of this 
kind of diversity. Figure 1 demonstrates the number of channels (and thus the 
number of programmes) viewers could choose from at any given time in 2005, 
2010, and 2015, respectively. The DR viewer could choose between two pro-
grammes in 2005, while this number in 2010 and 2015 was six.










 Diverse programme supply Diverse programme supply
Comments: The dotted line illustrates the viewer’s option at any given time.
To a public service media institution such as DR, the multichannel portfolio is 
an advantage in allowing DR to broadcast a greater number of programmes at 
the same time, thus making it possible to cover more genres and target groups. 
In this way, horizontal or external diversity is bigger within the channel port-
folio of DR.
However, in reality, it is not necessarily the case that an increase in the number 
of channels will cause a more diverse programme output in the entire channel 
system. It can result in the opposite, so that there will be more of the same kinds 
of content. Hellman (2001: 186) writes, “it is possible that each channel aims 
at diversity with similar content (identical channel diversity), with none of the 
channels making any ’extra’ contribution to the overall system diversity”. The 
reason for this is that in a segmented channel, the programme output will be 
narrower than on a channel with a mixed profile. At the same time, a greater 
number of television channels results in more intense competition for the at-
tention of viewers. When in addition there is a smaller part of the population 
of interest to advertisers, and consequently for private commercial television 
companies, those channels tend to focus on the same target groups. In a study 
of the Norwegian television landscape, Ihlebæk and colleagues (2011) con-
cluded that the public service television channels broadcast a broader variety 
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of programme genres and addressed a greater part of the population compared 
with private channels. 
DR’s television channel portfolio
Since DR launched its second television channel in 1996, the strategy has been 
a mixed portfolio rather than mixed channels. Analyses of DR’s strategies and 
interviews with key staff show that the design (and changes) of the profile for 
the entire portfolio has reflected contemporary challenges in the media landscape 
in general, and to DR specifically. For example, the profile of DR’s television 
channel portfolio from 2014 to 2020 points to difficulties this company (and 
other legacy broadcasters) face in reaching children and young people who 
are leaving traditional linear channels in favour of on-demand services. DR is 
grappling with this development by offering three channels targeted to children 
and young people: DR Ramasjang for children aged 3–6, DR Ultra for children 
aged 7–12, and DR3 for teens and young adults aged 15–39.
An aspect of central importance in designing the overall portfolio profile is 
competition. Soon after DR’s monopoly was broken in 1988, DR began losing 
viewers to the new, competing public service channel TV 2. As more channels 
and services have come into being, the competition has grown ever fiercer. A 
response to the competition is the strengthening of DR’s main channel DR1. 
Since DR2 was launched in 1996, DR1 has been the main channel in the port-
folio. But this position was strengthened in 2012 regarding which programmes 
the individual channels broadcast and the scheduling strategies for the portfolio.
Besides making it possible for DR to address the difficult-to-reach-target 
groups, the multichannel strategy lets DR offer viewers more content to choose 
between and cater to niche groups with narrower profiles. The strategy has 
worked well in light of audience ratings. The main channel, as well as the 
portfolio channels, have obtained high shares and reaches in viewing. In 2015, 
DR’s television channels obtained a joint share of viewing of 34 per cent (in 
2018 the number was 37%), and DR Ramasjang obtained the highest share 
amongst the children’s channels in the Danish television market with 2 per cent 
(DR Media Research, 2019; Lassen, 2018). 
However, legitimising the strategy of a large channel portfolio with segmented 
channel profiles is challenged in two areas. First, the number of channels makes 
it difficult for DR to fill out the schedule with original programmes. When DR 
launched new channels (in 1996 as well as in 2009), DR’s income was not 
increased correspondingly. Therefore, many reruns and imported programmes 
were necessary. From 2005 to 2015, the share of reruns went from 51 per cent 
to 79 per cent on DR’s television channels, while the broadcast hours of fiction 
from abroad rose from 2,419 hours to 13,872 hours – or from 23 per cent to 
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32 per cent of DR’s total television programme output (Lassen, 2018).2 This 
development gives rise to criticism, not least from Danish politicians, which 
will be elucidated at the end of this chapter.
The second reason the legitimisation of the channel portfolio is challenged 
hinges on the question of whether an assortment of niche channels actually 
comprises a universal service. The entire population can access all DR’s chan-
nels, and the combination of one broad and several narrow channel profiles 
gives DR rich opportunity to cater to every taste group. But if the public is 
fragmented into niche audiences that do not share a common experience, then 
a core value of public service broadcasting is undermined. To address this chal-
lenge, the next section will shed light on the degree to which DR is uniting its 
television channel portfolio through its scheduling strategy.
A united television channel portfolio?
Two aspects are highlighted in the study of whether DR is offering a united 
portfolio or running separate channels, and how this has developed from 2005 
to 2015. Both aspects are related to the structural and strategic level of DR’s 
television activities. 
The first aspect is whether the range of programmes are coordinated so 
that it is easy for viewers to shift between channels without missing content. 
If this is not the case, the viewers will have to choose one channel and stay on 
it (or switch to a competing channel) and will not benefit from DR’s different 
offers and channel profiles. Secondly, DR’s practice of making programme 
promotions will be investigated. Of special interest will be whether DR does 
cross-promoting so viewers know what can be found on the other channels 
during specific viewing periods.
The data consists of printed television listings and recordings of the range 
of programmes for a week during the autumns of 2005, 2010, and 2015. The 
focus is on prime time (6:00 p.m.–midnight) – a longer period than usual be-
cause the channels in the portfolio have different prime times.
Coordination of scheduling structure
There are two main reasons why it is important to coordinate the channels’ range 
of programmes. For the broadcasters, it increases the possibility of retaining 
viewers within the channel portfolio. For the viewers, it is a better service due 
to more options to choose between. In this chapter, “intersection” describes 
the coordination of programme starting times. The three tables below show the 
intersections between the channels comprising DR’s television channel portfolio 
during a week in 2005, 2010, and 2015.
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Table 1. Intersections in DR’s television channel portfolio during week 40 in 2005
Monday Tuesday
Wednes-
day Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
6:00 p.m. X
7:30 p.m. X





Table 1 shows a limited number of intersections between DR1 and DR2 during 
prime time in 2005. This is remarkable because it should have been an easy 
task for the schedulers to coordinate the programme start times with only 
two television channels. However, as also apparent from Table 1, there was a 
well-established break in the range of programmes on both television channels 
every day at 8:00 p.m. This break happens nearly every day on most of DR’s 
television channels for the adult target groups throughout the time period of the 
study. This break does not lead up to any specific programme. On the contrary, 
different programmes within different genres are broadcast at 8:00 p.m. during 
the week. However, it is a tendency in the Danish television channel landscape 
to have a break at 8:00 p.m.
In 2010, DR’s portfolio featured more television channels – one for children, 
one 24-hour news update channel, and four “regular” television channels: DR1 
and DR2 with mixed genre profiles, DR K (“K” for “culture”), and DR HD 
broadcasting in high definition. The news update channel ran as a separate offer 
with no firm schedule and will not be examined in this chapter. Nor will the 
children’s channels be included: DR’s one children’s channel in 2010 and two 
children’s channels in 2015 differed substantially from the rest of the channels 
in the portfolio regarding structure, transmission time, and prime time(s), ow-
ing to the target groups of the channels.
Table 2 shows the intersections between the four DR television channels in 
2010. As also appears from Table 2, the increased number of channels caused 
more possibilities to establish points where viewers could switch channels. What 
the table does not show, however, is that the intersections in 2010 primarily 
involve two of the four channels (except for the break at 8:00 p.m.). During the 
weekends, some intersections involve three or even all four of the channels for 
the adult target group, but during the weekdays, the overall impression is that 
DR runs six separate channels with few possibilities to smoothly switch from 
one channel to another within the portfolio during prime time.
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Table 2. Intersections in DR’s television channel portfolio during week 46 in 2010
Monday Tuesday
Wednes-
day Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
6:00 p.m. X X X X X X
6:30 p.m. X X X X
7:00 p.m. X X X X X
7:30 p.m. X X X X X
8:00 p.m. X X X X X X X 
8:25 p.m. X*
8:30 p.m. X X
8:45 p.m. X
8:50 p.m. X
9:00 p.m. X X X X







Comments: *Two channels broadcast the same programme at the same time, one of them in HD quality
Table 3. Intersections in DR’s television channel portfolio during week 46 in 2015
Monday Tuesday
Wednes-
day Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
6:00 p.m. X X
6:05 p.m. X





8:00 p.m. X X X X X X X
8:30 p.m. X X
8:45 p.m. X X
9:00 p.m. X X X X
9:30 p.m. X X X X
9:40 p.m. X
10:30 p.m. X X X X
The intersections in 2015 are characterised by a big difference when comparing 
weekdays and weekends. Unlike the structure in 2010, there are more intersec-
tions during the weekdays’ prime time than in the weekend. And whereas most 
intersections in 2010 were before 8:00 p.m., Table 3 shows several intersections 
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later in the evening in 2015. Most importantly, many of the intersections in 
2015 involve three or all four channels for adult viewers (two of the six televi-
sion channels in DR’s portfolio were children’s channels at this point in time). 
Thus, viewers could choose between a greater number of channels in 2015 
than in 2010. 
This development is not least due to the strengthening of DR1 as the main 
channel in the portfolio. From 2012–2014 DR restructured its television chan-
nel portfolio in an attempt to stem declining viewing figures. The first step in 
this restructuring was to strengthen DR1 as the entry point for all DR offers. 
The main channel position comes to light in at least three aspects. First, if a 
programme is deemed important, it will be placed on DR1. Second, the channel 
has – by far – the largest budget.3
Third, and most relevant in this context, the programme schedule of DR1 is 
reflected in the structure of the range of programmes on the portfolio channels. 
Throughout the week, DR1 has a fixed structure: From 6:00 p.m.–8:00 p.m. 
and from 9:30 p.m.–midnight, the schedule is fixed with the same programme 
series or types of programmes every day Monday–Thursday. Between 8:00 
p.m. and 9:30 p.m., genres vary over the course of the week, but each day has 
a fixed time structure that is repeated weekly. The fact that the structure is this 
fixed during the week offers two advantages: it makes it easy for the rest of the 
channels to adjust to this structure, and the recognisable structure cultivates 
routine use. This also facilitates DR1 strengthening its position in the competi-
tion with the other large Danish main channel – TV 2.
This development suggests that DR, from 2005 to 2015, has become more 
adept at running a cohesive and unified multichannel portfolio. The structure 
in the range of programmes of all DR’s channels has been sharpened, and the 
scheduling has become a task that involves and considers the entire channel 
portfolio. Obviously, it is not enough to create intersections in the range of 
programmes, however. To make sure the channel portfolio in practice functions 
as a unified offer, DR must make sure the viewers know about the different 
programme options at a given time. We next examine the degree to which DR 
informs viewers about the content on other channels in the portfolio through 
programme promotions.
Cross-promotions
As the analysis above showed, there is a break at almost all of DR’s television 
channels at 8:00 p.m. This break gives viewers an opportunity to switch to 
another channel in DR’s portfolio or to a competing television channel. Thus, 
DR must promote its programmes in order to retain, move, and guide the view-
ers. While some programme promotions are trailers, line-ups, or other visual 
presentations, some are articulated as a voice-over by the “channel voice”. 
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In rare cases, this articulation is done by the programme host (Bruun, 2016; 
Ihlebæk et al., 2011, 2014; Johnson, 2013b; Stigel, 2004; Søndergaard, 1994; 
Van den Bulck & Enli, 2012). Several scholars (Bruun, 2016; Johnson, 2013b; 
Stigel, 2004) suggest two dimensions are especially important with regard to 
programme promotions: when a programme is being broadcast (time) and on 
which channel or platform (place) it is broadcast. In this chapter, I focus on place 
to shed light on the degree to which DR’s channels are linked via continuities. 
Bruun (2019: 88) defines continuities as a “televisual text that informs the view-
ers of upcoming content, holds their attention during these intermissions and 
even attracts new viewers for the upcoming content”. The sample for analysis 
is the programme promotions at 8:00 p.m. on DR’s television channels for the 
adult target groups during a week in 2005, 2010, and 2015. 
Table 4 shows how many promotions were on DR1 at 8:00 p.m. during the 
analysed weeks and the duration of the continuity. It is clear that the overall 
number of promotions is fairly stable over the time period of investigation. 
However, the promotions have been made differently throughout the period, 
which is reflected in the duration of the promotions. In 2010, DR used line-ups 
– that is, visual overviews of the programmes to be broadcast – in combination 
with longer trailers. Therefore, the overall duration of the continuity is shorter 
in 2010 than in 2005 and 2015.




2005/40 4–10 1 minute, 55 seconds–2 minutes, 20 seconds
2010/46 5–9 1 minute, 35 seconds–1 minute, 55 seconds
2015/46 5–9 2 minutes, 10 seconds–2 minutes, 45 seconds
In 2005, the emphasis was on the programmes to be broadcast on DR1, and 
only a few programmes on DR2 and other platforms. In 2010, trailers for DR1’s 
own programmes still dominated the continuities, but DR used voice-overs dur-
ing the roll of credits for ending programmes – an approach Johnson (2013b) 
and Ihlebæk and colleagues (2014) found in British and Norwegian contexts, 
respectively. One trailer promoted a DR radio channel, and four trailers were 
for general branding of the company. 
In 2015, DR hardly used any line-ups, but while approximately four trailers 
per continuity were for programmes to be broadcast on the portfolio channels, 
only a few concerned programmes on DR1. Few trailers promoted other plat-
forms during the week: the children’s web-universe, the DR concert hall, and 
a DR radio channel. Thus, the main channel functions as a display for the rest 
of the portfolio and DR’s different services.
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For portfolio channels, the situation is the opposite. With few exceptions, 
the portfolio channels promote their own programmes with no exposure of 
the other channels’ offers. Similarly, there were only a few promotions for 
other platforms on portfolio channels during the three investigated weeks. This 
practice is surprising from a competition perspective, especially because the 
viewers of portfolio channels, according to managing editor of DR’s schedul-
ing department, Henrik Birck, choose specific programmes to watch instead of 
just “watching TV” (personal interview with Henrik Birck, 18 March 2016). It 
would seem an obvious advantage to present viewers with the different offers 
across DR’s portfolio and platforms.
From a pragmatic perspective, one can ask if it is relevant, for example, 
that the viewer of the culture channel DR K is informed about an upcoming 
programme on the youth channel DR3. The answer could very well be that it 
is not, because the channels’ target groups have too little in common. However, 
in light of DR’s public service task, the lack of cross-promotions (even among 
diverse topic areas) is problematic: When viewers of the narrowly profiled 
portfolio channels are kept on each channel instead of being exposed to the 
programme offer of the entire channel portfolio, the channels come across as 
separate entities. As pointed out earlier, DR’s diverse and versatile programme 
output is to be found horizontally across the channel portfolio and not in a 
single channel. When viewers of the portfolio channels are not informed about 
the offers in other channels, the public service media organisation does not 
stimulate a diversified selection of programmes. Additionally, it is more difficult 
to legitimise DR’s role as a public service institution if viewers are retained on 
narrowly profiled channels and are not (necessarily) exposed to genres that are 
deemed important for the wellbeing of the society.
Beyond these two points, a potential consequence of the lack of cross-
promotions and the viewers’ isolation on narrowly profiled portfolio channels 
may be that a shared, national debate is undermined by niche groups and small 
communities of interest. The following section will elaborate on this challenge.
One mixed channel or a segmented portfolio  
– which is “best” for public service?
As Light (2004: 21) wrote, “with a greater choice of channels, the likelihood is 
that audiences will fragment across them, reducing any sense of a shared space 
and a shared moment” (see also Keane, 1995; Rasmussen, 2016). By running 
a multichannel portfolio – in the interests of competition and individualised 
media usage – DR potentially contributes to a fragmentation of the public.
Two points should be emphasised. First, this is a theoretical consideration. 
Only comprehensive empirical studies can document the actual media usage 
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in the multichannel system (and such studies have not yet been carried out in a 
Danish context). Second, it is important to emphasise that the fragmentation and 
individualisation is not only the work of DR. The entire media system is devel-
oping this way, not least the growing number of video on-demand subscription 
services. But one could argue that as a public service media organisation, DR 
should counteract this tendency and programme one or a few television chan-
nels with mixed genre output, as Scannell (1989) suggested. However, there are 
important reasons for DR to follow the general tendency of the media market.
When DR2 was established in 1996, a key argument for the channel was that 
DR needed a better position in the competition against the other players in the 
television market. Although DR (for economic reasons and as a consequence 
of its specific tasks) does not need to compete, it is important that the public 
service media organisation has a high reach. DR can only facilitate a collective 
dialogue in society if it is in contact with a great part of the population (Nissen, 
2006). With targeted profiles, the multichannel portfolio ensures that DR has 
a high reach and share. Should DR decide to run but one single channel with 
a mixed programme output, it is reasonable to expect that the viewers would 
seek the more targeted offers somewhere else, in line with how the media usage 
and the media landscape in general have developed.
The strategy of the multi-channel portfolio DR has chosen corresponds to 
what Jakubowicz argues as the best way to understand universality of content 
in the age of channel proliferation: 
Universality of content can no longer be understood as one-size-fits-all pro-
gramming on one or more broadcast channels, but as both universality of 
basic supply on generalist channels (including mass-appeal, entertainment 
programming), which will be central to what public service broadcasters of-
fer to the public, and universality across the full portfolio of services, some 
of them specialized or tailored for specific audiences, adding up to a more 
extended and comprehensive range of services. (Jakubowicz, 2006: 13)
Although DR segments the population across a number of portfolio channels, the 
public service media institution operates the main channel, DR1, as a broad and 
intentionally unifying channel. The main channel functions as a counterweight 
to the potential risk of fragmentation that a multichannel portfolio contributes 
to. By operating a main channel that is prioritised economically and in schedul-
ing, the channel can achieve a high reach and share, which positions DR as an 
important unifying institution in Danish society. Had the public service media 
organisation only offered a number of specialised channels, it would be more 
difficult to legitimate the continued need for DR as a public service alternative 
to commercial offers. 
Similarly, a single channel with a mixed-genre profile would be challenged 
since the viewers most likely would turn to other, more specialised offers. With 
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a channel portfolio that contains both a widely profiled main channel and a 
series of channels that target specific segments with content – that otherwise 
is sparsely represented in the Danish media landscape – DR maintains its role 
as an important alternative to private commercial media. The combination of 
broad and narrow channel profiles ensures that DR can provide universality 
in content and across audiences. DR can simultaneously address the public as 
a whole and remain in contact with different target groups.
A smaller DR in the future
This chapter has shed light on the development of DR’s television activities from 
2005 to 2015, where DR extended its television channel portfolio from a few 
to many channels. During this decade, DR has become more adept at operat-
ing a channel portfolio as scheduling – to a large extent – increasingly unites 
the channels to comprise a joint offer. With its multichannel strategy, DR has 
achieved high reach within the population while providing a universal service 
in both access and content dimensions. However, while this chapter was being 
written, the conditions of DR’s television activities changed.
In the spring of 2018, the liberalist-leaning Danish government decided to 
cut DR’s income by 20 per cent between 2019 and 2023, and to reduce the 
number of DR linear television channels (The Ministry of Culture, 2018). The 
reason for this decision is that the parties behind the agreement believe DR is 
distorting the competition on the Danish media market. In September 2018, DR 
and the Danish Minister for Culture signed a public service contract in which 
it was agreed that DR will close three of its six linear television channels in 
2020.4 The remaining channel portfolio will consist of one main channel with 
content that aims at uniting the population and two channels with narrower 
profiles: one with a combination of society and culture programmes and the 
other a continuation of the current DR Ramasjang for children aged three–six 
(DR, 2018a). 
The changes suggest an end to the multichannel strategy and a significant 
downsizing of the main public service media organisation in Denmark. It will 
also be a radical change for viewers and for the larger Danish media market. 
Of interest in this context is how the decision to reduce the number of linear 
television channels by 50 per cent will likely affect DR’s prospects of providing 
a universal service.
DR’s linear television service will still be a universal service in the under-
standing of universality as a matter of access and – with the broad main channel 
– mass appeal. But as three channels will be closed, DR will not have the same 
possibilities to address minorities and niche audiences with linear content. When 
the plans were made public in September 2018, Director General of DR Maria 
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Rørbye Rønn said that she expects DR will lose viewers as a consequence of 
the downsizing. If this happens, the future DR will be less inclusive and thereby 
harder to legitimate as a public institution for the entire Danish population.
It should be noted that part of the agreement between DR and the Minister 
for Culture intends that DR’s online streaming service (DRTV) will become a 
more extensive service with more unique content (DR, 2018a). This decision 
is in line with the general development of media use in Denmark where an 
increasing proportion of people, especially among the younger age groups, is 
moving from linear television channels to on-demand services (The Agency 
for Palaces and Culture, 2019). Likewise, it is interesting to note how other 
Scandinavian public service media organisations have fewer television channels 
than DR and yet obtain a better daily reach. In 2017, Finland’s YLE had four 
television channels and obtained a daily reach of 68 per cent. Norway’s NRK 
had four channel profiles distributed on three channels with a reach of 66 per 
cent. Sweden’s SVT had five channels and a reach of 62 per cent. Despite having 
six channels, DR obtained the lowest daily reach of 61 per cent (Nordicom, 
n.d.). Thus, a high number of linear channels is not necessarily tantamount to 
ensuring high reach.
With a combination of a broad main channel, two specialised channels, 
and an online streaming service, DR’s television service may well live up to 
Jakubowicz’s (2006: 13) description of universality as having a “presence on all 
relevant media and platforms with significant penetration, but also the ability 
to deliver a ‘personalized public service’ in the ‘pull’, online and on-demand 
environment”. However, DR’s online streaming service DRTV will, with the 
use of algorithms, cater to personalised tastes. This, combined with the future 
smaller linear channel portfolio, means that DR must reinterpret and restructure 
how it carries out the public service mission going forward. In today’s increas-
ingly more individualised media landscape it is of utmost importance that DR 
continue to curate its content to stimulate a diverse programme consumption 
and ensure the population has knowledge and experiences in common.
Notes
 1. For 2005, week 40 is investigated, while 2010 and 2015 are represented by week 46. This is 
due to limitations in the data. Week 46 is regarded as “the news week” in Denmark; that is, 
a week where no extraordinary events usually happen, and the collection of data is intensified 
by the Royal Danish Library. However, in week 46 in 2005 there was a municipal election in 
Denmark, which influenced the range of programmes of DR’s two television channels. Because 
of flaws in the official archiving systems, DR’s streaming service was not archived for most 
of the autumn in 2015, so the archiving was done manually by the author. This was possible 
in week 46. To represent 2010, week 46 was chosen. This way, DR’s streaming service could 
be compared most equally. The streaming service did not exist in 2005.
 2. The total amount of broadcast hours on DR’s television channels rose from about 10,500 
hours in 2005 to about 43,300 hours in 2015.
 3. DR spent about DKK 1,400 million – or 60 per cent of the television expenses – on the main 
channel DR1 in 2018. DR2 was the second most expensive channel with 16 per cent of the 
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expenses, followed by DR3 with 8 per cent. DR spent about 8 per cent of the television ex-
penses on DR K, and about 6 per cent on DR Ultra and DR Ramasjang (DR, 2019: 52). 
 4. In June 2019, a new government was elected in Denmark. In the fall of 2020, the media po-
litical agreement is expected to be renegotiated since several parties in the Danish Parliament 
wish to reduce the cutbacks of DR. The current government has stated that the decision to 
reduce the number of linear television channels will not be changed.
References
Bruun, H. (2016). The prism of change: ‘Continuity’ in public service television in the digital era. 
Nordicom Review, 37(2), 33–49. https://doi.org/10.1515/nor-2016-0016
Bruun, H. (2019). The delay economy of ‘continuity’ and the emerging impatience culture of the 
digital era. Nordic Journal of Media Studies, 1(1), 85–101. https://www.doi.org/10.2478/
njms-2019-0006
Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR). (2018a). Et nyt, mindre og mere digitalt DR [A new, 
smaller, and more digital DR]. Copenhagen: DR.
Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR). (2018b). Public service contract: 2019–2023. Retrieved 
May 26, 2020, from https://www.dr.dk/om-dr/detnyedr/public-service-kontrakten
Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR). (2019). Public service report 2018. Copenhagen: DR.
Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR) Media Research. (2019). Medieudviklingen 2018 [The 
Media Development 2018]. Copenhagen: DR.
Ellis, J. (2002). Seeing things: Television in the age of uncertainty. London: I.B. Tauris.
Goodwin, P. (2018). An impossible challenge for public service media? The intellectual context of the 
networked society. In G. F. Lowe, H. Van den Bulck, & K. Donders (Eds.), Public service media 
in the networked society (pp. 29–41). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Hellman, H. (2001). Diversity – An end in itself? Developing a multi-measure methodology of 
television programme variety studies. European Journal of Communication, 16(2), 181–208. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323101016002003
Ihlebæk, K. A., Syvertsen, T., & Ytreberg, E. (2011). Farvel til mangfoldet? – Endringer i norske 
TV-kanalers programlegging og sendeskjemaer etter digitaliseringen [Farewell to the diversi-
ty? Changes in Norwegian TV channels’ scheduling and range of programmes in the age of 
digitisation]. Norsk Medietidsskrift, 18(3), 217–236.
Ihlebæk, K. A., Syvertsen, T., & Ytreberg, E. (2014). Keeping them and moving them: TV sched-
uling in the phase of channel and platform proliferation. Television & New Media, 15(5), 
470–486. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476413479676
Jakubowicz, K. (2006, November 16–18). PSB: The beginning of the end, or a new beginning in 
the 21st century. [Conference presentation]. RIPE@2006, Amsterdam School of Communica-
tions Research, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.
Johnson, C. (2012). Branding television. London: Routledge.
Johnson, C. (2013a). The authorial function of the television channel: Augmentation and identity. 
In J. Gray, & D. Johnson (Eds.), A companion to media authorship (1st ed.) (pp. 275–295). 
Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Johnson, C. (2013b). The continuity of ‘continuity’: Flow and the changing experience of watching 
broadcast television. Key Words: A Journal of Cultural Materialism, 11(3), 1–22.
Keane, J. (1995). Structural transformations of the public sphere. The Communication Review, 
1(1), 1–22.
Knudsen, G. K., & Svenningsen, U. H. (2018). Det store fællesskab viger pladsen for de små. 
[The big community yields to the small ones]. In DR medieforskning [DR media research], 
Medieudviklingen 2017 [The media development 2017] (pp. 23–26). Copenhagen: DR. 
Lassen, J. M. (2018). DRs tv-virksomhed i forandring: programflade, portefølje og platforme [DR’s 
changing television activities: Range of programmes, portfolios, and platforms] (Publication No. 
2442766034) [Doctoral thesis, University of Copenhagen]. Danish National Research Database.
Light, J. J. (2004). Television channel identity: The role of channels in the delivery of public ser-
vice television in Britain, 1996–2002 (glathesis: 2004-3939) [Doctoral thesis, University of 
Glasgow]. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/3939/1/2004LightPhD.pdf
111
MULTICHANNEL STRATEGY, UNIVERSALISM, AND THE CHALLENGE OF  
AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION
McQuail, D. (1993). Media performance, mass communication and the public interest. London: 
Sage Publications.
Merriam-Webster. (2002). Channel. In Merriam-Webster.com dictionary. Retrieved September 10, 
2019, from www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/channel 
Mortensen, F. (2008). Indledning [Introduction]. In F. Mortensen (Ed.), Public service i net-
værkssamfundet [Public service in the network society] (pp. 9–29). Frederiksberg, Denmark: 
Samfundslitteratur.
Negroponte, N. (1995). Being digital. New York: Knopf.
Nissen, C. S. (2006). Public service media in the information society. Strasbourg: Media Division, 
Directorate of Human Rights, Council of Europe.
Nordicom. (n.d.). TV viewing: Daily reach 2000–2017. Retrieved September 10, 2019, from http://
www.nordicom.gu.se/sv/statistik-fakta/mediestatistik 
Rasmussen, T. (2016). The Internet soapbox: Perspectives on a changing public sphere. Oslo: 
Scandinavian University Press.
Scannell, P. (1989). Public service broadcasting and modern public life. Media, Culture and Society, 
11(2), 135–166. https://doi.org/10.1177/016344389011002002
Scannell, P. (1990). Public service broadcasting: The history of a concept. In A. Goodwin, & G. 
Whannel (Eds.), Understanding television (pp. 11–29). London: Routledge.
Stigel, J. (2004). TV’s egenreklame og kanalstemmen – en kvalitativ undersøgelse [Television’s 
advertising and channel voice – a qualitative study]. MedieKultur – Tidsskrift for Medie- Og 
Kommunikationsforskning [Media Culture – Journal of Media and Communication Research], 
20(37), 24–35. https://doi.org/10.7146/mediekultur.v20i37.1257
Syvertsen, T. (1999). The many uses of the ‘public service’ concept. Nordicom Review, 20(1), 5–12.
Syvertsen, T. (2003). Challenges to public television in the era of convergence and commercializa-
tion. Television and New Media, 4(2), 155–175. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476402250683
Søndergaard, H. (1994). DR i tv-konkurrencens tidsalder [DR in the age of television competition]. 
Frederiksberg, Denmark: Samfundslitteratur.
The Agency for Palaces and Culture [Slots- og Kulturstyrelsen]. (2019). Rapportering om medi-
ernes udvikling i Danmark 2018 [Report on the Media Development in Denmark 2018]. 
Copenhagen: Slots- og Kulturstyrelsen.
The Danish Ministry of Finance [Finansministeriet]. (2018). Licensen skal afskaffes og DR slankes 
[The license fee will be abolished and DR slimmed down]. https://www.fm.dk/nyheder/presse-
meddelelser/2018/03/licensen-skal-afskaffes-og-dr-slankes
The Danish Radio and Television Act (no. 255). (2014, March 20). Retrieved September 10, 2019, 
from https://www.retsinformation.dk/forms/R0710.aspx?id=161625 
The Ministry of Culture. (2018). Media Agreement 2019–2023. https://kum.dk/fileadmin/KUM/
Documents/Nyheder%20og%20Presse/Pressemeddelelser/2018/Medieaftale_2019-2023.pdf
Van den Bulck, H., & Enli, G.S. (2012). Bye bye “Hello Ladies?” in-vision announcers as continuity 
technique in a European postlinear television landscape: The case of Flanders and Norway. 
Television & New Media, 15(5), 453–469. https:www.doi.org/10.1177/1527476412462143
Van den Bulck, H., & Moe, H. (2018). Public service media, universality and personalisation 
through algorithms: Mapping strategies and exploring dilemmas. Media, Culture & Society, 
40(6), 875–892. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443717734407
Ytreberg, E. (2002). Continuity in environments: The evolution of basic practices and dilemmas in 





A question of value or further restriction?
Public value as a core concept
Christiana Gransow
Abstract
Inaugurated by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), a systematic assess-
ment of a new service with regards to its public value is part of the governance 
system in public service media. The concept was applied throughout Europe over 
the past decade, in combination with the ex ante test. The procedure exists in 
14 European media systems and just under 90 services have been reviewed. This 
chapter critically analyses the conceptual understanding of public value and ad-
dresses how public broadcasters define the key term in practice. Four case studies 
illustrate the variability of the concept. In particular, the issues of a decreasing value 
and the effect of a proposed service to previously approved services are difficult 
to address. Based on a systematic inventory of the institutional responsibilities, 
public broadcasters and decision-makers are at the centre due to their negotiations 
of pros and cons of launching a new service, particularly in cases where the public 
value has been considered insufficient compared to its market impact. 
Keywords: public value, ex ante evaluation, public interest test, public service 
media, PSM, market impact assessment
Introduction
Budget cuts, structural reforms, and threats to the freedom of media challenge 
the future viability of public service media (PSM). The origins of such controver-
sies stem from attempts to reduce costs, increase accountability, and simultane-
ously deliver distinctive programmes of high quality, establish new services, and 
consolidate existing broadcasting channels (Herzog et al., 2018; Humphreys & 
Simpson, 2018; Schweizer & Puppis, 2018). To satisfy all these requirements 
in times of high competition and an audience with changing viewing habits, 
public service broadcasters (PSBs) emphasise public value as a core concept. It 
sets standards for publicly-funded corporations, guides key stakeholders on a 
normative and practical level, and helps them to implement new services (for 
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an overview, see Moore, 2017; Gonser & Gundlach, 2016; Martin & Lowe, 
2014). However, European competition law, or, more precisely, guidelines for 
state aid, require PSBs to respect the standards of fair and effective competition. 
Furthermore, most PSBs are legally bound to pass an ex ante test as a form of 
horizontal accountability (Campos-Freire et al., 2019). The procedure serves 
as a mechanism for weighing public value against market effects of either a 
modified existing or a newly created one. It determines, following a long and 
complex procedure, whether a negative impact is offset by the public value it 
is expected to deliver (Donders & Moe, 2014). 
Although half of the European member states have implemented an ex ante test 
and over eighty proposals have been assessed, there is still insufficient transnational 
analysis of the interpretation of public value as a concept. There is a research gap 
on smaller media systems and the sampling of cases remains biased. This chapter 
examines all European countries where the procedure was implemented by the 
end of 2018.1 Given its rapid changes, comparing the European media landscape 
is a methodological challenge. Each media system has its own structures, internal 
organisation, and policies with different rules, settings, and stakeholders – it is 
the universal validity of PSBs which unites them (Humphreys, 2012; Puppis & 
d’Haenens, 2012; Schweizer & Puppis, 2018; Van den Bulck et al., 2018). 
In addition to the British case as the background sample, three countries – Aus-
tria, the Dutch-speaking region of Belgium, and the Netherlands – are discussed 
in detail because the public value concept is applied stringently within these 
governance systems. All four case studies spell out a series of criteria to define 
the key term and develop methods for applying them. Therefore, the number 
of countries which actually applies both the ex ante test and public value as a 
concept has diminished over the last five years (Moe & Van den Bulck, 2014).
Its implementation can be manifold. Public value may be part of the remit, 
provide a basis for evaluating the programme, or act as a pillar in the account-
ability system. Public value has attracted criticism for its market-oriented per-
spective that cannot be considered separately from the need of PSBs to prove 
their added value to society (Goodwin, 2014; Moe & Van den Bulck, 2014). 
Comparative academic studies and commissioned studies (for an overview, see 
Gransow, 2018) examine the implementation of the procedures but focus on 
the actual results of the assessments. Raats and colleagues (2015) conducted a 
benchmark-related analysis with a focus on range and target audiences. Moe and 
Van den Bulck (2014), Neumüller and Gonser (2013), and Wippersberg (2010) 
lay the groundwork for researching public value conceptually. These authors 
demonstrate the PSBs’ effort to set up their public value concept in practice by 
continuous monitoring and reporting to the management and key stakeholders. 
This chapter expands their previous research by asking the following questions: If 
a PSB emphasises the public value concept, which are the central universal values 
serving the democratic, social, and cultural needs of the society? How are they 
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measured and by whom? Under which circumstances is the audience involved? 
What exactly is a material change of an existing service? What are the arguments 
to reject a proposed service? Does a proposal approved for its public value have 
an impact on other services or activities which are permitted by an ex ante test? 
The comparison is organised along three central themes: 1) legal frame-
work and remit; 2) set-up of the ex ante test and its public value assessment; 
and 3) the results of the decisions, which have been made in the last five years 
(2015–2019). The first section comprises a systematic inventory of the insti-
tutional responsibilities and classifies the case studies according to their use of 
the public value concept. In the second part of the chapter, the case studies are 
presented and analysed.
Public value as a concept in public service media
Academic debate about public value is contentious and the perspectives are 
manifold. Hence, the concept itself has proven to be near elusive (for an over-
view, see Martin & Lowe, 2014; Moe & Van den Bulck, 2014; Benington & 
Moore, 2011). In media studies, public value operates as an insurance and the 
ambition of PSM is to create public goods or services of high quality and to 
satisfy the needs of a society (Mitschka, 2013). The application of public value 
as a “lens for assessing PSM” (Martin & Lowe, 2014: 23) and as an “analysis 
tool” (Sorsa & Sihvonen, 2018: 11) are far from consistent. Proving the contri-
butions to fulfil the remit and being part of a professionalised and independent 
monitoring is a complex matter (Donders, 2012; Trappel, 2014). From another 
perspective “public value has become a vehicle for more top-down management 
approaches, extensive and increasingly bureaucratic assessment procedures” 
(Moe & Van den Bulck, 2014: 61), in terms of the ex ante evaluation.
According to Gonser (2013), the term has several dimensions and is meas-
urable with a range of qualitative and quantitative methods. Nevertheless, the 
main challenges are to define the scope of its components precisely and to set 
appropriate methods of measurement. Public value cannot be detached from 
its normative and ideological dimensions, which can provoke a conceptual 
overstretching PSB with its universal claim, standards, and remit to shape the 
respective understanding of the concept (Collins, 2011; Hasebrink, 2014). The 
different models of European media systems and the long-standing conflict 
between the European Commission and national decision-makers provide the 
framework for implementing the term and the procedure (Moe & Van den 
Bulck, 2014). O’Neill (2016: 173) draws attention to two essential problems 
by asking “which values are public values” and highlighting that “it is often 
left unclear whether public value is what the public actually value, or what they 
ought to value (but may not)”.
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The discourse on the distinctive ex ante tests is closely related to the divergent 
perspectives defining and measuring public value (Gonser & Gundlach, 2016; 
Lis et al., 2017). The question remains to what extent this argument has been 
adequately taken into account by the decision-makers and in the assessment 
itself. According to Campos-Freire and colleagues (2019: 12), the assessment 
of new media services act as a “double-edged weapon” in terms of increasing 
“transparency and participation in decision-making processes, legitimating 
the activity of public media, or as a hostile tool designed for its control and 
restriction, strongly in favour of commercial interests.” 
Research design and methodology
Taking the characteristics of comparative analysis into account, research on 
PSM is complex. It requires a reasonable selection of criteria and indicators 
to overcome difficulties in interpreting the concept of PSB, contextualising the 
special features of each media system and categorising different models of or-
ganization and contextual factors (Karppinen & Moe, 2012; Raats & Pauwels, 
2011). Drawing on literature review and document analysis, and the study 
taking Moe’s and Van den Bulck’s (2014) critique into account, the analysis 
of the public value concept calls for an extensive collection of texts.2 In each 
case, the use of public value as a key term and how it is operationalised was 
examined. If the term does not occur, a different value-based approach guides 
the governance and accountability system (see Table 1). The research covers a 
pan-European overview and the last twelve years, but we focus on the last five 
years because some of the governments have reviewed their legal basis.
Table 1. Classification of case studies
















Source: Gransow (2018) supplemented by own research
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Status quo of ex ante evaluations and decisions
Since 2015, over 20 proposals have been assessed by an ex ante test – five have 
been declined, three are currently pending. To understand the arguments of the 
different decision-makers, the procedure can be categorised: With the exception 
of the German media system, either the regulatory authority or a political agent 
takes the final decision to approve a new service (see Table 2).
Table 2. Institutional responsibility for ex ante tests and applications to date
Application
of the  





(50 / 2 / 1)
Austria
KommAustria
(4 / 4 / 2)
Denmark
Radio and Television 
Board




(1 / 0 / 0)
United Kingdom
Ofcom 
(6 / 1 / 0)
Belgium (Flanders)
Government
(0 / 1 / 0)
Finland
Administrative Council
(4 / 0 / 0)
Ireland
Ministry for Communica-
tion, Climate Action and 
Environment
(3 / 0 / 0)
Netherlands
Ministry for Education, 
Culture and Science 
(3 / 3 / 0)
Norway
Ministry of Culture
(2 / 0 / 0)
No
Hungary 












Comment: Results from the ex ante tests (based on data from October 2019) are shown within parentheses (approved / 
rejected / pending). 
Source: Adapted from MPRT (2017, 2015) and RTR-GmbH (2014) supplemented by own research.
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In the Austrian media system, the regulator KommAustria guarantees the in-
dependence of the procedure. In the Netherlands, the education minister has 
final decision-making powers. In both cases, only half of the proposals were 
approved (see Tables 4 & 6). Discussing the reasons for a refusal is important 
for the analysis. In the British case, the BBC Trust completed five public value 
tests before 2016 (see Table 3). Along with the renewal of the Royal Charter 
and Framework Agreement, major organisational and procedural changes have 
been implemented. The Office of Communication (Ofcom) is in charge of all 
decisions and has to carry out a public interest test (PIT). It already performed 
the PIT twice. The same provisions are found in the Danish, Hungarian, and 
Portuguese media systems, where the regulation authority has decision power. 
The last three cases are part of the group which also includes Croatia, Fin-
land, Ireland, Latvia, and Norway, where the political agent has approved the 
proposals. In Flanders and Sweden, the government takes the decision and the 
regulator conducts the procedure (see Table 5). The 14 case studies demonstrate 
heterogeneity in both institutional responsibility and application of the ex ante 
test. If a government acts as a decision-maker, its political influence on PSM 
must be criticised (Bardoel & Vochteloo, 2012; Donders & Pauwels, 2012). 
Indeed, five media systems legally formulated an ex ante test, but none 
of them have any experience assessing services. With the exception of the 
French-speaking part of Belgium, none of these countries completed a state aid 
procedure. One point of criticism is the procedure itself. In the Latvian case, 
the Council of Media never formulated a concrete procedure. In Sweden, the 
government intends to open up the ex ante test to interested stakeholders who 
request a service to be evaluated (MPRT, 2018). Taking these arguments one 
step further, it enables third parties to question each proposal developed by a 
PSB and to call for an ex ante test. Even more problematic is the limitation of 
PSBs’ innovation capacity, and therefore its universality, especially in media 
systems where the level of regulation is much higher and political independ-
ence is lacking. This requires a detailed analysis and classification of the latest 
developments in assessing new services and products of PSBs.
Characterisation of case study findings
Each case illustrates the variability of the concept. In particular, the issues of 
a decreasing value and the effect of a proposed service to previously approved 
services are difficult to address. With that in mind, the findings reveal that 
research still need to provide insight on evaluating public value in the context 
of different media systems. 
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The United Kingdom
Table 3. Concluded proceedings in the UK
Date Proposals Results
01/08/19 BBC iPlayer Approved
26/06/18 BBC Scotland Approved
25/11/15 BBC Three, BBC One, iPlayer and CBBC Approved
31/07/09 BBC Local Video Rejected
24/01/08 BBC Gaelic Digital Service Approved
27/04/07 BBC HDTV Approved
31/01/07 BBC on-demand proposals Approved
Source: Gransow (2018) supplemented by own research
In November 2017, the BBC published its concept for another Scottish televi-
sion channel, BBC Scotland. The expansion was justified with its contribution 
to the mission particularly providing impartial news and information according 
to BBC’s public purposes (BBC, 2017a). After carrying out a PIT, including 
a review of the public value, Ofcom permitted the launch of the new service 
(Ofcom, 2018a, 2018b). The purpose of Ofcom’s assessment was to ensure that 
it “made a compelling, well evidenced and methodologically sound assessment 
of the public value” (Ofcom, 2018b: 1). Therefore, the regulator identified a 
number of impacts that are strongly connected to public purposes. One of them 
is personal value. Its level depends on the ability of the BBC to “deliver creative 
and distinctive output” for all viewers (Ofcom, 2018b: 10). 
Some aspects are problematic: The broadcaster again applies a broad defini-
tion for the key terms and revises the existing definition of public value. The 
assessment suggests a strong public value and a strong contribution to the public 
purposes and mission of the BBC. It also concludes that BBC Scotland would 
generate a personal value on a medium to high level. To measure a possible 
public value that justifies the impact on the market, the PSB runs qualitative 
deliberative workshops and a quantitative research project. The BBC board 
consults the public for six weeks and accepts responses from other stakehold-
ers or citizens. Commissioned consulting firms analyse and model the results 
(BBC, 2017a). BBC used this mixed methodological approach because “it is 
not possible to put a monetary value on the different elements which contribute 
to public value” (BBC, 2017a: 34).
Despite the positive arguments, the regulator points out that the “BBC Board 
will […] consider closely the wider effects of other BBC services [BBC Alba] and 
third parties of any further expansion to the proposal” (Ofcom, 2018b: 27). 
Ofcom doubted that the new channel compensates for the lost public value of 
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the already existing television channel (Ofcom, 2018b). The ties between exist-
ing and new services create a general problem and makes it difficult to quantify 
the changes. Therefore, BBC has to be aware that any proposal linked to other 
services approved by an ex ante test will change their public value. 
With the relaunch of BBC Three as an online-only service, the formalities 
are changing as well. This new format has financial and strategic effects (BBC 
Trust, 2015b). As Ramsey (2016) argues, the reasons for change have to be 
convincing and confront challenges. This is particularly important in the case 
of a leading PSM organisation such as the BBC. Most recently, the BBC in-
tends to reinvent the iPlayer by extending the time period of box sets and other 
programme content available by using personalisation options in steps with 
changing audience habits and needs (BBC, 2019). Ofcom calls on the need to 
support PSBs in the digital age and supplies the BBC as a cornerstone of the 
global media markets which have to be well-funded and reach its audience, 
especially the younger age group (Ofcom, 2018c). Regarding the proposed 
changes, the regulator approved a services extension of up to one year. However, 
the adverse impact on rival services is a concern. To justify the positive ruling, 
the BBC has to specify the extent of the iPlayer’s impact. There is a need to 
clarify the maximum number of available content and to filter data by different 
categories and genres (Ofcom, 2019). The BBC is not the only broadcaster that 
is taking steps to improve their services, but this broadcaster explicitly makes 
an effort to take on a trailblazer role.
The Netherlands
Table 4. Concluded proceedings in the Netherlands
Date Proposals Results
31/08/2018 NPO Soul & Jazz TV channel Approved
19/08/2016 NPO Plus Approved
05/04/2016 NPO FunX Turkpop Rejected
05/04/2016 Npo3.nl Approved
- NPO News and Events Withdrawn
8/2010 Revising of NPO Services Rejected
Temporary approval until January 
2012
4/2009 New NPO Service proposal Rejected
Trial until September 2010
Source: Gransow (2018) supplemented by own research
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The Dutch stakeholders still highly prioritise the concept of public value as its 
self-promotion. The term is specified in Dutch media law and is part of the remit. 
Legally integrated as a concept in 2008, its status has increased over the years. 
In 2016, the government reformed the legal requirements for the Nederlands 
Publieke Omroep [Dutch Public Broadcasting] (NPO). Safeguarding the future 
of PSM and the commitments as set out in the agreement have to comply with 
public values (NPO, 2016). The recommendations of the Council of Culture3 as 
an advisory body have had an impact on ensuring a modern PSM. The policy 
agreement 2016–2020 states that the broadcaster seeks to generate public value 
and quality across programmes and genres. Its services fulfil the democratic, 
social, and cultural needs of the Dutch society and are measured along a number 
of quality criteria each year (RvC, 2014). To score the potential public value, the 
NPO has developed strict guidelines and a monitoring concept based on eight 
criteria. If a certain broadcasting service does not fulfil the expected norms, it 
is judged by an expert panel and can even be cancelled (NPO, 2015, 2016). 
The ex ante test has been carried out six times – three proposals were ap-
proved and three were rejected. With the new concession plan, the PSB proposed 
four new services (NPO, 2015). NPO Plus, a commercial video-on-demand 
service, was permitted because it generates enough public value to justify the 
market impact (OCW, 2016a). Education Minister Bussemaker states that 
the effects may be negative because commercial providers hinder setting up 
comparable new, profitable services. However, many new providers enter the 
audiovisual market, and therefore, the NPO needs to develop pioneering ser-
vices (OCW, 2016a). 
In a separate request, the NPO sought permission to launch a new radio 
channel for pop music and traditional Turkish music to better address younger 
target audiences. The NPO saw the public value in a potential appeal to young 
Dutch people with a foreign background (NPO, 2015). The minister agreed with 
the council’s rejection who feared the proposal would only appeal to a rather 
limited audience and would only have public value if it achieved some degree 
of cross-promotion with the other channels. In addition, the application does 
not explain how a service for a specific target group matches the ambition to 
be a connecting force for society (OCW, 2016b). 
Finally, the NPO requested approval of a new online platform for a young 
audience. PSBs have to respond to two major changes in young persons’ media 
use: their preference for on-demand services and their increasing need for inter-
action with the media (NPO, 2016). The project combines all the broadcasting 
and online content of the NPO which appeal to that age group. Moreover, it 
offers a space where young Dutch people can get involved. The council approved 
this proposal: By offering new (web-only) content, the PSB meets the needs of 
its young audience in terms of form, duration, and storytelling. As such, it con-
tributes to the fulfilment of the remit. The council also suggests that the content 
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should be disseminated via other online and social media platforms. The minister 
agrees and states that it is logical and sensible that the NPO develops a range 
of services that match the target group and promote the remit (OCW, 2016a). 
Flanders
Table 5. Concluded proceedings in Flanders
Date Proposals Results
22/05/2017 Ketnet Jr. Rejected
Source: Gransow (2018) supplemented by own research
According to the current management contract, public value has four dimen-
sions: democratic, cultural, social, and economic. Each of them describes the 
connection of the programme and products to fulfil the needs of the Flemish 
society (VRT, 2017). The Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie [Flem-
ish Public Broadcasting] (VRT) commits to quality understood as being socially 
relevant and responding to the needs of the audience. The public value concept 
is currently based on six criteria. Additionally, there are two characteristics 
for assessing functional quality. This constitutes the assessment of a proposed 
service and is the key factor in everything the PSB does (VRT, 2016, 2018). 
The only ex ante test yielded a rejection. The idea was to expand the existing 
online service for children in the linear programming (VRT, 2017). According 
to the Media Decree of 2009, the broadcaster needs government approval. The 
Flemish Council of Media4 (VRM), acting as regulatory authority, assesses the 
proposal and advises the government. Rather than determining what a new 
service is or defining a material change as in the other case studies, the media 
agreement was supplemented by a wide list of existing broadcasting and online 
services. However, this list was so extensive that according to Karen Donders 
(personal interview, 3 December 2013), it was barely possible to classify a 
planned service as a new one. Moreover, all the services of an online platform 
were automatically covered by the remit. Extending the number of television 
channels is not part of the list. As a result, the government finally had to carry 
out an ex ante test. The process of assessing a proposal is not as sufficiently 
detailed as in the other cases. The regulator consults the public, experts, and 
other media companies and makes a decision. 
Six months after VRT submitted its proposal in 2016, the PSB was not 
able to convince the government to support a new children’s channel. In their 
decision, the government pointed out that the assessment showed inconclusive 
results. These were confirmed by the partial evaluations, which did not allow 
a positive or negative recommendation of the new service. The impact on the 
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media market along with insufficient protection and promotion of the Flemish 
identity were the main reasons for declining the proposal. Although VRM gave 
a positive recommendation, the government considered the additional channel 
as an unnecessary addition to the existing programme incompatible with the 
management agreement (VRM, 2017). Therefore, the delivery of public value 
was not adequate to convince the government to launch a new television chan-
nel (Donders & Van den Bulck, 2014). 
Austria
Table 6. Concluded proceedings in Austria
Date Proposals Results
09/05/2018 ORF video library “Flimmit” Rejected




14/11/2012 Archive of Focus (Radio show) Approved
21/11/2011 Ö1 is catching on Approved
18/05/2011 Special-interest TV channel for information and 
culture 
Approved
Source: Gransow (2018) supplemented by own research
The public value concept is a key element of the accountability and governance 
system of the Austrian PSB. Whereas the term is not legally implemented, it sets 
the standards for the quality management system. Österreichischer Rundfunk 
[Austrian Public Broadcasting] (ORF) releases a report each year which proves 
the variety of the services and its performance as a PSB. Its concept consists 
of five dimensions with 18 criteria. Each criterion is connected to one or more 
requirements of the remit, programme policy, guidelines, or code of conduct, 
and even the demands of the Protocol of Amsterdam are mentioned. 
By processing a political independent evaluation procedure, the Austrian 
version of the ex ante test serves as a role model in Europe. The ORF is the only 
PSB that holds a public hearing for six weeks before the actual test is performed. 
The added value of the proposal can be revised before the regulator expresses 
any criticism. In addition to the competition authority, an advisory body as 
part of the KommAustria assesses the public value of a proposed service. It is 
comprised of media experts which represent the public interests (RTR-GmbH, 
2014). The evaluation procedure is clearly described in the media law. A total 
of ten services has required an ex ante approval so far. The remaining propos-
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als were rejected either because of their incompatibility with the remit or the 
potential negative market impact was higher than the presumed public value. 
In contrast to the other case studies, ORF’s presence on the Internet is more 
limited than other PSBs. 
In their last decision, KommAustria denied ORF’s proposed presence on 
YouTube for several reasons. Other providers of video-sharing websites were 
disadvantaged. The online channel should extend the accessibility of the broad-
caster’s programme. The regulator confirms the need for ORF being present 
on media platforms and sees potential to fulfil the remit. However, it is not 
reasonable to pass over the legal requirements, which include a weakening of the 
PSB’s own platform (KommAustria, 2018a). In another recent decline, the PSB 
wanted to launch its own video-on-demand service in order to be more acces-
sible for those age groups who watch online television content (KommAustria, 
2018b). The rejection was based on the uncertain financial sustainability such 
as in the media law requested (KommAustria, 2018b). The council supports 
the proposal because since it has only been in operation for a short while, it 
does not provide public value in the sense of a publicly funded service. The 
same applies in the case of its own YouTube channel. Being innovative and 
relevant to young audiences is important for PSBs in order to deliver public 
value for all. It is the broadcaster’s responsibility to ensure coherently worded 
proposals that meet a variety of legal requirements (KommAustria, 2018a; 
2018b). More recently, ORF requests an approval on two new services that 
focus on news and fiction.
Discussion: Rise and fall of public value
A range of services and products require an ex ante approval. Common propos-
als include content-specific and high-definition channels, on-demand-services, 
and various mobile apps. The evaluations are predominantly tailored towards 
specific age groups or language minorities.5 The few proposals which have 
been declined either lacked public value or could not be implemented for legal, 
financial, or technical reasons. During the first wave of procedures, the PSBs 
were establishing themselves in the world of online services. Currently, it is 
more relevant to develop on-demand catch-up services which allow (especially 
young) audiences to watch a programme anywhere at any time. The challenge 
is to make the new services compatible with the requirements of media law. 
Martin and Lowe (2014) remark that it is important to invest public money 
in services and products that promote public value. Therefore, PSBs must be 
enabled and trusted to expand their boundaries beyond the existing require-
ments, as they are facing a number of urgent issues. It has become clear that 
the ex ante test is not an overarching response because of its costs and time-
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consuming organisation, but in terms of transparency, it is an important step 
towards their engagement in progressive services. 
Three aspects are crucial in public value assessment. It is still difficult to 
apply all different values. The question remains if they can accurately be sepa-
rated from one another. Values such as independence, diversity, innovation, 
and universality avoid the danger of overlaps, subjective determination, and 
overvaluation. No matter what the concept concentrates on − a new service, 
improving an existing one, or activities as a whole − the values are still norma-
tive. Even if the PSBs execute an order by the government, the application of 
public value does not exempt them from being aware of, refining, and evolving 
their services continuously.
This comparison emphasises the indispensability of a public value framework. 
The concept raises PSBs’ awareness of their specific key values, how they relate 
to their remit, and helps to assess a new service. Essentially, the democratic, 
social, and cultural structure of a country is crucial to determining public value. 
The key stakeholders are responsible to discuss the characteristics of PSM in 
depth, in particular which studies are important for its evolution. For some, it is 
essential that their PSBs are present in social media, break down the digital shift 
by having their own commercial on-demand-service, or intensify cooperation 
with other institutions. For others, it is more difficult to provide these services.
However, what are the strategic plans of a PSB board to convert an existing 
television channel to an Internet service? It is necessary that a PSB reacts to the 
challenges – including covering all demographic groups – with services to suit 
their needs and ensure the existing broadcasting services in its own interests. 
Relaunching BBC Three is one step in the right direction, but Ramsey (2016) 
argues that the quota is only one important pillar for being distinguishable from 
commercial television, and with the exclusive online service, these percentages 
are omitted. It remains unanswered which production quotas are obligatory 
for a service like BBC Three. Ramsey also suspects that other television chan-
nels will go online, but the discussion relates to financing and the concept of 
production quotas. However, what happens if the impact of an online-only 
service offers too little in terms of added public value? 
In recent years, public value has become an important argument for the PSBs 
fulfilling their remit and for assessing new projects. The issue of decreased value 
of a service needs be addressed, particularly whether the services, which are 
launched without prior approval, have sufficient public value. In spite of the 
public value approach, it is doubtful that a range of key values is enough to 
convince democratically elected parliaments that their services have value for 
society. Certain warning signs, such as the increasing political control of public 
institutions or replacing the financial model, linked to the weakening of PSM 
and restricting the mission, cannot be ignored. Citizen support is essential and 
contribution to PSM is a sign of democratic health. To underline their value 
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to societies, PSBs need to consult with the people who pay for the services and 
show them concrete evidence of their value. However, statutory provisions and 
saving public expenditure are setting the development of PSM. 
Another crucial issue remains unsolved: To what extent, if at all, are PSBs 
allowed to stream their content online? With popular streaming services such 
as Netflix and Amazon Prime, and Disney+ coming up, it is outdated to main-
tain old regulations. Instead, the flexibility of using publicly financed content 
needs to be increased. Politicians are called to finally conform the remit to the 
developments of the media market to highlight the importance and indispen-
sability of PSM. In times of fake news and drastic changes in the media sector, 
the existence of PSB is more urgent than ever to audiences and societies, even if 
they may not always be aware of this. A further concern relates to the purpose 
of the second wave of ex ante tests. It is not assessed if an approved service has 
any negative impact on existing services. BBC Scotland is predicted to have a 
negative impact on BBC Alba and BBC Two in terms of the number of viewers. 
Their Scottish content will also decline, which reduces their public value. Based 
on Ofcom’s assessment, the changes to the iPlayer will have an adverse impact 
on the media sector in the UK. These omissions will have to be addressed.
Conclusion: The reform of the remit is a matter of urgency
Based on the three different types of decision-making, 14 cases have been catego-
rised according to their application of the ex ante test. There is no standardised 
procedure to assess a new service or change an existing service. Each country 
defines their way of expanding the range of PSM individually. All case studies 
have a concept of the value of PSBs’ services; however, public value is not the 
preferred evaluation criterion in their accountability system. Only four PSBs 
assign the concept. The other cases, such as Germany and the Scandinavian 
countries, determine the democratic, social, and cultural needs of their society 
based on a genres-related approach. The findings reveal that the specific mean-
ing of public value depends on its legal status in the media system. 
Audience demands are in constant flux, and so are the contents of PSM. In the 
age of Internet and media giants, politicians need to support PSM even more as a 
unique feature of democracy that strengthens pluralism and enriches the increas-
ingly fragmented nature of media markets. PSBs must be given the opportunity 
and the money to invest in new online streaming formats or receive a political 
mandate in order to be innovative and appeal to all different demographic groups. 
Using the full potential of its universality is key to ensuring that all generations 
value public broadcasters. It is an ongoing process between PSBs and key stake-
holders of media policy to predict future purposes of PSM and to deliver online 
and linear services with values determined by the remit. For both parties, it is 
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not expedient to serve the status quo in combination with a time-consuming 
procedure. Conflicts with private media companies due to the ineffectiveness of 
the procedure, such as in the Irish and Finnish cases, do not solve the problem. 
Neither does rejecting new services. The revision process is far from complete and 
many challenges need to be addressed, but not at the expense of the audience.
Notes
 1. The countries included were: Austria, the Flemish and French part of Belgium, Croatia, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Sweden, and the UK.
 2. This includes media laws, decrees, management contracts, government agreements, reports 
published online by PSBs and regulation authorities, guidelines, and outcomes of previous 
evaluations.
 3. Raad voor Cultuur (RvC).
 4. Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM).
 5. Two exceptions from this pattern are the assessment for leasing a PSB’s studio or the provision 
of an information service for public facilities and transport.
References
Bardoel, J., & Vochteloo, M. (2012). Conditional access for public service broadcasting to new 
media platforms: EU state-aid policy vis-à-vis public service broadcasting – the Dutch case. 
In N. Just, & M. Puppis (Eds.), Trends in communication policy research: New theories, 
methods and subjects (pp. 303–315). Bristol: Intellect.
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017a). Proposals for the launch of a new BBC Scotland 
TV channel: Submission to Ofcom. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from http://downloads.bbc.
co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/howwework/accountability/consultations/bbc_public_inter-
est_test_submission.pdf 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2017b). Public interest test on the proposed new BBC 
television channel for Scotland: Consultation document and guidance for submission. Retrieved 
May 18, 2020, from https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/bbc_publicinteresttest_scot-
landtv_consultation_june2017.pdf
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). (2019). BBC iPlayer proposals: Public interest test consul-
tation. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/insidethebbc/
howwework/accountability/consultations/iplayer_public_interest_test_consultation.pdf 
British Broadcasting Corporation Trust (BBC Trust). (2015a). Final decision on proposals for 
BBC Three, BBC One, BBC iPlayer, and CBBC. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from http://
downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/review_report_research/service_changes/deci-
sion/final_decision.pdf 
British Broadcasting Corporation Trust (BBC Trust). (2015b). Public value test: Service descrip-
tion of proposed changes of BBC Three, BBC iPlayer, BBC One and CBBC. Retrieved May 
18, 2020, from http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/review_report_research/
service_changes/service_description.pdf 
Benington, J., & Moore, M. H. (Eds.). (2011). Public value: Theory and practice. Basingstoke, 
UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
Campos-Freire, F., de Mateo-Pérez, R., & Rodríguez-Castro, M. (2019). The trend of assessment 
indicators for public service media in Europe. In M. Túñez-López, V.-A. Martínez-Fernández, 
X. López-García, X. Rúas-Araújo, & F. Campos-Freire (Eds.), Communication: Innovation 
& quality (pp. 3–19). Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Collins, R. (2011). Public value, the BBC and humpty dumpty words – does public value man-
agement means what it says? In K. Donders, & H. Moe (Eds.), Exporting the public value 
128
CHRISTIANA GRANSOW
test: The regulation of public broadcasters’ new media services across Europe (pp. 49–57). 
Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Coyle, D., & Woolard, C. (2012). Public value in practice: Restoring the ethos of public service. 
Retrieved Janjuary 28, 2019, from https://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/
regulatory_framework/pvt/public_value_practice.pdf 
Donders, K. (2012). Public service media and policy in Europe. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Mac-
millan. 
Donders, K., & Moe, H. (2014). European state-aid control and PSB: Competition policy clashing 
or matching with public interest objectives? In K. Donders, C. Pauwels, & J. Loisen (Eds.), 
The Palgrave handbook of European media policy (pp. 426–441). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Donders, K., & Pauwels, C. (2012). Ex ante tests: A means to an end of the end of public service 
media? In G. F. Lowe, & J. Steemers (Eds.), Regaining the initiative for public service media 
(pp. 79–92). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Donders, K., & Van den Bulck, H. (2014). The digital argument in public service media debates: 
An analysis on conflicting values in Flemish management contract negotiations for VRT. In 
G. F. Lowe, & F. Marin (Eds.), The value of public service media (pp. 145–163). Gothenburg: 
Nordicom, University of Gothenburg. 
Goddard, P. (2017). “Distinctiveness” and the BBC: A new battleground for public service television? 
Media, Culture & Society, 39(7), 1089–1099. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443717692787
Gonser, N. (2013). Zu guter Letzt – ein kurzes Nachwort [Last but not least – A short epilogue]. 
In N. Gonser (Ed.), Die multimediale Zukunft des Qualitätsjournalismus: Public Value und 
die Aufgaben der Medien [The multimedia future of quality journalism: Public value the 
purposes of media] (pp. 179–182). Wiesbaden: VS Springer.
Gonser, N., & Gundlach, H. (2016). Public value. In J. Krone, & T. Pellegrini (Eds.), Handbuch 
Medienökonomie [Handbook of media economics] (pp. 1–27). Wiesbaden: Springer VS. 
Goodwin, P. (2014). The price of everything and the value of nothing? Economic arguments and 
the politics of public service media. In G. F. Lowe, & F. Martin (Eds.), The value of public 
service media (pp. 77–86). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Gransow, C. (2018). Public Value-Konzepte im Öffentlichen Rundfunk: Eine vergleichende Ana-
lyse europäischer Rundfunksysteme [Public value concepts in public service broadcasting: A 
comparative analysis of European broadcasting systems]. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Hasebrink, U. (2014). Public value als Diskurs [Public value as a discourse]. In ORF (Ed.) Texte 
II: Öffentlich-rechtliche Qualität im Diskurs [Texts II: Quality public services as a discourse] 
(pp. 16–21). Vienna: Austrian Public Broadcasting Provider.
Herzog, C., Hilker, H., Novy, L., & Torun, O. (2018). Transparency and funding of public service 
media in Germany, the western world and beyond. In C. Herzog, H. Hilker, L. Novy, & 
O. Torun (Eds.), Transparency and funding of public service media (pp. 3–17). Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS.
Humphreys, P. (2012). A political scientist’s contribution to the comparative study of media systems 
in Europe. In N. Just, & M. Puppis (Eds.), Trends in communication policy research: New 
theories, methods and subjects (pp. 154–174). Bristol: Intellect.
Humphreys, P., & Simpson, S. (2018). Regulation, governance and convergence in the media. 
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Karppinen, K., & Moe, H. (2012). What we talk about when we talk about document analysis. 
In N. Just, & M. Puppis (Eds.), Trends in communication policy research: New theories, 
methods and subjects (pp. 177–194). Bristol: Intellect.
KommAustria. (2018a). KOA 11.278/18-001. Bescheid zur Auftragsvorprüfung zur Änderung des 
Online-Angebots in sozialen Medien [Review Decision for changing the online services in social 
media]. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.rtr.at/de/m/KOA1127818001/36971_
KOA%2011.278-18-001%20.pdf 
KommAustria. (2018b). KOA 11.280/18-004. Bescheid zur Auftragsvorprüfung zum Antrag eines 
öffentlich-rechtlichen Abrufdienstes mit fiktionalem Schwerpunkt (Film und Serie) [Review 
decision for launching a commercial video on-demand service (Film and series)]. Retrieved 
129
A QUESTION OF VALUE OR FURTHER RESTRICTION?
May 18, 2020, from https://www.rtr.at/de/m/KOA1128018004/36836_KOA%2011.280-
18-004.pdf
Lis, B., Nienstedt, H.-W., & Günster, C. (2017). No public value without a valued public. Inter-
national Journal on Media Management, 20(1), 25–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/14241277.
2017.1389730
Martin, F., & Lowe, G. F. (2014). The value and values of public service media. In G. F. Lowe, 
& F. Martin (Eds.), The value of public service media (pp. 19–42). Gothenburg: Nordicom, 
University of Gothenburg.
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap (OCW). (2016a). Besluit aanvraag nieuw aan-
bodkanaal NPO Plus [Decision for launching a video-on-demand service NPO Plus]. Retrieved 
January 28, 2019, from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2016/08/22/
besluit-over-npo-plus
Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap (OCW). (2016b). Besluit aanvragen nieuwe 
aanbodkanalen en stopzetten bestaande aanbodkanalen Concessiebeleidsplan 2016-2020 [De-
cision for launching new channels and removing existing services]. Retrieved January 28, 2019, 
from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/besluiten/2016/04/05/besluit-aanvragen-nieu-
we-aanbodkanalen-en-stopzetten-bestaande-aanbodkanalen-concessiebeleidsplan-2016-2020 
Mitschka, K. (2013). Wer gewinnt durch Public Value? [Public value? Whose value?]. In N. Gonser 
(Ed.), Die multimediale Zukunft des Qualitätsjournalismus: Public Value und die Aufgaben 
von Medien [The multimedia future of quality journalism: Public value and the purposes of 
media] (pp. 139–146). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Moe, H., & Van den Bulck, H. (2014). Comparing “public value” as a media policy term in Europe. 
In G. F. Lowe, & F. Marin (Eds.), The value of public service media (pp. 57–76). Gothenburg: 
Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Moore, M. H. (2017). Public value: A quick overview of a complex idea. Retrieved January 
28, 2019, from https://dpmc.govt.nz/sites/default/files/2017-07/public%20value%20-%20
mark%20moore%20presentation.pdf 
Myndigheten för Radio och TV (MPRT). (2015). Utveckling och påverkan i allmänhetens tjänst 
[Development and influence in public service]. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.
mprt.se/documents/uppdrag/ps%20marknadspåverkan%202014-2015/utveckling%20
och%20påverkan%20i%20allmänhetens%20tjänst%20inkl%20summary%202015.pdf 
Myndigheten för Radio och TV (MPRT). (2017). Beslut från 22 juni 2017 [Decision of 22 June 
2017]. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.mprt.se/casedecisions/223284.pdf 
Myndigheten för Radio och TV (MPRT). (2018). Yttrande över public service-kommitténs slut-
betänkande: Ett oberoende public service för alla – nya möjligheter och ökat ansvar [Opinion 
on the public service committee’s final report: An independent public service for all – new op-
portunities and increased responsibility] (SOU 2018:50) 19 October 2018. Retrieved January 
28, 2019, from https://www.mprt.se/documents/remissvar/2018/remissvar%2018-02316%20
public% 20service.pdf 
Neumüller, M., & Gonser, N. (2013). Alles anders? – Unterscheidbarkeit als Kriterium für Public 
Value [Everything is different? Public value as a criterion for distinctness]. In N. Gonser (Ed.), 
Die multimediale Zukunft des Qualitätsjournalismus: Public Value und die Aufgaben von 
Medien [The multimedia future of quality journalism: Public value the purposes of media] 
(pp. 15–34). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Nederlands Publieke Omroep (NPO). (2015). Concessiebeleidsplan [Concession policy plan] 
2016–2020. Retrieved January 28, 2019, from https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/
kamerstukken/2015/06/15/aanbieding-concessiebeleidsplan-npo-2016-2020
Nederlands Publieke Omroep (NPO). (2016). Beleidslijn Publieke Waarden [Guidelines for 
public value]. Retrieved January 28, 2019, from https://seizoenspresentatie.npo.nl/uploads/
media_item/media_item/132/61/Beleidslijn_Publieke_Waarden_vastgesteld_11_apr_2017_ 
in_werking_1_jan_2016-1495091039.pdf
Office of Communication (Ofcom). (2018a). Review of the BBC’s materiality assessment of pro-




Office of Communication (Ofcom). (2018b). BBC Scotland competition assessment: Final determi-
nation annex 1: Review of public value. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.ofcom.
org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0022/115267/BBC-scotland-statement-annex-1-public-value.pdf
Office of Communication (Ofcom). (2018c). Public service broadcasting in the digital age: Support-
ing PSB for the next decade and beyond. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.ofcom.
org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0026/111896/Public-service-broadcasting-in-the-digital-age.pdf
Office of Communication (Ofcom). (2019). BBC iPlayer competition assessment: Final de-
termination. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/
pdf_file/0029/159725/statement-bbc-iplayer-final-determination.pdf 
O’Neill, B. O. (2016, June). Appendix three: Public service broadcasting, public value and public 
goods. In D. Puttnam (Ed.), A future for public service television: Content and platforms 
in a digital world. A report on the future of public service television in the UK in the 21st 
Century (pp. 171–174). Retrieved May 18, 2020, from http://futureoftv.org.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/FOTV-Report-Online-SP.pdf 
Puppis, M., & d’Haenens, L. (2012). Comparing media policy and regulation. In F. Esser, & T. 
Hanitzsch (Eds.), Handbook of comparative communication research (pp. 221–233). Lon-
don: Routledge.
Raad voor Cultuur (RvC). (2014). De tijd staat open: Advies voor een toekomstbestendige pub-
lieke omroep [The time is open: Advice for a future-proof public broadcaster]. Retrieved 
January 28, 2019, from https://www.cultuur.nl/upload/documents/adviezen/De-tijd-staat-
open-28-maart.pdf 
Raats, T., & Pauwels, C. (2011). In search for the Holy Grail? Comparative analysis in public service 
broadcasting. In K. Donders, & H. Moe (Eds.), Exporting the public value tests: Regulation of 
public broadcasters’ new media services across Europe (pp. 83–95). Gothenburg: Nordicom, 
University of Gothenburg.
Raats, T., Van den Bulck, H., & d’Haenens, L. (2015). Benchmarck van den publieke omroep in 
Europa: Een analyse van het aanbod, financiering en publieksbereik [Benchmark of the public 
broadcasters in Europe: Analysis of the supply, financing and audience reach]. Brussels: Free 
University of Brussels.
Ramsey, P. (2016). ‘It could redefine public service broadcasting in the digital age’: Assess-
ing the rational for moving BBC Three online. Convergence, 24(2), 152–167. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1354856516659001
RTR-GmbH. (2014). Öffentlich-rechtliche Angebote auf dem Prüfstand: Ein Blick in die Praxis in 
Österreich und Europa [Decisions on the future of Public Services: Practices in Austria and 
Europe]. Vienna: Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications. 
Schweizer, C., & Puppis, M. (2018). Public service media in the “networked” era: A comparison of 
remits, funding, and debate in 17 countries. In G. F. Lowe, H. Van den Bulck, & K. Donders 
(Eds.), Public service media in the networked society (pp. 109–124). Gothenburg: Nordicom, 
University of Gothenburg.
Sorsa, K., & Sihvonen, M. (2018). The public value and shared value approaches. In N. Gonser (Ed.), 
Der öffentliche (Mehr-)wert von medien: Public value aus Publikumssicht [(Added) public 
value of media: Public value in the eyes of the public] (pp. 9–22). Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Trappel, J. (2014). What media value? Theorising on social values and testing in ten countries. In 
G. F. Lowe, & F. Martin (Eds.), The value of public service media (pp. 57–76). Gothenburg: 
Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
Van den Bulck, H., d’Haenens, L., & Raats, T. (2018). Public service media in Western Europe 
today: Ten countries compared. In L. d’Haenens, H. Sousa, & J. Trappel (Eds.), Compara-
tive media policy, regulation and governance in Europe: Unpacking the policy cycle (pp. 
92–116). Bristol: Intellect.
Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM). (2017). Advies aan de Vlaamse Regering betreffende de 
Nieuwe VRT-Dienst lineaire televisieomroep Ketnet Jr. Beslissing van de Algemene Kamer van 
22.05.17 [Advice to the Flemish Government concerning the new VRT-service linear television 
broadcasting Ketnet Jr. Decision of the General Chamber of 22 May 2017]. Retrieved May 18, 
2020, from https://www.vlaamseregulatormedia.be/nl/file/6996/download?token=KcNGugc3
131
A QUESTION OF VALUE OR FURTHER RESTRICTION?
Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT). (2018). Jaarverslag 2017 [Annual report 
2017]. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.vrt.be/content/dam/vrtbe/over-de-vrt/
prestaties/LRN%20VRT%20Jaarverslag%202017%20web%20low%202.pdf
Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT). (2017). Jaarverslag 2016 [Annual Report 
2016]. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.vrt.be/content/dam/vrtbe/over-de-vrt/
prestaties/ VRT%20Jaarverslag%202016.pdf 
Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT). (2016). Jaarverslag 2015 [Annual Report 
2015]. Retrieved May 18, 2020, from https://www.vrt.be/content/dam/vrtbe/over-de-vrt/
prestaties/jaarverslag2015.pdf 
Wippersberg, J. (2010). Die Bedeutung des privaten Rundfunks in Österreich [The importance of 
private broadcasting in Austria]. In RTR-GmbH (Ed.), Public Value und privater Rundfunk in 
Österreich [Public value and private broadcasting in Austria] (pp. 41–156). Vienna: Austrian 
Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications.

Chapter 8
Challenges for public service radio  
in small nations
Lessons from Scotland
Aleksandar Kocic & Jelena Milicev
Abstract
Scotland does not have any public service radio on a local level, except for a few 
bulletins or programmes offered by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 
Radio Scotland on an opt-out basis. Scottish commercial radio stations do cover 
local issues, but only in the form of brief hourly news bulletins without any in-
depth coverage. By neglecting local news, BBC Scotland fails to meet one of its 
key obligations as a public service broadcaster – universality of content. Through 
a review of the existing literature on the role of media in democracy – and in 
particular the role of local radio – interviews with academics whose expertise lies 
in the fields of media policy and regulation, and focus groups with members of 
the public, this study formulates proposals on how to achieve universality in this 
key area of news provision in Scotland.
Keywords: local, radio, public, service, news, regulation
Introduction
Scotland is a stateless nation, or as the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC) refers to it in the context of its own structure – a national region. In 
the radio arena, Scotland has a very strong national player in the form of 
BBC Radio Scotland, which is both a national radio for Scotland and, as part 
of the bigger BBC family, a regional one. What Scotland lacks, though, is lo-
cal public service radio along the lines of similar services in many countries, 
including south of the border in England. In terms of local news provision, 
radio audiences in Scotland are served by a network of commercial radio sta-
tions, while the BBC in Scotland offers local news only on its website. That 
level of provision, as we argue in this chapter, is insufficient. Of particular 
interest to us is provision of local hard news, or what Kernell and colleagues 
(2018: 240) refer to as “civic affairs news” – news that help inform citizens’ 
political activity. This is particularly important now that the local press is in 
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decline, with titles closing down or reducing staff numbers and output (Fraser, 
2017; Mayhew, 2018). 
According to a YouGov survey on news consumption, for citizens of the 
UK, radio is the second most popular source of news, after television and still 
ahead of print, online news sources, and social media feeds. British people say 
that local or regional news is the second most important type of news, after 
national, with a combined figure of 76 per cent saying that it is either “very” 
or “fairly” important. The four most important types of local news for British 
people are: crime and policing (80%), local events and entertainment (69%), 
traffic and travel (63%), and local politics (62%). Although 61 per cent say there 
is enough local news where they live, it is not clear if the levels of satisfaction 
vary between the four nations of the UK, given that the BBC runs local radio 
stations only in England (all figures by YouGov, 2019). 
In that context, and with focus on universality of content as one of the stated 
obligations of public service media, we aim to answer two research questions:
 1. What is the state of local news provision by radio in Scotland? 
 2. How to achieve universality of content for BBC radio in Scotland? 
To answer these two questions, we reviewed the existing literature on the role 
of media in democracy. We also interviewed news editors, station managers, 
and academics with expertise in the fields of media policy, regulation, and his-
tory. Furthermore, we spoke to members of the public in focus groups. The 
same data set has been used to answer other research questions, with partly 
overlapping conclusions published elsewhere (see Kocic & Milicev, 2019). Our 
aim is to evaluate the current local news provision by radio in Scotland and 
formulate possible ways forward for BBC in Scotland so it can achieve more 
complete universality of content. 
Theoretical perspectives on the role of media
In Scotland, as elsewhere in the UK, the BBC is the main public service broad-
caster, while commercial rivals have only limited public service obligations. Pub-
lic broadcasting systems are allocated certain responsibilities and are required 
to serve the “public interest” in ways that go beyond what market forces can 
determine (McQuail, 2003: 15), which makes the BBC’s position over local news 
coverage in Scotland rather peculiar. What seems to be of particular concern here 
is to what extent the BBC meets its responsibilities in terms of universality and 
diversity. These are – together with independence and distinctiveness – some of 
the main responsibilities of public service broadcasters, as defined by Banerjee 
and Seneviratne (2005). The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) distinguishes 
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between universality of content and universality of access. It is universality of 
content that is of particular interest to this study. 
The EBU (2002) defines universality of content in two ways: universality of 
basic supply on generalist channels and universality across the full portfolio 
of services, some of them specialised or tailored for specific audiences. Writing 
before the proliferation of digital services, Born and Prosser (2001) argued that 
in the context of universality of content, the traditional concept of mixed pro-
gramming is superior to the concept of niche channels, where more demanding 
programmes on current affairs or the arts are concentrated in specialist channels. 
While BBC Radio Scotland has maintained the single-channel approach, this 
chapter demonstrates that it has deliberately neglected a key aspect of news 
provision – local news coverage. 
For Bardoel and d’Haenens, the universality of content requirement presents 
public service broadcasters (PSBs) with a particular challenge as they seek sup-
port of a society that is changing rapidly because of major social trends such as 
individualisation, lower interest in politics and established institutions, as well 
as a shift from a mono- to a multicultural society. A key problem is the gradu-
ally diminishing reach of PSBs among “problematic groups” such as younger 
generations, migrants, and the less educated (Bardoel & d’Haenens, 2008: 341). 
Young people often support the ideal of public service in media, but many do 
not find public service media (PSM) channels or content of personal interest 
and value (Van den Bulck et al., 2018).
In Scotland, the gap in local news coverage by BBC Radio Scotland is partly 
filled by commercial radio, in the form of brief hourly news bulletins. Never-
theless, as commercial media have a structural bias against news and current 
affairs (Aalberg et al., 2010), it remains unclear to what extent this addresses 
the informational needs of Scottish audiences. This is important because of 
the potential of local media to contribute to democratic processes. Democracy 
functions best when its citizens and decision-makers are informed about dif-
ferent viewpoints on policy problems (Baumgartner & Jones, 2015). Local 
journalism provides information about local public affairs, it holds local elites 
at least somewhat accountable, it provides a forum for discussion, and it ties 
communities together (Nielsen, 2015). Local media have the ability to bring 
politically disinterested citizens together and help them engage in public life 
(Campbell, 1999). The media do that by raising citizens’ concerns about issues 
(Smith, 1987) and by providing information on how individuals can participate 
in politics (Lemert, 1981). Furthermore, local media help foster social integra-
tion by helping people navigate their local community and contribute to social 
cohesion and a sense of belonging to the locale (Costera Meijer, 2010). From 
this perspective, local and regional media are seen as fundamental resources of 
both democracy and identity (Robins & Cornford, 1993). 
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The functioning of democracy relies on an informed citizenship (Esser et al., 
2012). News media use is expected to affect political participation by affecting 
knowledge about current political affairs, which then affects beliefs in one’s 
capability to act on this knowledge (Andersen et al., 2016). Active political 
participation is key to a healthy democracy, especially within the frameworks 
of participatory and deliberative democracy (Strömbäck, 2005). Citizens who 
pay close attention to news about public affairs and politics should not only 
be able to cast more informed ballots and hold elected officials accountable; 
they should also be more supportive of democratic processes and procedures 
(Goidel et al., 2017). 
The second equally important function of the media is in facilitating par-
ticipation in deliberative processes. Carpentier and colleagues (2013) say that 
the media sphere serves as a location, where citizens can voice their opinions 
and experiences and interact with other voices. This concept is of particular 
importance to the present study as we believe that local media – and local radio 
in particular – play a key role in facilitating public participation in democratic 
processes. This is achieved through its role of bringing to the fore issues relevant 
to local communities it serves and, through its staple – the phone-in – and 
other speech-based programmes, facilitate mediated public discussion around 
those issues. 
The arrival of the Internet brought with it a new public sphere with great 
hopes for the effect of online and mobile news’ effect on democracy. Jakubo-
wicz (2008: 5) is among those who believe that the Internet has “transformed 
large parts of the traditionally passive audience into active communicators, 
willing to engage in debate and expecting a similar willingness on the part of 
professional media”. Social media in particular was thought to have democratic 
potential to engage people in dialogue about issues of common concern and 
public interest (Hjarvard, 2018; Shirky, 2008). Others, however, have argued 
that the potential for digital democracy is greatly overstated (Ceron & Memoli, 
2016; Hindman, 2008). Digital media may subsequently have little effect on 
democratic attitudes, or the effects may be more nuanced (Goidel et al., 2017). 
As far as local news coverage is concerned, the emergence of new digital forms 
of local media has caused a great deal of optimism, but as Nielsen (2015) points 
out, the evidence that digital-only operations can sustain local journalism on 
a significant scale is inconclusive.
Radio market and listening habits in Scotland
Currently, there are 34 local commercial stations available to listeners in Scot-
land (Ofcom, 2019).1 According to their schedules and service formats, they 
all provide news coverage in the form of brief hourly news bulletins in peak 
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hours. At the same time, substantial local news coverage by the BBC exists 
only on “opt-outs” in some parts of Scotland. BBC Radio Orkney and BBC 
Radio Shetland each broadcast a half-hour daily news programme, extended 
to a full hour in winter months, while short local news and weather bulletins 
are also broadcast on weekdays from studios in Selkirk, Dumfries, Aberdeen, 
and Inverness. This leaves other parts of Scotland, including large cities such 
as Glasgow, Edinburgh, or Dundee, without any local news coverage. 
In order to help fill the gap in the coverage of local councils and other public 
bodies in the UK, the BBC in 2017 launched Local News Partnerships – a news 
agency tasked with providing content for print, broadcast, and online news 
outlets. The agency currently employs 20 journalists in Scotland who produce 
content available to over 130 partners, mostly local newspaper and commercial 
radio stations (BBC, 2019). While certainly a step in the right direction, that 
project does little to address the lack of local news coverage by BBC Radio 
in Scotland itself. This is quite important as research by the Office of Com-
munications (Ofcom) consistently shows that listeners in Scotland attach a 
great deal of importance to local news coverage – it is the second most valued 
type of content after music (2019). Radio in general remains very popular in 
Scotland, with 85 per cent of adults tuning in every week in quarter 1 of 2019. 
Local commercial radio is the most popular type, at 51 per cent weekly reach, 
while BBC Radio Scotland – at 17.2 per cent – is doing better than local radio 
in England combined (all figures from Ofcom, 2019).
Methods
The present study – which received ethical approval from Edinburgh Napier 
University prior to data collection – used a mixed-methods design as a way 
to collect rich, comprehensive data and compare quantitative and qualitative 
findings.
Design
We employed an exploratory sequential design (see Wisdom & Creswell, 2013) 
whereby a qualitative approach was used to explore the previously established 
quantitative findings. Content analysis was used to reach quantitative find-
ings. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were employed to obtain views of 
experts, professionals, and government officials, allowing us to gather detailed 
answers about each respondent’s field of expertise (Guest et al., 2017). Focus 
groups were used to obtain the views of members of the public. This method 
was appropriate as group dynamics – based on the interactions between group 
members – were likely to produce a wider range of views and perspectives than 
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one-to-one interviews (cf. Kidd & Parshall, 2000; Krueger & Casey, 2015). 
Combining quantitative data about the extent of local news coverage and 
qualitative data about user needs and ways to address them, we obtained a 
comprehensive tool to assess the current state of local news provision by radio 
in Scotland, as well as the ability to draw up suggestions about optimal ways 
of achieving universality of content for BBC radio in Scotland. 
Procedure
The study was undertaken in four consecutive phases: 1) interviews with news 
editors; 2) content analysis of news bulletin scripts; 3) interviews with experts; and 
4) focus groups with the general public. The findings from each phase informed 
the design of the subsequent phases in the following way. First, news editors at 
BBC Radio Scotland and Bauer Media2 were interviewed face-to-face using a semi-
structured approach to gain insight into stations’ editorial policies and output. 
Next, content analysis was applied to the news bulletin scripts provided by 
Bauer Media and the BBC Radio Scotland, looking into programmes by four Bauer 
Media stations and the BBC Radio Scotland between 25–27 September 2017 (see 
Table 3). News stories were sorted according to the predetermined categories listed 
in Tables 2 and 4. Once the state of news provision by commercial and PSB radio 
in Scotland was quantified, we used semi-structured interviews with six experts 
and one Scottish government representative to put those findings into perspective 
and solicit ideas for ways forward. The academics (see Table 1) were chosen on 
the basis of their extensive knowledge of media history, policy, and regulation in 
Scotland, or more general expertise on radio and its public service role. 
Table 1. Interviewees
Station or news editors
Gary Smith, Head of News, BBC Radio Scotland






Neil Blain, Professor Emeritus of Communications,  
University of Stirling
David Hutchison, Visiting Professor in Media Policy,  
Glasgow Caledonian University
Peter Schlesinger, Professor of Cultural Policy, University of 
Glasgow and former member for Scotland on the Content 
Board of Ofcom
Peter Lewis, Professor of Media and Culture, London  
Metropolitan University
Chris Frost, Professor of Journalism, John Moores  
University
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Finally, the findings from content analysis and interviews with editors and 
experts were used to inform the design of the focus groups’ interview schedule. 
Participants
The academic experts (see Table 1) were chosen on the basis of their extensive 
knowledge of media history, policy, and regulation in Scotland, or more general 
expertise on radio and its public service role. Scottish residents aged 18 and 
above were eligible to participate in our focus groups, provided they had resided 
in Scotland for more than a year. Invitations for participation were emailed 
to the members of Edinburgh Active Citizenship Group – whose members are 
ordinary citizens with a keen interest in public affairs – and students at Edin-
burgh Napier University. Scottish citizens (N=22; age range 19–72) took part 
in four focus groups. The purpose was to gain insight into ordinary citizens’ 
views on the importance of local news and local radio.
Data analysis
Both the interviews and focus groups were analysed using thematic analysis. 
This is a flexible approach that allows for identification of key patterns (themes) 
in the data and their interpretation in relation to the research questions and 
relevant theoretical ideas (cf. Braun & Clarke, 2013, 2014). It was a particu-
larly suitable way to address our research questions, which aimed to tap into 
individuals’ conceptions of social phenomena, as it enabled us to capture a 
wide range of views as well as identify the most dominant ones (cf. Willig, 
2013). First, we assigned preliminary codes to the data. Next, we searched for 
patterns across the interviews. Finally, themes were refined and defined so that 
each one was coherent and distinct. Consequently, our themes represented the 
dominant attitudes and perceptions related to local news provision in Scotland, 
while the minority opinions were recorded as “disproving cases”, helping to 
form a balanced representation of the entire data set. 
Quantitative results
On BBC Radio Scotland we counted 124 stories in total, with the breakdown 
listed in Table 2.
We note here – as per BBC Radio Scotland’s news policy explained by its 
Head of News Gary Smith – that local stories are included in news bulletins or 
programmes only if they are considered by editors to be of interest to the wider 
Scottish audience. Such stories often fall into these categories: crime, traffic, 
and human interest. Some of the headlines in this category we found included: 
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“Easterhouse Stabbing Inquiry Continues”; “A Man Has Died Following a 
Disturbance in Dundee”; and “Motorists Reporting Long Delays on the A9 
in the Cairngorm”.
Table 2. Types and number of stories covered by BBC Radio Scotland 








Arts and entertainment 4
Other 0
Total 124
In the commercial sector, we looked at the output of four Bauer media stations, 
listed in Table 3.
Table 3. Commercial radio stations included in the content analysis
Station  Output
Clyde 1 (greater Glasgow area) FM and DAB 
Weekday news bulletins, hourly 6:00 
a.m.–7:00 p.m.
Clyde 2 (greater Glasgow area) AM and DAB
Weekday news bulletins, hourly 6:00 
a.m.–7:00 p.m.
Radio Borders (Scottish Borders and North 
Northumberland)
FM
Weekday news bulletins, hourly 6:00 
a.m.–7:00 p.m.
Radio Forth (greater Edinburgh area) FM and DAB 
Weekday news bulletins, hourly 6:00 
a.m.–7:00 p.m.
All of the above listed stations have one thing in common – they offer a far 
smaller number of stories than BBC Radio Scotland, but with more emphasis on 
local news. Lorraine Herbison, Bauer Media’s head of news for Scotland, points 
out that this is because local news is Bauer’s USP in terms of its news offering. 
This point is clearly illustrated in our breakdown of the four radio stations’ 
news output over the same three days in September 2017, listed in Table 4.
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Table 4. Types and number of stories covered by four commercial radio stations
Station
Clyde 1 and 2 Radio Borders Radio Forth
Local 11 17 12
Regional 13 6 5
National 9 12 17
International 2 4 3
Sport 7 3 9
Human interest 2 0 0
Business 1 2 1
Science 2 1 2
Art and Entertainment 1 2 1
Other 1 0 0
Total 49 47 50
Our analyses demonstrate that in relative terms, commercial radio in Scotland 
covers a substantial number of local stories. However, those stories are covered 
in brief only, as the majority of stations, including those listed here, do not go 
beyond the two-minute news bulletins on the hour, extended to five minutes at 
1:00 p.m. on AM stations only (which serve an older audience).  
Qualitative results
In our interviews with media experts, three themes emerged: 1) the BBC is not 
doing a good enough job; 2) commercial radio is not a viable alternative; and 
3) the BBC and broadcasting policy in Scotland should be reformed. 
Theme one: The BBC is not doing a good enough job
All expert interviewees agree that the BBC could do better in the area of local 
news provision. Frost said he thought that local news provision “was the main 
purpose of BBC Scotland”, while Lewis pointed out that attention on local 
radio suffered due to the BBC’s “prioritising” of television and online services. 
Schlesinger challenged the traditional concept of mixed programming: “An 
all-purpose pan-Scottish station’s model is ripe for review, not least as patterns 
of consumption change apace”. 
Theme two: Commercial radio is not a viable alternative
Given the lack of local news provision on BBC Scotland, we asked our inter-
viewees to comment on local news provision by commercial rivals in Scotland. 
For Schlesinger, “the long-term trend of commercial local radio has been to 
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de-localise content and to consolidate ownership”, while for Blain, commercial 
radio is less suitable as an alternative to PSB because it is “more prone to buf-
feting by various market considerations”. Frost sees deregulation as the main 
reason why commercial radio fails to provide substantial news coverage and 
does not expect that to change any time soon. 
Theme three:  
The BBC and broadcasting policy in Scotland should be reformed
Our interviewees suggested a variety of ways for future local news provision 
in Scotland – from the preservation of local press (Blain) to the “rethinking” 
of public provision by the BBC (Schlesinger) or a possible new network of 
non-BBC PSB stations (Hutchison). Blain thinks the BBC should trial local sta-
tions in areas “where research indicated a kind of identity community which 
would support them”. He adds that the existing provision for Shetland and 
Orkney could be a useful model. Hutchison argues that the money allocated 
to the BBC’s new digital channel for Scotland could be better spent by setting 
up local radio stations. For him, one of the reasons for that is the decline of 
local press: “When local newspapers were stronger that didn’t matter, but I 
think it started to matter more and I’m not sure the solution is expanding the 
BBC website”. The Scottish government, which on broadcasting matters does 
not have policy-making powers, says it too would like the BBC to go beyond 
just the local opt-outs: “We believe that […] audiences would also welcome 
dedicated services from the BBC offering high quality news and current affairs 
from the distinctive perspective of Scotland’s regions”. 
For Lewis and the Scottish government, the solution lies in devolution of 
broadcasting in the UK, which in the government’s view would “ensure that 
proportionate decisions can be taken which recognise the requirements of view-
ers and listeners in Scotland”. Schlesinger believes the dilemma facing the BBC 
is “how to design and market content that will appeal to younger demographics 
without an entrenched habit of radio listening [and balance it] with attention to 
existing radio audiences”. This is of course the dilemma facing all PSBs around 
the world, as highlighted by Van den Bulck and colleagues (2018).
Focus groups
Thematic analysis of the focus groups revealed four dominant, interrelated 
themes: 1) we are second best for the BBC; 2) there is a need for a variety of 
local news; 3) commercial radio does not do news well; and 4) the BBC may 
not be the only solution.
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Theme one: We are second best for the BBC
Most of the participants expressed dissatisfaction with various aspects of the 
BBC in Scotland, most notably its trustworthiness and impartiality. These were 
perceived as compromised by a “really obvious political bias it has, which is 
[…] not even subtle now, it’s just awful”. According to our participants, the 
station also lacked in spirit and creativity (“There is no energy in that radio”), 
which was attributed to the inferior status of the regional provider in relation 
to the national corporation: 
I feel like there’s a very strong sense in Scotland with a lot of people that we 
are second best for the BBC.
BBC Scotland’s news […] I think they’re badly prepared, truly badly prepared 
compared to BBC core. Main news broadcast and lot of the news is very 
vague, they don’t grow traction or stimulate.
Our focus groups were also critical of the extent to which BBC Scotland catered 
for different groups, tastes, and needs. Main perceived deficiencies were to do 
with repetitiveness (“It’s always the same lady that’s on, she kind of backslaps 
and jokes with the people. It seems a fairly trivial chat”), and the lack of lo-
cal content (“But there usually seems to be chat shows, it’s not local news”). 
Nevertheless, many participants praised particular elements of BBC Scotland’s 
output, such as the morning programme, sports, or night-time music.
Theme two: There is a need for a variety of local news
In line with the aforementioned 2019 YouGov survey of news consumption, 
most participants expressed great interest in local news. In addition, they voiced 
frustration that local news is “not out there” or that “if it’s covered at all, it’s 
not in-depth”. There was a shared feeling that important local information 
was obtained accidentally (“I only happen to hear about these if somebody 
happens to come on the door”) or that “you’ve got to want to make an effort 
to look for it”. Interests included council spending and planning, transport, 
infrastructure, services, schools, education, and “feel-good” stories. Finally, 
several participants stressed the relevance of local information to the possibility 
of civic action and political activity:
Like, if you want things to change, or if you want to hear about local corrup-
tion, or bad planning, or that sort of things, local news should be a platform.
I think it’s good to know what they’re spending money on, because that 
shows what your local Council thinks is important. And if I think something 
is important and you can see they’re not spending any money on it, then I 
would ask myself why. Or ask them.
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Theme three: Commercial radio does not do news well
Although commercial radio in Scotland provides news in the form of short 
hourly bulletins, our participants did not feel that this was an adequate way to 
provide local news coverage, labelling it “ridiculous”. Similar to experts, focus 
groups expressed the view that commercial media cannot be an adequate sub-
stitute for PSBs: “Every time I listen to any local channel on the radio, I never 
hear the news in it, I just hear the same pop tune that is on the next channel”.
At the same time, our focus groups perceived some aspects of commercial 
radio rather positively: “I think they can be fun to listen to and I think there 
are a lot of really good people, like, hosting different types of shows”. 
Theme four: The BBC may not be the only solution
The focus groups also indicated there is demand for local public service radio, 
though not necessarily one provided by the BBC. While some participants 
thought that each of the seven cities of Scotland should have its local BBC 
station, the majority felt that the BBC’s reputation as a news provider was too 
“tainted” due to its shortcomings discussed in theme one, and that there was 
a need for a public broadcaster that would “have autonomy and not be yet 
another aspect of the BBC”, which would be close to the Scottish government’s 
view that broadcasting should be devolved. While overall there was ostensible 
enthusiasm for some form of local radio, there were also those who thought 
that radio’s days were numbered: “Online news is the future really. It will all 
be shifted over to online at some point”.
Discussion
In this study, we set out to evaluate the state of local news provision by radio 
in Scotland and to explore the possible ways in which to achieve universality 
of content for BBC radio in Scotland. Our content analyses demonstrated that 
BBC Radio Scotland covers local news only as an exception, while commercial 
radio in general includes a relatively large number of local news, but mostly 
without any in-depth coverage. Our thematic analyses resulted in three over-
arching themes for the interviews and four for the focus groups. Notably, the 
two sets of themes overlapped to an extent, providing a more rounded view of 
the issues at stake. Both experts and the members of public agreed that local 
radio is important as a provider of local news and facilitator of local democracy. 
While the experts highlighted the public service media as the best for the 
role, members of the public did not have a strong preference for it to be the 
BBC, voicing unambiguous dissatisfaction with the performance of the national 
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broadcaster in Scotland. The perceived bias and lack of creativity, diversity, 
and local content imply that, in the view of Scottish residents, BBC Scotland 
might be failing to meet its PSB responsibilities of independence, distinctiveness, 
universality, and diversity, as defined by Banerjee and Seneviratne (2005). The 
fact that our focus groups felt that local information was vital for their politi-
cal activity and civic action supports Kernell and colleagues’ (2018) notion of 
civic affairs news as news that empower citizens by informing their political 
activity. Both focus groups and experts suggest that the BBC model in Scotland 
should be reformed. Focus groups supported the view that commercial media 
cannot be an adequate substitute for PSBs because, as Aalberg and colleagues 
(2010) pointed out, they have a structural bias against news and current affairs. 
In addition, they felt that the BBC should be replaced by a more autonomous 
news provider, echoing the view of the Scottish Government that broadcasting 
should be devolved. Despite some differences between the views of experts and 
focus groups, a sufficient number of common perspectives has emerged to help 
us answer our research questions. 
Theoretical perspectives on the role of radio outlined above demonstrate a 
clear need for robust local news provision in democracy. In assessing the state 
of that provision by radio in Scotland, we looked at the number of stories cov-
ered before gathering perspectives on the quality of the coverage. Our content 
analyses show that public service radio covers more stories and offers more 
airtime to news and current affairs than its commercial rivals but by and large 
neglects local news. Our interviews with experts highlight this as an important 
gap, while our focus group interviews demonstrate both scepticism of the BBC 
and dissatisfaction with commercial radio. 
We conclude that the current provision by the BBC and commercial radio in 
Scotland is insufficient and that Scotland needs local radio with a strong public 
service role. Such radio would help keep the citizens informed about local is-
sues and thus potentially engaged in local democracy. Democracy functions 
best when its citizens are politically informed (Aalberg et al., 2010). Studies 
show that news media with high levels of political content affect knowledge and 
voter turnout positively (Althaus & Trautman, 2008; Baekgaard et al., 2014; 
De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006). 
In order to achieve universality of content for BBC radio in Scotland so that 
it includes local news coverage, we propose that the BBC set up a network of 
local radio stations with opt-ins into BBC Radio Scotland. This would be based 
on the English model – where currently there are 40 local BBC stations – pos-
sibly starting with the expansion of the existing BBC community stations in 
Scotland (see below), followed by the establishment of new ones. The amount 
of output per station would vary, and they would all at certain times opt into 
BBC Scotland, or at night, a national BBC station such as BBC Five Live. Some 
of our experts suggested precisely this.
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Our focus group interviews revealed distrust of the BBC based mostly on 
its perceived bias. While this is a matter for a separate study, we here note that 
in the current constitutional setup, the BBC is best placed to provide universal 
news service to audiences in Scotland. Without the unlikely regulatory overhaul, 
commercial radio can only play a supplementary role in news provision, while 
a PSB rival to the BBC, as championed by some of our experts and focus group 
participants, does not seem to be viable in the current political climate in the UK. 
A reformed BBC therefore would best meet the two complementary obliga-
tions for PSBs, namely universality and diversity. The BBC with a single national 
radio station for Scotland, together with a network of local stations, would 
enable the corporation to achieve more meaningful diversification in terms of 
the audiences targeted and the subjects discussed, thus reflecting the whole 
range of current issues in society, especially at local level.
The BBC is a well-established PSB, with sufficient resources to run such a 
service, provided BBC Scotland is reorganised. According to its annual report 
for 2017–2018 (BBC, 2018) the BBC raises over GBP 320 million in Scotland 
from the licence fee but spends about a GBP 100 million less. The rest goes to 
the central BBC budget. The total spent on radio is just over GBP 22 million 
(BBC, 2018).3 By establishing a network of local radio stations, the BBC would 
go a long way towards reaching universality of content in its news coverage 
in Scotland. However, we consider this option unlikely in the near future. It 
is clear that in the short-to-medium term, the BBC does not have any plans to 
invest in a network of local radio stations, as confirmed to us by Gary Smith. 
Alternatively, BBC Radio Scotland could continue running a single national 
radio station, but with more local opt-outs – giving existing BBC community 
stations more airtime and adding new ones in places where they don’t already 
exist. At the moment, BBC Radio Orkney and BBC Radio Shetland both air a 
half-hour daily news programme each, while local news and weather bulletins 
are also broadcast from studios in Selkirk, Dumfries, Aberdeen, and Inverness 
on weekdays. From the perspective of universality, this option would be in line 
with Born and Prosser’s (2001) argument that the traditional concept of mixed 
programming is superior to the concept of niche channels. In this scenario, 
news for different localities would essentially be an integral part of a single 
BBC Radio Scotland channel. We acknowledge, however, that this option had 
limited support among our expert interviewees and focus group participants. 
At present, the BBC in Scotland provides local news coverage mainly on its 
website, where Scotland is divided into six geographical areas. This is certainly 
welcome and can be seen as an essential part of strengthening the reach of 
public broadcasting. The merits of this strategy – which at the moment appears 
to be insufficient both in scope and aims – should be examined in a separate 
investigation. In terms of its capacity to nurture and represent inclusive public 
dialogue – as suggested by Bardoel and Lowe (2007) in their argument for 
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transition from PSB to PSM – the website fails, as it does not offer a possibility 
for discussion of issues. 
Conclusion
Through a combination of policy and regulatory decisions, Scotland has been 
left without significant local news provision by radio. This may not have mat-
tered much in the days of a strong local newspaper market,4 but today it creates 
a worrying gap. This is not to say that radio in Scotland is a failure – on the 
contrary, BBC Radio Scotland is going strong with a steady audience of around 
20 per cent; but we believe its current remit creates a significant gap in relation 
to its universality obligation. 
In the present study, we approached the issue of validity by using triangula-
tion, that is, looking at the issue at stake from two different standpoints: experts’ 
and citizens’ (see Wilson & MacLean, 2011). We acknowledge that this study 
is limited by relying on a small number of interviews and focus groups and the 
fact that all focus group participants were from Southeast Scotland and hence 
the views expressed might be primarily representative of this region. Future 
research could verify the generalisability of the current findings by surveying a 
larger number of participants from a wider geographical area. The proposals 
outlined here present a starting point for discussion and further in-depth re-
search that would look at their political viability and feasibility. Future research 
should also address the state of the current local news provision in Scotland 
in general – by encompassing print and online media. Given the position of 
Scotland in the UK and the extent of its autonomy, future research should also 
look at the possibility of local news provision by public service radio set-up 
outside the BBC. 
Notes
 1. Radio listeners in Scotland are also served by a range of community radio stations. Scottish Com-
munity Broadcasting Network currently lists 27 of those. Community stations, however, usually 
lack resources to be able to produce standard news bulletins and news programming, and they do 
not employ trained journalists. As such, they were excluded from our considerations.
 2. Bauer Media runs thirteen stations at eight locations in Scotland, and in quarter 1 of 2018, it had the 
largest proportion of the market among commercial radio groups (Ofcom, 2018).
 3.	 These	figures	do	not	include	the	GBP	32	million	allocated	annually	for	the	BBC’s	new	digital	tele-
vision channel for Scotland, launched in early 2019.
 4. 57.9 per cent of the British population live in areas not served by a local daily. Rural areas are par-
ticularly poorly served, with almost all local daily papers covering major urban areas (NUJ, 2017).
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Whose voices and what values?
State grants for significant public content  
in the Russian media model
Olga Dovbysh & Tatiana Belyuga
Abstract
This study explores how the public service function of media can be implemented 
in a media model where the institution of public service broadcasting has not been 
established thus far. Analysing the Russian media model, we investigate how pa-
ternalistic state support is related to the commercial logic of mass media. Taking 
the example of state grants for significant public content, we reveal what topics 
and whose voices are gaining visibility in mass media. The analysis of state grants 
revealed the limitations of public accountability in grant competition, the overlap of 
public interest with state interest in grant projects, and a lack of problematisation 
in supported projects. Two main groups of topics were identified – public-oriented 
“by default” topics (culture, history, etc.) are related to an official governmental 
agenda, while problem-based and controversial topics are less visible. Journalists 
applying for grants try to anticipate what topics will be considered public-oriented 
topics by the grant competition’s expert council. Therefore, the only voices that 
matter are those that do not contradict the official political agenda. 
Keywords: state grants, Russian media model, public service content, state con-
trol, market failure 
Introduction
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, public service broadcasting (PSB) was 
introduced in the majority of post-communist states. Only some post-Soviet 
countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan) failed to transform state broadcasting into PSB (Jakubowicz, 
2012). 
Some scholars note that the introduction of PSB in post-Soviet countries was 
an artificial process performed at the “insistence” of and under “additional 
pressure” from the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media 
(Richter & Golovanov, 2006). Public broadcasting in such countries is criticised 
Dovbysh, O., & Belyuga, T. (2020). Whose voices and what values? State grants for significant public content in the 
Russian media model. In P. Savage, M. Medina, & G. F. Lowe (Eds.) Universalism in public service media (pp. 151–173). 
Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of Gothenburg.
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for being strongly dependent on political elites and a direct extension of the 
political power structure (Jakubowicz, 2012).
Another case is Russia and other countries where the institution of PSB 
was not introduced at all. How can enhanced civic engagement and informed 
citizenship be achieved in such media models? What is the nature and degree 
of state intervention in the way mass media provides a public service? In this 
chapter, we explore the mechanims of state support for public-oriented content 
production and distribution in the current Russian media model. We address not 
only the practical embodiment of public service, but also a more general idea 
of public interest. Public interest implies a responsibility to support the norms, 
ethics, and values of a society through informational diversity and represent the 
opinions and perspectives of various social groups and communities, including 
those that are small and underprivileged (McQuail, 2010; Rozanova, 2007). In 
this sense, we understand public service as the ability to create a “communica-
tional condition of democracy characterized by [the] informed and responsible 
engagement of citizens in public debates under conditions of separation and 
[the] balance of power” (Rozanova, 2007: 142).
In the following study, we focus on one particular institutional form of this 
mechanism – state grants for providing “significant public information”. We 
find these grants to be an important aspect of the Russian media model and 
especially for regional mass media to provide informational diversity and the 
opportunity for different voices within society to be heard. Following Couldry 
(2010), we understand a voice as the instrument by which one expresses an 
opinion, which can in turn have two interrelated meanings: voice as the process 
of speaking or voting in elections, and voice as an expression of value, or the 
act of valuing and choosing to value. Therefore, voice can be seen as an instru-
ment for organising human life and resources through the process of valuing 
particular social groups or topics. Therefore, when considering state grants for 
mass media, we investigate two research questions: 
 1. How does the mechanism of state grants shape the process of addressing 
public interest?
 2. Whose voices gain visibility in the mass media as a result of such grants, 
and what values do they construct?
This text is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the contempo-
rary Russian media model and the role of public interest in it. Next, we analyse 
previous attempts to establish PSB in post-Soviet Russia. These two issues lead 
us to an analysis of the political economy of media in Russia and ways media 
fulfil the public service function given the lack of an institutionalised public 
service model. In the empirical part, we describe the research methodology 
and present the results. The chapter concludes by discussing state grants as 
a mechnism to support public-oriented content production and distribution.
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Russian media model:  
The role of the state and public interest
De Smaele (1999) was one of the first scholars to notice the limits of applying 
a Western media model to Russia. She witnessed the emergence of an “indig-
enous” Russian media model.1 Later, Oates (2007) concluded that Russian 
media operated according to a “neo-Soviet model”. Becker (2014: 192) criticised 
this approach and argued that the Russian media landscape, particularly with 
respect to government control, “has more in common with other authoritarian 
countries than it does with the immediate Soviet past”. He suggests that this 
model can be better described as “neo-authoritarian”. 
The current Russian media model operates based on a duality of new and 
old institutions (Kiriya, 2018). New neoliberal norms were mainly implemented 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and involve, for instance, commercial 
advertising in media, news journalism, and private ownership in media. Old 
norms suggest peculiar relations with political power, the prohibition against 
privately owning certain types of media (first of all – television), the use of me-
dia to forcefully advance government policy, and fragmentation of the public 
sphere. Referencing the same dualistic image, Vartanova (2012) calls the Rus-
sian media model “statist commercialized”, with two simultaneous processes 
shaping the model: marketisation and state influence.
The media industry in Russia is growing quite rapidly compared to other 
countries. In 2018, Russia ranked fifth (together with Indonesia and Pakistan) 
in the rating of the fastest-growing entertainment and media industries (Price-
waterhouseCoopers, 2018). The Russian advertising market is also growing fast, 
approximately 16 per cent annually (RMAA Agency, 2018). At least four main 
features of the current Russian media market can be mentioned (Vartanova et 
al., 2016). First, it is important to note the economic, audience, and information 
domination of national television.2 Russian television, regardless of the owner-
ship structure, is financed primarily by advertising and sponsorship. Second, 
the prevalence of an advertising-based business model is noteworthy. Third, the 
media market is largely concentrated in leading segments of the media industry, 
combined with the fact that the state controls much of the media capital. The 
largest media companies belong to government-controlled structures (All-Russia 
State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company [VGTRK], Gazprom-Media) 
or to private companies with their main interests outside media sectors. Finally, 
the media market is dominated by central (federal) media companies economi-
cally and in terms of control of audience numbers and information. Regional 
media holdings are much smaller in terms of revenues and audiences.
State interference in the media market includes the role of the state and 
state agencies in shaping media structures and policy. The role of the state in 
Russian media has been widely discussed by previous scholars from different 
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perspectives, such as direct interference in media ownership (Gehlbach & Sonin, 
2014), market regulation (Kiriya, 2017) and media manipulation in electoral 
campaigns (Akhrarkhodjaeva, 2017; Enikolopov et.al, 2011), to name a few.
In general, state intervention is one of four central dimensions or pillars of 
normative media models, together with media markets, political parallelism, 
and journalistic professionalism. The particular constellation of these four di-
mensions then constitutes the three models and is the basis by which individual 
countries are classified (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). State interference can be high 
in democratic corporatist countries because of the central role of PSB, which 
is usually subjected to a higher degree of regulation than commercial media 
systems falling under the liberal model (Voltmer, 2011). However, as Voltmer 
stresses, there is a substantial difference between state interference as the exten-
sive regulation of PSB and interference in the running of media organisations 
and their editorial decision-making processes. When focusing on the Russian 
media model, Vartanova (2012) points out a strong interrelationship between 
the media, journalists, and the state, legitimised by shared beliefs – whether 
consciously or unconsciously – in the regulatory and decisive role of the state 
(or state agencies). With respect to the connection between public broadcast-
ing and the political system (Hallin & Mancini, 2004), Russia is closer to the 
government model, where implementation of the public service is moderated 
by the government or by the political majority.
Vartanova (2012: 130) points out that the “philosophy and values of PSB 
had never been legally or even publicly declared in Russia”. In the post-Soviet 
period, political and business elites have been the main driving forces in media 
policy, whereas the public has mostly been shunted aside (Koltsova, 2006). The 
limited degree of participation by people in the public sphere can be seen as one 
of the elements that are largely indigenous to the Russian media model (Kiriya, 
2018). In the next section, we elaborate on these peculiarities by applying them 
to the establishment of PSB in post-Soviet Russia and the reasons it has failed.
Failed attempts:  
Why PSB did not emerge in post-Soviet Russia
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were two national television net-
works in Russia that potentially could have been reorganised as PSB channels 
– Channel 1 and Channel 2. 
Attempt One: ORT – Russian Public Television
Channel 1, formerly known as Gosteleradio (State television and radio of USSR), 
had a broadcasting signal that reached almost every household in the country. 
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After the collapse, transmission and production facilities were still financially 
supported, but not as lavishly as in the Soviet years (Hoffman, 2002). Channel 
1 tried to earn revenue from advertising, but it was unsuccessful due to a lack 
of commercial experience and a high level of theft. In 1994, Channel 1 was 
taken over by Boris Berezovsky, a well-known political entrepreneur who was 
close to then-President Boris Yeltsin and his family. 
In order to explain this process, two important things must be clarified about 
this transitional period. First, mass media outlets of that period (in fact, in the 
next periods as well) should be understood as political resources rather than as 
business or public service actors (Soldner, 2008), as a “weapon to gain political 
capital” (Koltsova, 2001: 322). In fact, politicised media-holding companies 
played the role of “surrogate parties” during the Yeltsin presidency (Zasoursky, 
2016). In this context, addressing public opinion was of minor importance, 
while media campaigns mainly addressed “political decision makers and/or to 
rivals in the economic or political sphere” (Soldner, 2008: 162). Second, during 
the Yeltsin presidency, political decisions were often made behind closed doors 
through informal bargaining between those who were close to the president 
and his family (Soldner, 2008).
As such, Berezovsky lobbied for the creation of a “president’s channel”, 
which would be Yeltsin’s instrument in the political struggle. In November 
1994, Yeltsin signed a decree making it possible to privatise the huge television 
channel without an auction, as required by law (Hoffman, 2002). The name of 
the new organisation was Russian Public Television (ORT). Hoffman (2002: 
281) continues that “the idea of ‘public’ television, which would not be state 
television, was a novelty, and no one knew precisely what it would become”. 
In fact, the word “public” meant nothing, since the company was owned by 
state enterprises (51% of shares) and by various private companies (49% of 
shares). From the very beginning, Berezovsky started to manage the channel 
as a commercial one.
Attempt Two:  
RTR – Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company
Another national television network, Channel 2, continued to be owned by the 
state during the period of Perestroika. A new Federal State Unitary Enterprise, 
The Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (RTR), was founded 
in 1990 and served as the main media outlet supporting Yeltsin in his struggle 
with then-Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. In early 1993, RTR acquired the 
status of a national broadcasting company, according to the VGTRK official 
webpage.3 In 1998, all regional branches of the former Gosteleradio were merged 
into a holding company, thereby making RTR the largest state-owned media 
corporation in Russia. Since the company also inherited broadcasting facilities 
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that allowed it to reach almost 98 per cent of all Russians, media moguls always 
saw it as an extremely attractive actor in the advertising market, making it the 
focus of lobbying from the advertising industry. Thus, RTR began to operate in 
hybrid form – a state-owned company with subsidies from the federal budget 
and, at the same time, a commercial player in the advertising market. 
Though public broadcasters in European countries often receive funding 
from advertising, significant limitations are placed on the amount of advertising 
in broadcasting in order to diminish dependence on ratings, but stimulate the 
production of the content, which is valuable for society (Kiriya, 2018). In the 
case of RTR, though, no regulations were put into place regarding advertising. 
Therefore, state and quasi-state media companies declared their devotion to 
state and public interests, but in fact acted primarily according to the logic of the 
market, making money on advertising while still enjoying budgetary financing, 
various tax and other reductions, and long-term state loans (Aksatarova et al., 
2003). Kiriya and Degtereva (2010) point out the paradox of Russian state 
television channels receiving the largest part of their income from advertising. 
This is still true: in 2017, Perviy Kanal (the current brand name of ORT) and 
VGTRK (the current brand name of RTR) posted the highest revenues among 
national television broadcasters (Federal Agency for Press and Mass Media, 
2018). 
Attempt Three: OTR – Public Television of Russia
Almost 20 years later, in 2013, another attempt was made to introduce PSB 
in Russia through the launching of the television channel Public Television of 
Russia (OTR). It was an initiative of then-President Dmitry Medvedev, who 
founded it as non-commercial organisation. OTR’s official web page claims that 
its mission is the “formation and development of contemporary civil society 
[translated]”.4 According to OTR’s charter, the television channel’s activities 
aim to “distribute and promote ideas of civil society that includes by inform-
ing Russian audience about events in Russian and abroad through television 
broadcasting [translated]” (OTR, 2015: 3). The company is fully subsidised 
by the state. Advertising activities are restricted (except for social advertising 
and social sponsorship). 
The Council of Public Television assigns people to the television channel’s 
supervisory board. The general director and members of the council are assigned 
directly by the president of Russia. 
Initially, OTR was available on all cable networks, by satellite, or Internet 
protocol (IP) television, while the terrestrial broadcasting of OTR was avail-
able in digital standard format only. Therefore, in 2017, OTR’s audience share 
was only 0.6 per cent (for the audience “all 4+”) (Federal Agency for Press 
and Mass Media, 2018). Later, OTR was included in the first multiplex set of 
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television channels, available to households after the country’s shift to digital 
broadcasting. After the shift in the majority of Russian regions in January 2019, 
the share of OTR will grow (RIA Novosti, 2019). 
On the one hand, OTR is an artificial case of a television channel being 
established de jure as a public one, while de facto it does not meet at least two 
important requirements of public media (Brants & Siune, 1992). First, it lacks 
public accountability since the members of the council and the general director 
are assigned by the president. Second, it lacks service universality in a territorial 
sense because of the low coverage of OTR. On the other hand, OTR is prob-
ably the only television channel with nationwide coverage, representing and 
giving voice to people from different regions (the programme Bolshaya strana 
[Big country]) and from small settlements, the programme Malye goroda Rossii 
[Small towns of Russia]) in partcular. 
When comparing these three cases, the failure to establish PSB in Russia can 
be explained with several different reasons. The examples of Channel 1 and 
Channel 2 demonstrate the lack of political will to establish PSB together with 
non-mature economic and social institutions during the transitional period. The 
Case of OTR is rooted in a lack of PSB elements and is closer to cases of PSB in 
eastern European countries (Jakubowicz, 2012). As such, in the next part we 
discuss what mechanisms are used to ensure the production and distribution 
of public service content within the Russian media model.  
The political economy of media in Russia:  
“Market failure” and state paternalism
Following previous research, we distinguish two interrelated aspects of the 
Russian media model that influence how public service functions can be imple-
mented: the “failure” of the media market and the paternalistic role of the state.
How does the concept of market failure relate to public service information? 
McChesney (2012) claims that controlling media markets with private capital 
makes them concentrated and noncompetitive and leads to a marginalisation of 
the voices and interests of the poor and working class. It means that if a media 
outlet exists within a commercial paradigm (i.e., it relies on market financing 
sources), then it seeks to maximise its audience rather than appeal to the public 
(Berg et al., 2014). Consequently, the media outlet preferably focuses on such 
content that allows it to attract a larger audience. Often, it is referred to as 
“sensationalism” of the media or the “sex, sport, scandal” formula. As a result, 
socially significant – but less attractive – content aimed at a mass audience be-
comes irrelevant for such a media outlet and will not be published or broadcast.
This “market failure” effect has the most visible impact at the regional level 
of a country’s media system. Beginning in the 2000s, regional media outlets 
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have been forced to act as commercial actors, which also has an influence on 
their editorial policy and news process (Dovbysh, 2019; Richter, 2006). At the 
same time, regional media professionals still claim to be performing a service 
for the public. Within limited professional freedom and clientelistic relations 
with local authorities, this job also becomes, for many journalists, a way for 
professional legitimisation (Erzikova & Lowrey, 2014). 
The “failure” of the Russian media market co-exists with another important 
element of contemporary media culture – the paternalistic role of the state in 
relations between citizens and power elites and between people and their leader. 
Russians have “viewed it [the state] as a sacral force, a guarantor of the unity and 
the very existence of the Russian nature and society” (Vartanova, 2012: 131). 
Beginning in 2000, when Vladimir Putin became president, another element 
was added to the description of state-media relations – the formation of so-called 
common values and construction of a “national idea” (Becker, 2004; Kolstø, 
2004). Soon after his appointment as president, Putin emphasised the need 
for a new state ideology, one based on “pan-human values” and “traditional 
Russian values”. State paternalism was deemed one such value. Kolstø (2004: 
3) notices that the claim for a new ideology came after “nearly a decade of 
conscious deideologization of the Russian state”.
In other words, this is a kind of authoritarian model, where ruling elites 
not only exercise control but also feel responsibility towards society. Following 
this logic, state authorities implement paternalistic policies aimed at “curing” 
the “market failure” of media outlets not providing much socially significant 
content. There are three main mechanisms to bridge this this gap in the con-
temporary Russian media model:
 1. Direct subsidies from the state are usually aimed at national or regional 
state-owned media outlets. In 2018, the state spent RUB 83 billion (0.5% 
of all budget expenses, or 0.1% of Russian GRP) on mass media (Gazeta.
ru, 2018). The main recipients of these subsidies are the largest media 
companies: VGTRK (RUB 24.6 billion); TV-Novosti, the autonomous 
non-commercial organisation that produces content for Russia Today’s 
television channel (RUB 19.2 billion); Russia Today (RUB 6.8 billion); 
OTR (RUB 1.5 billion); Zvezda, the television channel owned by the 
Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (RUB 2 billion); and print 
media (RUB 3.5 billion) (Gazeta.ru, 2018). The mechanism of direct 
subsidies does not include any transparent procedure of public control 
regarding how these media outlets spend the budgetary funds (Kiriya, 
2018). Also, there is no clear and publicly discussed editorial policy for 
these media outlets. As such, Russian state-owned media companies are 
usually considered instruments for articulating the official discourse (Tolz 
& Teper, 2018).
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 2. State information contracts is another institutional form of state support, 
popular in Russian regions. Using such contracts, regional authorities “or-
der” the coverage of specific topics in regional mass media (Ademukova 
et. al., 2017). Previous analysis of such contracts demonstrated that many 
of them were designed to produce “socially significant content” (Dovbysh 
& Gudova, 2016). However, topics are assigned on a top-down basis, and 
in many contracts, the nature of such content is only stated vaguely. For 
instance, one of the most popular topics in such contracts is media coverage 
of the governor’s activities. Media content under this topic may vary from 
investigating the governor’s activities to enhancing authorities’ accountabil-
ity to pure political public relations. However, when taking into account 
the client-executor relations underpinning these contracts, they become a 
convenient tool for manipulation and lead to clientelistic relations between 
regional authorities and the mass media (Erzikova & Lowrey, 2010). 
 3. State grants for “significant public projects” from the Federal Agency for 
Press and Mass Communications (FAPMC) were established by decree 
by the Ministry of the Russian Federation for Press, Television and Radio 
Broadcasting and Mass Communications5 in March 2000. According to 
Decree No. 44 (2000), financing can be granted for the production or 
distribution and replication of concrete television and radio programmes, 
contributing to the solution of public significant tasks.
Later, a description of significant public content was added to the decree. Ac-
cording to the latest version (Decree No. 6, 2018: 8), significant public projects 
are understood to be different types of television and radio programmes, “rep-
resenting public and state interests and corresponding with main directions of 
state informational policy and long-term priorities of state and public develop-
ment [translated]”. Some of these directions are specified: 
 • patriotic education
 • promoting a healthy lifestyle, physical culture and sports, spiritual, moral 
and cultural values of the peoples of the Russian Federation, traditions 
of family education, motherhood and large families, education and new 
educational possibilities
 • the formation of a tolerant mind and prevention of extremism
 • the formation of a tolerant attitude toward labor migrants and the social 
adaptation of migrants
 • development of inter-ethnic communication
 • promoting the best achievements in science, education and culture
 • informational support of socially unprotected groups of citizens
 • an increase in legal and financial literacy
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 • promoting charity and patronage
 • ecological education
 • projects for kids
[translated] (Decree No. 6, 2018: 8) 
Surprisingly, Internet projects are briefly described as projects having “social 
or educational value”. 
According to the Decree (2018), a project should meet certain requirements 
in order to receive a grant, such as 1) addressing the “public significance” of 
the project; 2) providing a descriptive scenario of how the project will be con-
ducted; 3) accurately accounting for the project budget; and 4) explaining how 
it corresponds to the needs of the target audience, that is, the media outlet’s 
audience and others. 
All the projects are assessed by an expert council. The members of the council 
are assigned by the head of FAPMC. In 2018, the council included nine members: 
the head of FAPMC (council chair) and three other representatives from FAPMC; 
a representative from the Ministry for Digital Development, Communications 
and Mass Media; a representative from the Federal Service for Supervision in 
the Field of Communications, Information Technologies and Mass Commu-
nications (Roskomnadzor); a representative from the Federal State Unitary 
Enterprise, Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRS); a 
representative from the Russian Child Foundation; and a representative from 
St. Petersburg State University. The assessment procedure is organised in the 
form of voting. The project receives support if the majority of the members of 
the expert council vote for it. 
In comparison to state information contracts, state grants suggest a clear 
pattern of how money is spent. If state informational contracts work in a 
top-down manner – as authorities specify what topics should be covered – the 
grant system works in a bottom-up fashion, meaning that media outlets, not 
authorities, propose socially and publicly significant topics they want to cover. 
Moreover, the mechanism of a grant contest is centralised: all media outlets 
from all regions compete for grants with each other. Therefore, we consider 
state grants as the most transparent institutional form of state support of public 
service content production and distribution within the Russian media model 
today. In the next sections, we thus analyse the projects and topics supported 
via state grants in the years 2001–2015. 
Methodology
The initial database included 2,875 media projects for television, radio, and 
Internet supported by FAPMC from 2001 to 2015. The data are freely available 
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on FAPMC’s website. The projects included television programmes, movies 
and series, radio programmes and perfomances, websites, and other forms of 
media. The data were collected in a single table, which contained the names 
of the projects, the companies applying for them, and brief descriptions of the 
projects. 
The coder for this research was developed via the open-coding method 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990) in order to conceptualise and label the data 
(Moghaddam, 2006). Categories for coding were defined by the researcher 
based on their observations. Thereby, data analysis involves the researcher 
as an actor in the process (Walker & Myrick, 2006). For this research, the 
procedure included two parts: pre-coding and a basic coding stage. First, we 
selected 100 project descriptions (50 from the top of the data list and 50 from 
the end). The descriptions were then assigned thematic categories by two 
encoders working independently. Then, they defined the thematic categories, 
discussed them, and collected them together in a coding protocol. Second, the 
rest of the project descriptions were encoded using the categories identified in 
the first stage. Some of the categories were removed, and additional categories 
were proposed. Ultimately, 20 categories were identified based on the empirical 
data: economy; Russian regions; security; healthcare; education; science; un-
derprivileged groups of people; culture; religion; foreign policy and diplomacy; 
domestic policy; patriotism; history; migration; travel and tourism; mass media; 
ecology; Internet; sport; other.
The majority of them included three to five subcategories providing additional 
information derived from the project descriptions. For instance, the category 
of culture included four subcategories: art (music, fine art, ballet, etc.); litera-
ture; multiculturalism, traditions, folk art; and Russian language. In order to 
provide more detailed coding, each grant project could have several categories 
and subcategories. For instance, a radio programme called People of Russia also 
covered the topic of ethnical variety of Russian population and discussed the 
history of folklore, cultural exchange, and the preservation of traditions and 
music pieces of various ethnic groups; hence, it was coded using the categories 
Russian regions (subcategory: national autonomies and ethnicities) and culture 
(subcategory: multiculturalism, traditions, folk art). 
Results
This section presents and interprets analysis results of the aforementioned 
dataset. First, descriptional statistics of the whole dataset are presented. They 
are followed by analysis of topical subcategories. 
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Number of projects
The number of project applications grew steadily between the years 2001 and 
2015, with a slight decrease in 2006–2009 (see Table 1). In the beginning of 
the 2000s, the FAPMC supported approximately 100–150 grants projects. The 
number increased to nearly twice that amount by the mid-2010s. The majority 
of projects receiving support are for television, while the numbers of projects 
for studying the Internet and radio are almost the same. Even though the num-
ber of grants focusing on the Internet increased, it is still lower than for radio. 
Table 1. Number of grant projects for different types of media
Year Internet Radio TV Total
2001 14 21 68 103
2002 3 13 38 54
2003 23 28 111 162
2004 21 21 52 94
2005 49 26 114 189
2006 19 16 42 77
2007 24 31 63 118
2008 44 38 93 175
2009 49 28 72 149
2010 48 63 157 268
2011 54 65 141 260
2012 42 65 161 268
2013 43 56 133 232
2014 44 56 91 191
2015 49 57 140 246
Grant topics
Table 2 demonstrates what grant topics have been most popular during the 
15-year observation period. 
The most popular categories were culture, history, and education, while 
the least popular were economy and ecology (see Table 2). The average share 
of projects for each category was quite stable and did not change significantly 
during the 15-year observation period, with the exception of five categories (see 
Figure 1). One topical category – religion – demonstrated the highest growth, 
improving from 0.7 per cent in 2001 to 5.6 per cent of all funded projects in 
2015. In total numbers, it means a growth from one project in 2001 and two 
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projects in 2002, to 16 projects in 2014 and 19 projects in 2015. The greatest 
number of projects on religion received support in 2013 – 21 projects.























One category – healthcare – demonstrated significant decline. After funding 
six projects in 2001 and five projects in 2002, the FAPMC then funded fifteen 
projects in 2011, followed by a decline to only seven projects in 2015.
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 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
  Education  Underpriveliged groups  Religion
  Domestic policy  Foreign policy, diplomacy
Topical subcategories
Analysis of the categories gives only a cursory and generalised representation 
of what topics were supported by the state. Therefore, an examination of the 
subcategories provides more nuance.
For instance, we divided the regions category into four subcategories: na-
tional autonomies and ethnicities; life in Russian regions; Chechen Republic; 
and Republic of Crimea. Interestingly, the FAPMC supported projects on the 
Chechen Republic in 2001–2007, a time of military conflict in the republic. 
Likewise, the FAPMC funded more projects on the Republic of Crimea in 
2014 –2015, simultaneously with the emerging political crisis in Ukraine and 
annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 (see Table 3). Projects receiving sup-
port covered the history and culture of Crimea and represented the peninsula 
as a part of Russia, emphasising its important military role in Russia’s past and 
present. For instance, the description given for one of the projects, a television 
documentary movie called Pozor Shestogo flota [Shame of the Sixth Fleet] by 
Miriam Media production studio, states:
This TV documentary talks about one heroic episode of domestic military 
history when in 1988, Soviet sailors from a small patrol ship entered into 
confrontation with a heavy American cruiser off the coast of Sevastopol and 
forced it to leave the Black Sea area [translated]. (Federal Agency for Press 
and Mass Media, 2014: n.p.)
165
WHOSE VOICES AND WHAT VALUES?









Life in Russian 
regions
2001 1   2 5
2002 2 1 4
2003 2 9 5
2004 1 1 4 3
2005 4 1 9 7
2006 4 3





2012 1 9 7
2013 12 5
2014 3 10 3
2015 7 6 5
Total 11 13 126 80
We devided the security category into four subcategories: terrorism, fighting 
against it, international terrorism (11 projects); legal violations (15 projects); 
traffic regulations (15 projects); and emergencies (7 projects). 
We also divided the healthcare category into four subcategories: drug ad-
diction (56 projects); alcohol consumption and smoking (8 projects); healthy 
lifestyle (49 projects); and medical help for the population (16 projects). The 
first project applications about the danger of alcohol consumption and smok-
ing appeared in 2009. 
We divided the education category into six subcategories. Three of the 
subcategories dealt directly with types of education: pre-school and school 
education (31 projects); higher education (20 projects); and education aimed 
at gifted children (33 projects). The other three subcategories dealt with edu-
cational content: for children (pre-school and elementary school students) (179 
projects); for teenagers (middle- and high-school students) (197 projects); and 
legal and financial literacy of citizens (34 projects). Projects on how best to 
provide educational content for adults appear only after 2010. It is clear that 
the most popular topics have been those focusing on providing different kinds 
of educational programmes for children and teenagers. Such topics as reforming 
the educational system, educating kids with special needs, and other challenging 
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topics are barely represented. For instance, we found only one project related 
to special needs: a television programme Uchimsya vmeste [Study together], 
“devoted to inclusive education for people with disabilities [translated]” in 
2013. This project was proposed by non-commercial organisation for disabled 
people Inva TV (Federal Agency for Press and Mass Media, 2013).
We divided the science category into three subcategories: problems in the 
reforming and financing of science; history of science, international scientific 
achievements; and achievements of Russian and Soviet science. However, the 
majority of projects belonged to the second (63 projects) and third (98 in total) 
subcategories. Only nine projects dealt with reforms and other problems of 
science – this is less than one project per year. 
We divided the underprivileged groups of people category into five subcat-
egories: disabled people; underprivileged children (disabled, orphans, etc.); old 
people; mothers and large families; and NGOs working with underprivileged 
groups. Figure 2 demonstrates how often each subcategory was represented 
during the sample years. The most popular subcategories were disabled people 
and underprivileged children. Topics on motherhood and large families only 
appear among grant project applications beginning in 2007.










 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
  Disabled people  Underpriveliged children  Old people and pensioners
  Mothers and large families  NGOs working with underprivileged groups
We divided the culture category into four subcategories: art (including pro-
jects related to different types of art, like music, ballet, cinema, fine arts, etc.); 
literature; multiculturalism in Russia (projects on multiculturalism, traditions, 
folk art of ethnicities living in Russia); and Russian language. The first two 
subcategories have proved three times more popular than the others. 
The religion category includes four subcategories: interfaith relations and 
religious studies (15 projects); Orthodoxy, Russian Orthodox Church (116 
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projects); Islam (1 project); and other faiths (5 projects). The number of project 
applications dealing with Orthodoxy or the Russian Orthodox Church domi-
nate, and the number of such projects has increased dramatically since 2010. 
The foreign policy category includes three subcategories: international or-
ganiaations, memberships and cooperation (46 projects); cooperation between 
states, diplomacy (28 projects); and contemporary world events related to 
foreign policy (20 projects). 
We divided the internal policy category into five subcategories – one for each 
branch of power: executive branch; judicial branch; and legislative branch – 
and two for the most salient topics in this category: corruption; and army and 
armed forces. 
Surprisingly, the most popular subcategory in this group proved to be the 
last one, with most projects covering topics related to the Russian armed forces 
(44 projects). Also, we noticed changes in the nature of the projects over time. 
At the beginning of the 2000s, the projects mainly focused on daily life and 
the problems with recruits, discussing army life, its weekdays and holidays, 
and everyday military work. In the 2010s, the projects became more oriented 
toward the army as an institution and covered activities of the Russian army and 
fleet, often with a “patriotic” stance. Only one radio programme Voennoe revu 
[Military revue] from this period, by media outlet Komsomolskaya Pravda and 
supported in 2013 and 2014, was problem based and covered army reform via 
a “frank conversation with military personnel and retirees about the army and 
its problems [translated]” (Federal Agency for Press and Mass Media, 2013).
The patriotism category includes three subcategories: contemporary Russian 
heroes and well-known persons (103 projects); attractions (modern or historical) 
(88 projects); and heroes – ordinary Russian people (37 projects). We chose to 
call this category “patriotism” because the projects aim at nurturing a sense of 
patriotism and praising Russia’s places and people. 
We divided the history category into five subcategories: Russian history 
and events (212 projects in total); world history, events (44 projects); histori-
cal Russian heroes, famous personalities, masterminds (236 projects); foreign 
heroes, famous personalities (6 projects); and wars (147 projects). The two 
subcategories dealing with Russian history and heroes received the most project 
applications, while grant projects on various wars took third place. The majority 
of projects in this subcategory dealt with the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945) 
and World War II (1939–1945). Projects on other wars only appear in the data 
during anniversary years, for instance the 100-year annivesary of World War I 
in 2013 (9 projects) or the 200-year anniversary of the 1812 Patriotic War with 
Napoleon of France (4 projects). Only a couple of projects focused on recent 
military conflicts, like the Afghan conflict (1979–1989), or other wars. Several 
projects focused on wars and military conflicts in Crimean history, supported 
in 2015, a year after the penninsula’s annexation.
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We divided the migration category into three subcategories: immigration (24 
projects); migration within CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) and 
the Baltic countries (40 projects); and history of immigration (10 projects). We 
defined only two subcategories within the travel and tourism category: internal 
tourism (in Russia); and external tourism (abroad). This category has been one 
of the least popular, and the projects in the subcategories are distributed almost 
equally. For the five remaining categories (mass media, ecology, Internet, sport, 
others), we did not include any specific subcategories. 
In the next section, we critically analyse state grants as a tool for the produc-
tion and distribution of public service content within the Russian media model. 
Discussion
The contemporary Russian media model is characterised by a tendency towards 
commercialisation. With the exception of the national state-owned media, which 
get direct funding from state budgets regardless of ownership structure, media 
outlets in the country tend to receive financing from advertising or sponsorship. 
It concerns also regional and local state-owned media, usually experiencing lack 
of budgetary funds. Such circumstances direct the behaviour of media outlets 
towards producing less complex, but more attractive, content for a mass audi-
ence. This behaviour creates a “market failure”, one related to an underrepre-
sentation of public service content in mass media. Another important feature 
of the Russian media model is the paternalistic role of the state. This duality 
has the most significant influence on regional media. The intersection of these 
two elements creates a situation wherein the state implements a paternalistic 
policy to support the production and distribution of public service content (i.e., 
to improve “market failure”).
We argue that state grants are the most transparent form of state support 
within the Russian media model. First, media companies, regardless of their 
ownership structure, can obtain such grants.6 Second, there is clear and publicly 
available information about what content is produced via the grants. The pro-
cedure of grant competition is also more transparent than in the case of direct 
subsidies or state informational contracts. Third, the grants provide support for 
local and regional media, which are in a more difficult financial situation than 
national media outlets. Finally, the database for grant funding lists a number 
of bright and interesting media projects focusing on different aspects of life 
and different places within the country. However, a detailed investigation of 
the state grant system revealed several limitations. 
The first limitation concerns the procedure of grant competition. At the 
moment, only two members of the expert council represent various groups of 
society: the representative from the Child Foundation and the representative 
169
WHOSE VOICES AND WHAT VALUES?
from St. Petersburg State University. All other members are officials from or-
ganisations affiliated with the executive branch of power or from other state-
owned organisations. Therefore, the disproportional representation by state 
actors sitting on the council highlights the restrictions on public accountability 
and affects the selection process. 
The second limitation has to do with the unclear and vague definition of what 
constitutes significant public content used in official documentation (the Decree 
and additional documents). It states that projects should represent “public and 
state interests”, while state interests in fact often replace public interests. Since 
the Decree predefines certain topics that are a priority for long-term public and 
state development, these topics predominate among the projects receiving sup-
port. On the one hand, the expert council assesses the projects according to this 
framework. Yet, on the other hand, media outlets themselves suggest topics that 
are “safe” and have more of a chance of being supported. Such self-censorship 
is especially relevant for regional media outlets, for which these grants are a 
significant – if not a crucial – source of financing.
As an illustration of this two-sided framing of issues, let us look more closely 
at the category of underprivileged groups of people. Five subcategories define 
which underprivileged groups should be represented in media. For instance, all 
the projects in the subcategory, motherhood and large families, represent two 
groups – traditional families with two or more kids, and families with adopted 
kids. Only one project (out of 44 in this subcategory) focused on another un-
derprivileged group – pregnant women or women with kids living in difficult 
conditions. Since a focus on motherhood and large families is mentioned as 
a priority of long-term state development, media outlets replicate this prede-
fined topic for their projects. As a result, other significant public issues related 
to motherhood and families, such as rates of employment among mothers or 
teenager mothers, are not represented at all. 
Another case of the two-sided framing of issues concerns the attempts by 
journalists to react to the current political agenda and even anticipate it. For 
instance, projects about the Chechen Republic were visible only at the time 
of military conflict there; however, there are still many other issues of social 
interest and problems in the republic that deserve attention.
A lack of problematisation is the third limitation of the grant system. Topic 
analysis demonstrates that the majority of the projects represent different 
kinds of success stories about Russia (gifted kids, scientific achievements, con-
temporary heroes, artistic achievements, etc.), rather than investigate various 
significant public problems. In fact, the majority of grant projects represent 
either topics that are problematic “by default” (like drug addiction, alcohol 
consumption, or terrorism) or topics that are assigned as problematic by the 
state, for instance, migration issues or the adoption of kids. Projects focusing 
on problem-based, controversial, or uneasy topics are much less represented. 
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Conclusions
This chapter investigates how public-oriented content can be produced and 
distributed within a hybrid media model, and it takes the grants system as a 
case study to analyse and evaluate this process. With respect to the example 
of a Russian statist-commercialised media model, we explore how public 
service function occurs in a media model that never made any allowances for 
PSB institutions. The state implements a paternalistic policy to support the 
production and distribution of public-oriented media content through direct 
subsidies, state informational contracts, and state grants. However, to what 
extent do these projects give a voice to the voiceless in public media discourses 
on different groups of people? 
Our analysis of state grants as the most transparent form of state support 
revealed the limitations of public accountability in the competition process, an 
overlap of public interest with state interest in the grant projects and a lack 
of problematising those projects receiving support. The grant system, initially 
aimed at expanding the variety of topics covered in the media and improving 
“market failure” regarding the underrepresentation of significant public content, 
in many cases works as a mechanism for promoting a state agenda. 
This chapter moves beyond the context of PSB institutions that easily fit into 
Western (European) media models and discusses instead how public-oriented 
topics can be addressed outside PSB or in media systems in non-democratic 
regimes. The current crisis affecting PSB in many European countries requires 
a reconsideration of the values underpinning PSB as well as a reassembling of 
the mechanisms of public-oriented content production and distribution. Further 
discussion of how and through what externalities public interest and public value 
can be achieved by mass media in non-democratic and authoritarian regimes will 
contribute to an exploration of the additional risks, as well as opportunities, 
for universal public service beyond intsitutionalised PSB media organisations.
Notes
 1. The authors who we cite in this chapter use the notions of media system and media model 
synonymously. According to Hallin and Mancini (2004), a media system (of a country) can 
be characterised by a certain model. We will use model in this text as a specific type of a 
(Russian media) “system”. 
 2. Television channels with nationwide coverage. Beginning in January 2019, analogue broadcast-
ing was replaced by digital broadcasting; therefore, 20 television channels are now available 
to the majority of the country’s population free of charge.
 3. http://vgtrk.com/#page/221
 4. https://otr-online.ru/o-telekanale/
 5. The former name of the Ministry for Digital Development, Communications and Mass Media 
of the Russian Federation (https://minsvyaz.ru/en/)
 6. As of 2016, state-owned media outlets are no longer allowed to apply for state grants.
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Chapter 10
Public service media  
in the era of information disorder
Collaboration as a solution for achieving universalism
Minna Aslama Horowitz & Gregory Ferrell Lowe
Abstract 
Viral false information, siloed information habits, and growing distrust in the 
media are amongst today’s most alarming challenges to digital media markets. 
These phenomena impact trust in media at all societal levels – global, regional, 
national, and local. They are enabled by economic, sociocultural, and technologi-
cal transformations that have destabilised media systems and involve commercial, 
governmental, and civic stakeholders. The consequences significantly impact the 
lives of ordinary citizens. In today’s context, the ability of public service media 
organisations to fulfill a mandated universalism mission and counter these trends 
requires a new approach that prioritises and operationalises collaborative efforts. 
Keywords: multi-stakeholder, propaganda, media capture, collaboration, informa-
tion disorder, trust in journalism, universalism mission 
Introduction: Familiar concerns in new times
Decreasing trust in the media and increasing false content are challenges that 
have been at the centre of public debate and academic research in recent years. 
Efforts to combat “fake news” account for a significant amount of research, as 
well as international policy reports and responses.1 The concerns are familiar be-
cause disinformation, propaganda, and fake news have a long history (Ananny, 
2018). But today’s digital platforms combined with the lack of clarity about 
rules and requirements for their owners and users have created a context that is 
eroding trust in media, in journalism especially. New strategies and techniques 
for producing and distributing propaganda, combined with lack of editorial 
accountability, coincide with the development of online opinion-leaders as 
human “influencers”, viral marketing through online sharing, and automated 
content creation and distribution (Nedeva et al., 2018). 
Combatting the multiple and complex challenges that have culminated in 
a proliferation of disinformation and growing distrust in the media provides 
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a timely case for discussing what continues to matter in public service media 
(PSM), what is new that also matters greatly, and opportunities for renewing 
relevance and heightening beneficial impact. Rooted in the heritage of public 
service broadcasting (PSB), PSM’s mandate includes the historic PSB principle 
of universalism. Ensuring the availability of and access to content and services 
for everyone in a national context remains a core feature of the legacy mandate 
for public media as a public service.
Regrettably, this principle is not faring well in today’s context of globalised 
giants, fragmented audiences, unregulated platforms, and viral disinforma-
tion. Although the defining characteristics of PSB were not initially geared to 
counter a commercial media system suffering from political interference and 
characterised by “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011), as Per Jauert and Gregory 
Ferrell Lowe (2005) noted, this has become an increasingly important part of 
discussions about the PSM remit. 
This chapter contributes to debates about the contemporary relevance and 
value of PSM. We first offer a framework for understanding the proliferation 
of disinformation that is co-related with growing distrust in the media, here 
situated in relation to the universalism mission. We then discuss why and how 
today’s complex and complicated context provides new opportunities to in-
crease collaboration with other stakeholders in order to address the problems, 
especially including audiences and co-creators. Although we focus attention 
on Europe, the problems of fake news and declining trust in media are not 
confined to these countries. Their manifestations – as well as configurations 
of PSM – vary country by country.2 A focus on these issues in countries where 
PSM institutions are “mature” institutions is especially helpful to illustrate 
dilemmas in accomplishing the historic and always problematic universalism 
mission today. Our analysis is based on a policy brief that was produced for the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and a related white paper (Horowitz, 2018) authored 
for the Central European University’s Center for Media, Data and Society.
The context: An era of multiple challenges
Problems in today’s media environment are not easily categorised. From the 
perspective of both societies and individuals, we are experiencing a shift in our 
relationship with knowledge. The historically respected notions of objectivity 
and truth are no longer prominent in public debates about media, and even the 
legitimacy of such notions is called into question by phrases such as “truthiness” 
and “alternative facts”. This is indicative of a cultural shift that signals growing 
distrust for elites and institutions of all types – political, religious, journalistic, 
and scientific. At the same time, the economic conditions for media of com-
munication have become increasingly market-based and -dependent, and cor-
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respondingly marked by escalating competition for both attention and revenue. 
Technological advances have facilitated more choice but have also contributed 
to increasing fragmentation amongst publics as media audiences. New patterns 
for accessing information are based on the use of algorithms, micro-segmenting, 
and the pursuit of viral content-sharing in media (McNair, 2018).
For journalistic institutions, the erosion of trust has much to do with disrup-
tion caused by the emergence of digital markets. A 2018 report published by 
the European Broadcasting Union (EBU, 2018b) highlights several especially 
pertinent reasons. Amongst these reasons are local and national news produc-
ers being forced to compete with Internet giants for advertising revenue and 
attention. The resources of these global competitors greatly exceed those of even 
the wealthiest local providers. The need to compete is equated with a shift in 
priorities for commercial providers that increasingly involves blurring the line 
between opinions and facts, and higher accommodation of advertisers’ prefer-
ences. This development is encouraging a prioritisation of negative news and a 
focus on simple narratives that cannot do justice to complex issues. 
Another challenge hinges on the reality that many of these phenomena are 
both global and national. On the one hand, we live in an “attention economy” 
(Wu, 2016) under conditions that have been described as “surveillance capital-
ism” (Zuboff, 2015, 2019). Search engines and social media platforms generate 
revenue by selling predictions that are based on enormous, cumulative amounts 
of data the parent companies collect. On the other hand, we are also challenged 
by the problem of “media capture” (Schiffrin, 2018), which happens when gov-
ernments take over media outlets or unduly influence content. This problem is 
becoming acute in social media, as the 2019 Freedom House report on Internet 
freedom makes clear (Shahbaz & Funk, n.d.). Governments are increasingly 
harnessing social media as a highly effective tool for disseminating propaganda. 
The report notes that instead of serving as a platform for civic discussion, social 
media are now used to spread misinformation and to monitor citizens.
False news, disinformation, and misleading propaganda are a real concern. 
The 2018 Reuters Institute Digital News Report surveyed 37 countries (New-
man et al., 2018) and found that more than half of all surveyed news audi-
ences agreed or strongly agreed that they are concerned about not being able 
to distinguish between what is real and fake on the Internet. A Eurobarometer 
report from March 2018 found that nearly 40 per cent of the EU population 
comes across fake news either every day or almost every day, and more than 
80 per cent of respondents considered fake news as a problem in their country 
and for democracy more generally, both at home and abroad. 
Disinformation is at the heart of every explanation for declining trust in news 
amongst citizens, and for news media overall. The EBU recently completed a 
study on trust in the media (EBU, 2019b) that combines data from a series of 
Eurobarometer surveys with the Reuters Institute Digital News Report. They 
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found that 44 per cent of Europeans generally trust the news, which means 
that more than half do not. More than half trust whatever news sources they 
personally use. Unfortunately, news shared on Facebook and Twitter tend to 
be primary or significant sources for many news consumers. Overall, young 
people tend to trust news less than older generations. At the same time, search 
engines and social media are less trusted sources for news than legacy media 
for more or less everyone in Europe, even more amongst younger than older 
generations (Shearer & Matsa, 2018). 
The concept: Information disorder
Academic and applied analyses have grappled with the challenges from various 
perspectives. In recent years, near countless research projects and policy docu-
ments have been produced that focus on different dimensions.3 A study by the 
European Commission Joint Research Centre (Martens et al., 2018) summarises 
the different approaches. A narrow approach focuses on recognising verifiably 
false information, which is fairly easy to identify and can be countered by, for 
example, hiring fact-checkers, tagging suspicious postings, and removing false 
news posts. A broader approach focuses on identifying deliberate attempts to 
distort news in order to promote preferred ideologies, cause confusion, foment 
polarisation, and in some cases produce disinformation to earn money without 
necessarily intending to cause harm. While some efforts are politically moti-
vated, others are commercially motivated as evident in click-bait practices and 
the intentional filtering of news to attract targeted audiences. This approach is 
more difficult to study empirically, and to verify. It pertains to economic models 
for funding news markets and there is wide variation in the quality of news.
As serious as this is, the challenge is even broader than the issue of quality 
because it goes to the deeper concern about trustworthy news. In this chapter, 
we use the term “information disorder” to characterise a panoply of pertinent 
issues, challenges, and questions that are widespread and have serious implica-
tions for society and democracy. The term was first employed in a report for the 
CoE (Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017) targeted to researchers and policy-makers, 
and positioned as an “information disorder framework”. The proposed model 
includes: 1) types of information disorder based on intent, ranging from un-
intentional false content to disinformation (i.e., false or manipulated content 
and context, or a broader social use) with an intent to harm; 2) phases of in-
formation disorder (creation, production, and distribution); and 3) its elements, 
meaning the agents (i.e., who created the message and why?), the message (i.e., 
what was the content?), and the interpretation (i.e., how was it interpreted?). 
This framework is useful for steering discussion about universalism in PSM 
today because it highlights contextual features that are necessarily involved with 
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efforts to combat information disorder in market-driven or politically contested 
communication environments. The framework highlights ways in which PSM 
can help to distinguish between types of false information; to offer a guaran-
teed chain in creation, production, and distribution; and to supply content that 
addresses audiences as citizens instead of targeted audience micro-segments.
Information disorder and the universalism mission today
The challenges under discussion are relevant to the principle of universalism, 
which has been a foundational ideal for PSB from the start – especially important 
in Europe. Normative characteristics assigned to PSM by key stakeholders dem-
onstrate considerable uniformity. The EBU, the Public Media Alliance (PMA), 
the CoE, and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion (UNESCO) have all observed that universality in access and content is a 
cornerstone of the public service mission in broadcasting and beyond (CoE, 
2004; EBU, 2012).
This is the ideal. In practice, PSM organisations vary in how much relevance 
and impact they have in their respective societies and are enormously varied in 
institutional arrangements, reach, and budgets (Radu, 2017). From the start, 
PSB development was a national project with significant differences in reach and 
impact. For instance, in the Nordic countries and the UK, public media services 
have long dominated their respective audiovisual markets, while in Portugal and 
Italy, PSM companies have minor market shares for both television and radio 
services (Radu, 2018). As for institutional configurations, in Europe these vary 
from the global presence of the multi-channel, multi-platform, multi-project 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) (often considered a benchmark model 
for PSB, but in fact a comparative outlier), to the multiplicity of independent 
organisations defined by political-religious history that comprise the public 
broadcasting system in the Netherlands, to the newly established (as public 
broadcasters rather than state organs) PSB organisations in the Balkan region 
(KAS, 2019; Psychogiopoulou et al, 2017).
At the same time, issues addressed in the framework of information disor-
der are all components of what PSB has aimed for in advocating the ideal of 
universalism: a comprehensive, trustworthy chain of content production that 
is accessible for all, that can be trusted, and that unifies rather than segments 
citizens. The core ideals that have legitimated PSB speak to societal ambitions of 
ensuring progress in social development, respecting rationality as a prerequisite 
for a healthy democratic process, and the need for a relatively high degree of 
autonomy to be at arm’s length from both political and commercial pressures. 
The purpose of PSB is articulated in principles that require the institution to 
care for the information, education, and entertainment needs of a host society, 
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even if the approach to accomplishing this was admittedly paternal. Hannu 
Nieminen (2014) views PSB as part of the components of the European tradi-
tion of an “epistemic commons”, keyed to an ideal that knowledge and culture 
are a shared domain and relatively free of restrictions. The importance of civic 
education and universal literacy are at the heart of this idea, and mass media 
are facilitative. In his view, the epistemic commons is in danger partly due to 
challenges under discussion here. Indeed, the multitude of threats to democratic 
communication, including violations of privacy by the Internet giants (Zuboff, 
2019), persistent digital divides (International Telecommunications Union, 
2018), and the problem of exploitation and inequity created by algorithms 
(Eubanks, 2018). This impacts people’s abilities to be well informed, to engage 
in debates about issues of shared importance, and to act as responsible citizens 
in a democracy. 
Information disorder is adding a new dimension that is relevant to the idea 
of universal multi-platform access. A study of Yle (Finland), France Télévisions 
and Radio France (France), ARD and ZDF (Germany), Rai (Italy), Polskie 
Radio (Poland), and the BBC (the UK) indicates that PSM organisations are 
struggling with a set of characteristic tensions between their strategic priori-
ties, remit, and organisational imperatives, and those that are characteristic for 
commercial platform companies. Although PSM organisations continue to see 
social media as an important opportunity for increasing their reach, especially 
amongst young people and other hard-to-reach audiences, they are becoming 
wary of these platforms due to a growing chorus of blame and concerns about 
their culpability in facilitating information disorder (Sehl et al., 2018). This 
is of pressing concern because although global trust in the media is at an all-
time low, research has found a remarkably strong and stable degree of trust in 
legacy media – and particularly notable for mature public broadcasters even 
as trust is generally evaporating for online platforms and social media (New-
man et al., 2019). 
In addition, the traditional universalism mission for PSB is challenged by 
specific – and controversial – developments such as personalisation. For instance, 
can automated solutions deliver the kinds of diversity that manual decisions 
about programming deliver? Does the coding an algorithm employs embody 
the ideals of guaranteeing the inclusion of minority voices and a diversity of 
voices, or prioritise issues relevant to public interest? Intertwined issues include 
concerns about creating filter bubbles and intruding on privacy in PSM’s in-
volvement with the wider transformations in datafication and personalisation. 
PSM organisations are involved in developing algorithms to make their content 
findable via recommendation systems, and some are developing their own 
recommendation systems to ensure more exposure and personalised services 
for their users (Sørensen & Hutchinson, 2018). PSM companies are engaged 
in projects to develop digital personalisation that vary by type of engagement 
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and can result in tools that could threaten rather than strengthen their missions, 
including the pursuit of universality (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018). 
A role for PSM today
In policy-making circles, PSM is frequently mentioned, and sometimes empha-
sised, for its importance as part of the solution toolkit for combatting false news 
and information. For instance, the Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression 
and ‘Fake News’ Disinformation and Propaganda, published in March 2017 
by Special Rapporteurs, is comprised of several intergovernmental bodies and 
suggests that PSM has an important role (OSCE, 2017). The CoE holds a similar 
view (Horowitz, 2018), as does a recent report by the European Commission 
multi-stakeholder high level expert group (HLEG) (European Commission, 
2018). These expert organisations recognise the need for a robust and diverse 
media ecosystem and acknowledge the beneficial role of PSM in ensuring that. In 
addition, the CoE has on many occasions recognised the democracy-enhancing 
influence of PSM. Recently, Resolution 2255 highlighted the importance of PSM 
in combating disinformation and propaganda today (CoE, 2019).
Unfortunately, PSM is not strongly supported in most of the world, and 
is taking hard hits even in Europe where the legacy of PSB is comparatively 
strong. The decline is especially worrisome in central and southern Europe where 
PSB has struggled to emerge from the constraints of a state media heritage. A 
comprehensive overview of the situation in south eastern Europe (KAS, 2019) 
characterised the PSM dilemma as a “pillar of democracy on shaky ground”. 
Many countries in central Europe are in the same general situation. 
Even in countries with mature public service traditions, including Austria, 
Denmark, and Switzerland, PSM is weakened by political and commercial op-
position to the ethos, ideals, and practice of public service in media. The reasons 
are mainly self-serving and advanced by interest groups with commercial and 
political underpinnings, although usually framed as concerns over a higher-
ground issue related to safeguarding public funding (Wilson, forthcoming). In 
fairness, one should also acknowledge sceptical voices warning against putting 
too much trust in established PSM companies, such as the BBC, due to their 
dependency on and connections with power elites that may limit the degree of 
independence needed to address a “crisis of journalism” (Freedman, 2019). This 
problem has greater pertinence yet in much of the world where the connection 
between political power and media is direct, especially where broadcasters have 
struggled with making the transition from captured state organs to independent 
public service providers. 
One unifying trend across Europe is a growing preference for abandoning 
the licence fee system of financing and instead pay for PSM with taxpayer-
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generated funding. While that might make sense on paper, in practice it has 
already encouraged more and higher degrees of state intervention with chilling 
effects on editorial independence, and has also weakened possibilities for invest-
ing in research and development that is needed to counter challenges posed by 
information disorder (Dragomir, 2018; Gjerding Nielson, 2018). This is not to 
discount limited evidence that PSM may also be manipulated to spread content 
that borders on disinformation (Nolan & Walker, 2018). 
Due to persistent and often high commercial pressure within media markets, 
even in countries with well-established PSM organisations – especially Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden – there has been harsh criticism from commercial competi-
tors, which charge PSM with allegedly creating market distortion, especially in 
the digital news market (Newman et al., 2018). The trends indicate shrinking 
political support for PSM, as observed by the Council of Europe in 2017, that 
demonstrates growing threats to the independence of public broadcasters and 
regulators, including direct political interference in editorial practice, lack of 
legislative safeguards against political bias, and concerns about the appoint-
ment, composition, and dismissal of regulators and managers. These problems 
are aggravated by insufficient and declining funding (CoE, 2017).
Policy is one thing; performance is another. Do audiences think PSM is a 
remedy to false news, and is PSM distrusted as well? Recent EBU studies (2019a, 
2019b) demonstrate the centrality of PSM in Europe as a trusted source for 
content and as a pillar of a healthy functioning democratic system. According 
to a survey by the 2018 Reuters Institute Digital News Report (Newman et 
al. 2018), most respondents globally think the responsibility for information 
disorder rests with both new media platforms and legacy media operators as 
publishers. Similar views emerge from the Eurobarometer (2018) on fake news. 
In the view of those respondents, journalists, national authorities, and the press 
and broadcasting management should be made responsible for stopping the 
spread of false news and disinformation. 
Nonetheless, a study on PSM news audiences in the Czech Republic, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, and the UK (Schulz et al., 2019) 
indicates that even in mature public service contexts, PSM news does not matter 
universally to all citizens. In the digital era, the reach of public service news is 
still largely via broadcast channels, and those who access news through online 
services tend to be the same people who also watch broadcast news on televi-
sion. These “faithful” audiences consist largely of educated older people who 
are avid news consumers. Younger audiences and those who are less educated 
tend to rely (if “rely” is an accurate term here) on news distributed via social 
media, and PSM news organisations struggle to reach these populations. 
Thus, the evidence indicates ambivalent sentiments about public broadcast-
ers and their multi-media reiterations in different (all commercial) platforms. 
The lack of universal relevance for PSM news services and the still strongly 
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national basis of PSM pose serious challenges to the potential for achieving 
even approximate universalism in an internationalised media environment. 
New universalist solutions through collaboration
Given the complexity of the information disorder, it would be irrational to 
expect any one entity to offer a universal remedy for the situation. Thus, col-
laborations have been at the heart of policy efforts and plans in recent years. 
For instance, the European Commission HLEG included the participation of 
public service broadcasters via the EBU (European Commission , 2018), and in 
late April 2018, the EBU published its own position paper, titled ‘Fake News’ 
and the Information Disorder, that advocates for a holistic, multi-stakeholder 
approach to solving the problem (EBU, 2018c). PSM organisations have de-
veloped innovative solutions that are seldom acknowledged, on the basis of 
collaborating with other organisations – ranging from civil society organisations 
to universities, technology companies, and even their commercial competitors. 
PSM institutions and their partners are providing sustainable and universally 
meaningful solutions to the problem of information disorder.
From a conceptual perspective, this is not a new development. For some 
time now, scholars have observed that public services in media are delivered by 
varied sources. Some are certainly from PSM organisations as legally mandated 
institutions – that is, public service from the de jure perspective (in law). But 
there are also many public services in media that are not provided on the basis 
of institutionally designed and mandated operations – the de facto perspective 
(Bajomi-Lazar et al., 2012; Clark & Horowitz, 2014; Horowitz, 2015). The 
potential value of collaboration has been envisioned beyond media-related 
organisations and groups, extending from the level of individual programmes 
to the level of policy-making practices (Wauters & Raats, 2018). A variety of 
motivations encourage PSM to collaborate with a variety of partners, some more 
strategic than others (Raats, 2019). There is evidence that collaboration can af-
fect appropriate and effective solutions for addressing information disorder and 
pave a way forward for accomplishing a renewed universalism mission today. 
A relevant proposition concerning collaboration to promote individual rights 
and PSM’s role in that was voiced in the white paper, Public Service Media and 
Human Rights, from the CoE (CoE, 2011; Horowitz & Nieminen, 2016). In 
their view, PSM should be premised on treaties and legislation that mean to 
guarantee human rights, and in particular to safeguard human rights in content 
and services as an organisation. A special feature of this model is the inclusion of 
several stakeholders in accomplishing this mission via PSM. These institutions, 
national governments and regulators, and audiences each have important roles 
in developing and monitoring PSM in practice.
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Another broad and concrete initiative is the European Public Open Spaces 
(EPOS) project that conceptualises open public spaces in the digital networked 
public sphere. EPOS wants to create networked public spaces that are free of 
state and market interference and with a Europe-wide scope. Drawing on the 
traditional PSM remit, EPOS seeks to provide access to information, education, 
and culture, but also to festivals, universities, civic education, and peer-to-peer 
curation in the production of knowledge and software. One central aim is to 
provide a space for civic deliberation (EPOS, n.d.). A technological counterpart 
to EPOS is the Public Media Stack initiative that plans to co-create a sustain-
able ecosystem of ethical, independent applications of technologies to support 
public media projects without exploiting the data, content, or relationships that 
are critical to being and performing PSM (Storythings, 2019).
At a more practical level, numerous collaborations are already addressing 
the problem of misinformation in efforts to provide “universally” vetted content 
on the basis of effective and comprehensive fact-checking. This is perhaps the 
most visible response by PSM to disinformation and misinformation. In this 
pursuit, PSM organisations have engaged in various collaborative fact-checking 
efforts. For example, ZDF of Germany has chosen to work with Truly Media, 
a collaborative platform developed by the German PSM organisation dedicated 
to media development, Deutsche Welle, and a Greek technology company. 
Sometimes collaborations happen with (otherwise) competitors. In Austria, for 
example, ORF joined with a variety of partners in the Austrian Press Agency 
to raise awareness across news providers and platforms (Körber, 2017). Other 
public broadcasting companies, such as Germany’s BR and Italy’s RAI, have 
used the browser extension FactFox to enhance services, which is a product 
that supports managing and responding to user comments. 
In Norway, Faktisk, an independent fact-checking organisation, was created 
in 2017 by a consortium of media companies that included the public broad-
caster NRK (Mantzarlis, 2017). Similarly, the Swedish public service television 
(SVT) and radio (SR) partnered with the two largest daily newspapers, Dagens 
Nyheter and Svenska Dagbladet, in a collaborative fact-checking project there. 
The stakeholders conducted a joint training programme for journalists, and 
the participants collaborated on a fact-checking method that is based on the 
guidelines from the International Fact Checking Network (IFCN) (Funke, 2018). 
Perhaps the best-known multi-stakeholder collaboration is First Draft, 
hosted at Harvard University. The project has over 40 members that include 
commercial and PSM firms from around the world (e.g., ABC of Australia, 
ARD, Deutsche Welle, and ZDF of Germany, BBC News, France Télévisions, 
as well as Eurovision), not-for-profit journalism organisations such as Global 
Voices and ProPublica, and platforms from Facebook to Twitter (First Draft, 
2020). In addition to its collaborative fact-checking efforts (most notably around 
the French elections in a project called CrossCheck), and its contributions to 
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analyses of information disorder as a complex phenomenon (including the 
aforementioned report for research and policy, commissioned by the CoE), 
a recent contribution is the free online course for journalists and the general 
public for learning to identify misinformation (Rinehart, 2018).
Efforts by the EBU4 are, by nature of the organisation, highly collaborative. 
They have ranged from core activities such as the Eurovision News Exchange 
(EBU, n.d.), to business innovation involving big data (EBU, 2018a), to jour-
nalism training and toolkits, to focused workshops and annual events, to sup-
porting research, and to policy advocacy to support the provision of quality 
media to counter disinformation (Lovell, 2018). In 2017, the EBU created a 
cooperative system of verification for user-generated content that functions 
on a networked basis with various members’ newsrooms and other quality 
news partners collaborating in a decentralised (i.e., distributed) fact-checking 
process (Bowler, 2019). In addition, the EBU is a partner in the Journalism 
Trust Initiative (JTI) with Reporters Without Borders (RSF), Agence France 
Presse (AFP), and the Global Editors Network (GEN). JTI is designed to pro-
mote journalism through adherence to an agreed set of trust and transparency 
standards that are being developed and will be implemented collaboratively 
(Goodman, 2018). 
A renewed opportunity for public service media
The case of information disorder in relation to PSB, and especially to PSM, 
highlights factors that are at the heart of the universalism mission, both in terms 
of relevance and impact. There is clearly a need to rethink the foundational 
principle of universality in light of new opportunities to engage in collabora-
tions at the national and global levels in today’s media landscape. There are 
policy implications that can strengthen PSM. Assessed through the lens of the 
information disorder framework, PSM offers an antidote to most types of false 
content, whether motivated commercially or politically. PSM can guarantee 
a professionally vetted and ethically informed practice in the creation and 
production of media services, as well as universal distribution of trustworthy 
content and services. It can also provide citizens with tools for understanding 
information disorder and interpreting media to ascertain agency and determine 
the trustworthiness of content. Each of the described initiatives target some of 
these aspects, reflecting renewed need of the universalism mission for PSM in 
the era of information disorder.
PSB and PSM are, as institutions, part of media policy toolkits for countering 
market-driven challenges such as the concentration of ownership, overheated 
competition and diminishing content diversity, and inequalities of access to 
media (Bajomi-Lazar, 2017). Information disorder, scholars argue, is the result 
186
MINNA ASLAMA HOROWITZ & GREGORY FERRELL LOWE
of a complex storm of combined commercialisation, globalisation, and political 
interference (see Martens et al. 2018). The original premises of PSB emphasise 
a still ideal construct – it is non-commercial, nationally local, and at an arm’s 
length independent from the self-interested influences of markets and govern-
ments. Today, that construct is highly pertinent to what is needed to effectively 
combat problems caused by our contemporary information disorder. The his-
toric ethos of PSB needs updating in concept and practice, but the cornerstone 
principles are needed more than ever. As Daphne Wolter, a media policy expert 
at the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, posits: 
In these frantic times, there is a need for trusted content like never before. 
Albeit a great challenge, this is also an opportunity for shaping the content 
profile of public service media. Where public discourse derails repeatedly, 
public service media must guarantee that it remains democratic and cannot 
be controlled by any party, thereby preventing the emergence of media seg-
regation. (KAS, 2019: 7)
Emily Bell, Director of the Tow Center for Digital Journalism, argues: 
Existing political systems and public service broadcasters need to be free to 
imagine the kinds of information ecosystems that they’d want at the nation/
state level and then real freedom to experiment with and find new paths to 
deliver that. And also to think about themselves oriented in a world where it 
could well be that large-scale technology platforms — designed, built, operated 
in America — will be taking over much of what your information ecosystem 
looks like over the next decade. (Hofseth, 2018: para. 26)
There is a precondition. As noted earlier in the EBU research on media and 
democracy (EBU, 2019b), this requires safeguarding a relatively stable politi-
cal situation and citizen’s rights to active participation in political life, which 
coincide with a robust PSM system. The study on PSM news audiences (Schulz 
et al., 2019) shows that public service news does reach people everywhere on 
the political spectrum. So, while the traditional mission of PSB should endure, 
strategies and tactics need to accommodate a far more complex and complicated 
media-society environment. 
Regaining trust in journalism and educating publics about disinformation 
is a reasonable amendment to the mandates and remits for PSM. Their ac-
complishments will depend to a great extent on the ability of PSM institutions 
to work in partnership with other stakeholders, including media companies, 
cultural institutions, and civil society organisations, an example specifically 
pertinent to the case of disinformation. As has been highlighted by numerous 
fact-checking initiatives which showcase the ability of many (resourced and 
mature) PSM organisations to effectively respond to viral disinformation, this 
chapter clarifies and amplifies the role of PSM as a cornerstone partner in col-
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laborations to solve global and local challenges in the abundant and chaotic 
context of information disorder. 
Although the problems are global, the national context is the theatre of 
operations for misinformation, disinformation, and false news that is intended 
to undermine democracies and destabilise social relations. PSM is ideally posi-
tioned to combat this within and across national contexts. Policy-makers need 
to recognise the necessity and practical value of preserving a mixed media eco-
system, which is obvious to a unique degree in Europe and is instrumental for 
ensuring that a plurality of media and content co-exist and compete. A review 
of international standards and PSM concluded that, “If PSM are to realize 
their full potential in the future, then renewed attention needs to be given to 
these foundational principles established in the past” (Psychogiopoulou et al., 
2017: 1949). 
A renewed practice and revitalised concept of universalism will have instru-
mental importance in countering information disorder. This can be accomplished 
with a proven foundation of ideals and principles that legitimate the public 
service approach and social responsibility model of media provision. The ethos 
of public service in media is an essential part of the solution to the problem of 
information disorder, and not part of its cause. 
Notes
 1. These questions are addressed, for example, in the EBU’s annual and ongoing Trust in Media 
reports, the Knight Foundation’s Trust, Media, and Democracy projects in the US, and The 
Reuters Institute’s annual and ongoing Digital News Reports (see also, e.g., Hanitzsch et al., 
2018). The fluid and many-sided question of how to understand fake news has been addressed 
by scholars and policy-makers alike, and there is also already a vast amount of studies on the 
spread and impact of fake news (for overviews, see, e.g., Horowitz, 2018, 2019).
 2. For example, fake news and disinformation in Eastern Europe (https://en.ejo.ch/specialist-jour-
nalism/fake-news-and-disinformation-in-eastern-europe).
 3. For example, a rich resource for research and activities on misinformation and fake news 
by different stakeholders is the Open Access, crowd-sourced repository, Misinformation 
Research – Public Bibliography, initiated by the Director of Research at the Reuters Institute 
for the Study of Journalism, Professor Rasmus Kleis Nielsen (https://docs.google.com/docu-
ment/d/1HdOvjfNJAFQQqKNKUwoltA3B-gZcXdmTm6amaZFYqjY/edit?usp=sharing). 
 4. The EBU coordinates the efforts of its members in digital and media literacy initiatives (https://
www.ebu.ch/fr/contents/news/2012/03/empowering-citizenship-through-m.html).
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Chapter 11
Personalised universalism  
in the age of algorithms
Jannick Kirk Sørensen
Abstract
In this chapter, I address a complex relationship in linking the principles of 
universalism and personalisation as a tension of considerable importance in con-
temporary media use. The paradoxical aspects of this relationship are especially 
evident when treated in the light of ideal types and praxis in legacy public service 
broadcasting (PSB) and digital public service media (PSM). The relationship is 
viewed from five angles, culminating in discussion about the materiality produced 
by shifting technologies in the digital environment and its bearing on the ideologi-
cal concept of public service in media. The author introduces a new orientation 
for PSM: personalised enlightenment.
Keywords: digital platforms, enlightenment mission, universalism mission, recom-
mender systems, collaborative filtering, global media 
Introduction: Broadcasting and personal communication
Broadcasting is one of the twentieth century’s most influential forms of mass 
communication and was initially a failed invention. Early attempts to harness 
the “wireless telegraph” for private (mainly business) communication failed 
due to the physical properties of radio waves. Lacking encryption, everybody 
could listen to a conversation (Lewis, 1991) and that inherently ruled out private 
communication. Radio technology was better suited for a public purpose. In 
this iteration, it grew rapidly and became a worldwide phenomenon of mass 
communication. Less than ten years from its application as a mass medium, 
European countries systematised public service broadcasting (PSB) as the pre-
ferred orientation. In the context of growing threats from communism in the 
East and fascism in the West, governments believed radio was too valuable to 
be “given away” to commercial exploitation –due to broadcasting’s potential 
for both contributing to social development and misuse that could harm socie-
ties. The development of radio went differently in the US – but not entirely, 
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because there, too, the idea of public service was fundamental to the legitimacy 
of broadcasting (see Barnouw, 1966; Flichy, 1995; Lewis, 1991). 
The much-celebrated ideal of universalism is embedded in the notion of 
broadcasting, which has been generally understood as a ubiquitous coverage of 
transmitted signals across the breadth of a national territory. This notion can be 
understood as a side effect of early radio technology that depended exclusively 
on amplitude modulation (AM radio) and therefore had a large “footprint”, 
combined with governmental desires to regulate a medium that nearly everyone 
believed to be powerful in its potential to influence the public for good or ill. 
Today, broadcasting is no longer as dominant. Moreover, the early interest to 
harness radio waves for private communication has been operationalised with 
advances in encryption technologies. Mobile phones, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, 4G, and 
5G all make use of radio waves, but not for broadcasting. 
A private, encrypted, client-server configuration has become the dominant 
mode of distance communication in the Internet era. Even broadcasting and 
other mass media content is increasingly distributed via the Internet on plat-
forms that provide personalised and on-demand services. What does this mean 
for the celebrated concept of universalism that has been fundamental to the 
legitimacy of PSB? In particular, can the universalism principle be maintained 
as a core value proposition for public service media (PSM) in the light of this 
increasingly sweeping “return” to individual communication?
In the mass media era when broadcasting was a dominant medium, univer-
salism of coverage was mandated for transmission media that are character-
ised by one-way communication flows. Programming choices and scheduling 
practice reflected norms that mattered to an elite who decided what would be 
appropriate for “the masses” (Tracey, 1998). The PSB mission of advancing 
enlightenment had a nearly religious importance as a quasi-evangelistic concept 
of one voice speaking truth to the masses (Scannell, 2005). A convincing case 
has been made that the religious convictions of the first director general of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), John Reith, had an important contrib-
uting role in shaping the universalism ideal as fundamental to broadcasting (see 
especially The Reith Diaries by Stuart, 1975). Paddy Scannell (2005) alluded 
to that tradition in arguing for PSB as a generous form of dissemination that 
does not calculate the profitability or concern itself overmuch with the effect 
of speaking truth. 
Partly because of his commitment to the universalism mission in broadcast-
ing, Reith was not fond of the idea that the BBC might transmit more than 
one radio channel. Pressure from listeners with different music preferences 
and other demands eventually led to segmented radio programming, arguably 
the first deviation from universalism in broadcasting (Scannell, 1989; see also 
Jauert & Lowe, 2005). Scholarly literature on scheduling strategies and the 
development of channel portfolios demonstrate the changing identity of PSB 
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in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries (Lowe & Hujanen, 2003; 
Søndergaard, 1994; Steemers, 2003; Ytreberg, 2000; also see Lassen’s chapter 
in this collection).
With on-demand services, and particularly personalised recommendation 
systems, the functional impact of scheduling and profiling as means for achieving 
universalism is fading. The decline marks a co-related decrease in the agenda-
setting role of PSM (compared to PSB). Today, agenda-setting is part of the dark 
matter of algorithmic recommendation systems, a realm where even program-
mers and data scientists can’t always explain why a specific piece of content is 
recommended to a specific user. I will assess this dystopian narrative using case 
studies of PSM implementations of recommender systems to ask whether the 
personalisation of media actually threatens the universalism mission of PSM.
Deconstructing (public national) universalism
Universalism was interdependent with broadcasting, which features an allocu-
tion structure of communication (i.e., a one-way flow) that prioritises equity 
in communicative intentions. There is some opportunity for feedback, but it 
is weak and not very direct. Examples include the involvement of listeners, 
viewers, and users via phone-ins to talk programmes, workshop studios for 
citizens to produce radio programmes, and uploading user-generated content 
and comments online. But the basic communicative configuration is a one-way 
flow from a centralised source to mass audiences – even if self-selected and not 
necessarily all at the same time, but rather over some period of time due to 
on-demand affordances. 
The utility of universalism has been weakened in parallel with the growth 
of digital platforms and channels. As a result, the normative framework that 
legitimates universalism as a public service mission has been eroded, although 
the principle of universalism remains one of PSM’s most basic value propositions 
– albeit only in national contexts. More or less universally, PSM is still required 
to pursue the historic PSB mission of promoting national cultures and facilitating 
national democratic and political communication. The universalism of PSM is 
localised to each nation rather than universalised to the global media ecology. 
A governmental logic defines the boundaries of PSM universalism. Apart from 
a few genres such as drama co-productions and the retransmission of music, 
much of the programming and content of PSM is centred on the national as 
the priority purview for cultural and political construction.
While PSM remains a largely national project – or series of projects – me-
dia systems are no longer that. Media corporations, markets, and systems are 
increasingly global. This accounts for a tension between the normative basis 
for PSM and the operational realities of its enactment. Examining European 
194
JANNICK KIRK SØRENSEN
initiatives to personalise PSB web pages, Sørensen (2011) observed this tension 
as a contradiction between the concepts of PSB and personalisation; where the 
former ideally speaks to the unity of citizens within a nation, the latter seeks to 
serve individuals and as consumers. This tension begs the question of whether 
PSM organisations might be ignoring (or even betraying) their remits when 
offering personalised services? As we shall see, the answer depends on how 
one constructs the focal concepts of universalism and personalisation, from a 
theoretical standpoint and in describing PSM praxis. 
In simple terms, if national public universalism is understood as “every 
citizen receiving the same information”, then the customer sovereignty proposi-
tion of on-demand personalisation is not perhaps appropriate for PSM. If the 
algorithm only reflects the customer’s desires as an obedient servant, butler, or 
agent, then PSB’s historic role as an agenda-setter and source of enlightenment 
is undermined. Everyone is free to live in a personal “filter bubble” (Pariser, 
2011). In this perspective, recommender systems pose a threat to democracy 
(Sunstein, 2007). Subsequently, it has been suggested that policies and software 
systems need to ensure diversity of citizen exposure to media content (Burri, 
2015; Helberger, 2012; Schmidt et al., 2018; Sørensen & Schmidt, 2016). That 
hints at a degree of paternalism that is problematic today, and was never all 
that popular earlier. But it also points to the dilemma involved with ensuring 
universalism as a matter of no small importance for democracy in practice. We 
will return to this. 
As Bozdag and van den Hoven (2015) pointed out, objections to the idea 
that algorithms are anti-democratic depend on the type of democracy one is 
contemplating. The liberal type is concerned that information and opinions 
have equal chances for exposure and influence in a “marketplace of ideas”. 
Deliberative or participatory types of democracy are more concerned that all 
opinions can be heard, and to the extent possible, that they are heard by all. 
Whichever type, there is a shared sense of societal unease in what is perceived as 
relocating decision-making power from human agency to technical algorithms. 
Some of this concern is certainly overblown, but the issue is highly relevant to 
considerations of universalism in PSM.
If universalism is understood as a prerequisite for deliberative democracy, 
then one argument against personalisation and the growing importance of algo-
rithms to facilitate that is that all the opinions that matter won’t be heard and 
therefore cannot be considered by all citizens. This is more than a little naïvely 
optimistic, given that all opinions were never heard or considered even in the 
monopoly era, but concerns about voice and empowerment have continuing 
pertinence. If, however, universalism is understood in the light of representa-
tive democracy, then the concern is mainly about the accessibility of services 
and information for all citizens. Thus, while one perspective on democracy 
prioritises a diversity of sources and voices, the other prioritises accessibility 
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of contents and services. Both care about universalism, but not necessarily in 
the same sense or with the same prioritisation. 
Concerns about personalisation increasingly centre on three issues: privacy 
problems related to collection and ownership of user profile information (Sø-
rensen & Van den Bulck, 2018; Sørensen & Kosta, 2019), the opaqueness of 
algorithms (Bucher, 2018; Zarsky, 2016), and the fear that personalised media 
recommendations would lead to bias and filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011; Sunstein, 
2007). While legitimate concerns, it has been difficult to prove that algorithms 
for news recommendations create filter bubbles because the evidence sug-
gests human editors are slightly more biased in practice (Möller et al., 2018). 
Moreover, the assumption that recommender systems perfectly echo a user’s 
personal interests and desires may be wrong. It is actually rather difficult to 
produce relevant recommendations for new users because data is sparse and 
only accumulates over time with use. Even for loyal users, after a period of use, 
the relevancy of recommendations may decline as they become too predictable 
(called over-fitting). In both cases, or at both ends of the use curve, the balance 
between relevancy and diversity is difficult (Castells et al., 2015). This balance 
is important in an editorial context, and equally in the context of e-commerce. 
There is considerable commercial potential in exposing users to adjacent content 
that will be new to them rather than always only linking to the same things. By 
extending the user’s circle of interests, the media service can grow enjoyment 
(via discovery) and loyalty.
Public service media’s personalisation dilemma
Since the end of PSB monopolies, these organisations have kept an eye on 
methods used by private media to optimise audience contact and satisfaction 
(Søndergaard, 1994). In recent years, PSM companies have been inspired by 
the implementation of personalisation in private media (Bodó, 2019; Kunert & 
Thurman, 2019; Thurman & Schifferes, 2012) to launch initiatives of the same 
kind in developing and improving personalisation (Sørensen & Hutchinson, 
2018; Sørensen, 2013; Van den Bulck & Moe, 2017). This creates editorial and 
policy dilemmas for PSM (Sørensen, 2018, 2019). Should the algorithm apply 
the same selection criteria as the programming policies for broadcast schedul-
ing which prioritise diverse programming and fair representation of different 
viewpoints? Is it even possible to apply broadcast criteria to on-demand content 
(Sørensen & Schmidt, 2016)? How should oversight of algorithms be handled 
to ensure the quality control that is expected of the PSM content and service 
offer? How best to explain the rationale and criteria behind the recommenda-
tions that users receive? Can PSM replicate the human-centred meaning and 
logic that is embedded in programming and scheduling in the mathematical 
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logic of algorithms? How to maintain PSM’s distinctive “tone of voice”, which 
has much to do with credibility as well as brand identity, when recommended 
content is not determined by human agency? Should user behaviour data col-
lected by a PSM recommender system be looped into the editorial process as 
indicators of met or unmet demands, or of market potential? Finally, can a 
contracted technology provider be trusted to do this right, or is it strategically 
wiser to build up in-house expertise?
Sørensen (2019) presents a case study of how nine European PSM companies 
implemented algorithmic recommendation. Pöchhacker and colleagues (2018) 
present a study of personalisation at Bayerische Rundfunk (BR) in Germany. 
Both studies indicate that while noted dilemmas are the same across PSM 
organisations, the approaches taken by various companies differ but always 
reflect organisational values and cultures. There are also indications of hesitance 
and uncertainty. Regarding the former, an example is the approach to ensur-
ing diversity in recommendations. While diversity in Germany and Sweden is 
a central requirement for their recommender systems, in Denmark and several 
other countries, this receives less attention. Another example hinges on the ques-
tion of whether it is better to control the technology internally or to outsource 
algorithmic personalisation? If outsourcing, the only options are to contract 
the service from commercial providers. This, too, is addressed differently across 
organisations. Finally, a sign of PSM’s hesitance about personalisation is evi-
dent in the position of algorithmic recommendations on the screen, which are 
typically placed in less noticeable locations on the webpage and means users 
are less often and less directly exposed to them.
Although understandings of personalisation – and interest in this – var-
ies across PSM organisations, managers in every company are challenged by 
an emerging tension between universalism as ensuring content exposure to 
everyone, and individualism as algorithmically selected content. This tension 
goes to the heart of a core value proposition of PSM as guarantors of societal 
coherence. It also reflects a professional tension within PSM organisations 
between professionals who are responsible for creating meaning by producing 
programmes and others who are responsible for optimising the potential for 
exposure – that is, data scientists, data curators, and marketing departments. 
Editors are situated between the two communities and are responsible for 
safeguarding the truth, accuracy, and fairness of all output, and thereby taking 
care of the public image of PSM in context. Importantly, in many implementa-
tions of PSM recommender systems, the editors have hands-on control of the 
algorithm. This happens through keyword tagging of content, curating lists 
and categories of content, and creating rules that govern the system. Unrefined 
user-based recommendations can be overruled by editorial decisions. 
In general, the personalised recommendations of PSM content emphasises 
continuity by providing a centrally curated universalism that is understood 
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from a heritage rooted in broadcast channel curation. This has so far eclipsed 
the promise of optimised exposure and increased customer loyalty that are 
potential benefits of implementing algorithmic recommender systems. Provoca-
tively put, PSM organisations present users with the same content, only with 
slightly different sequences and prioritisation schemas. In the PSM context, 
then, recommender systems are a nudging tool to encourage more viewing of 
the institution’s output, rather than a tool that supports the user as a “customer 
king” choosing from a broad array of options (Schipper, 2002). 
Globalised technological universalism
The personalisation concept is a fundamental and instrumental feature of the 
global e-commerce industry. The first large-scale application of algorithmic 
recommendation is generally attributed to Amazon. Their business model de-
pended on expanding and improving customer exposure to the variety of books 
available in its online inventory. The operational format is the familiar “other 
users also bought” collaborative filtering algorithm (Bobadilla et al., 2013; 
Borchers et al., 1998). This became the core asset for online shopping on the 
Amazon platform. As the breadth and depth of products expanded far beyond 
virtual bookshelves, findability and inventory management also depended on 
algorithms (Linden et al., 2003). Thus, recommender systems were developed 
as a practical answer to the problem of efficiently handling extreme product 
heterogeneity. 
Algorithms analyse data to identify patterns in consumer behaviour that are 
presumed to indicate one’s personal interests. Those interests are compared with 
larger patterns of interest among other consumers with similar tastes or needs. 
The algorithm brings order, establishes hierarchy, and creates coherence among 
the nearly uncountable volume of items for sale via Amazon. The algorithms 
used for this and other Internet services are attempts at “bringing order to the 
web” as Google founders Page and Brin titled their paper on the Google web 
search engine (Page et al., 1998). In this light, it is interesting that algorithmic 
filtering and structuring are being applied by PSM which, according to its core 
value proposition, should already offer a properly structured and well-ordered 
filtering of the world’s complexities presented in content. One could get the idea 
that PSM organisations do not trust their own organising principles.
The ubiquitous dissemination of smart phones, tablets, and computers has 
encouraged a new dimension of universalism, here described as globalised tech-
nical universalism. A paradigm of universally applied technical standards now 
dominate how audio, video, images, and texts are distributed and displayed 
on different devices. The language of coding and principles of interface design 
have become universal, and thus the contents and services offered on popular 
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platforms can only be universally accessed if they adhere to the general coding 
and design requirements that pertain to a platform. 
This equally applies to every user due to the requirement to have a personal 
username, password, and profile in order to log in to most platforms. Even the 
algorithms that recommend content have become universal. A few very popular 
methods are increasingly common, especially content-based filtering (Lops et 
al., 2011) and collaborative filtering (Sarwar et al., 2001). These technologies 
are embedded in nearly every current recommender system. In technical terms, 
then, universalism has never been so widespread. 
Different perspectives on the purpose of public broadcasting
In scholarly discussions about PSM, the point of departure is typically addressed 
in one of two ways. One way is informed by the materiality of practice to indicate 
how these institutions act and react in political, economic, and technological 
contexts. This is a practical perspective that prioritises PSM in competitive 
environments. Alternatively, discussions of PSM centre on normative ideals 
about the roles and functions these institutions have in facilitating democratic 
communication, deliberation, and participation among citizens. From this 
perspective, PSM is idealised as an institution that is supposed to be a central 
hub for societal deliberations that are needed to produce and reproduce societal 
coherence. The focus of discussion is on the degrees to which PSM organisations 
achieve the ideals in practice. 
In recent years, the latter perspective has been less privileged, prompting con-
cerns about the “death of public service broadcasting” (see Søndergaard, 1999; 
Tracey, 1998). There is little evidence that this description is valid given the 
manifest capabilities for renewal that established PSB firms have demonstrated 
since the mid-1980s. Bolin (2004) suggested that the transformative power of 
PSB – its ability to morph – has ensured its institutional survival. That ability 
implies that PSM is less driven by doctrine and dogma than many might prefer, 
and more driven by practical interests in organisational sustainability under 
evolving and variable societal, political, and economic conditions. This, in turn, 
would suggest a market-based understanding of PSM is more characteristic than 
historic interests in normative prescriptions – that certainly has implications 
for discussions of universalism. 
In the early days of broadcasting, all governments needed to regulate radio 
frequencies, but they approached it in different ways. Generally, universalism 
was a corollary of monopoly environments. At first, the right to transmit was 
typically granted to one broadcasting organisation only. That company was 
required to ensure the signals would be geographically accessible to everyone 
residing within a national territory. As monopolies, these companies were also 
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expected to provide programming with universal appeal to general publics that 
were de facto mass audiences (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2017). A cornerstone 
of the public service mission in the first decades of practice was to contribute 
to societal cohesion by facilitating education and enlightenment. All of this is 
well documented in The Reith Diaries (Stuart, 1975). 
With the introduction of private commercial radio in the 1980s, and later 
television in the 1990s, concerns were raised about PSB causing market distor-
tion and its presumed role in remedying market failure, pushing aside concerns 
about cohesion (Henten, 2000; Noam, 1991). Compensating for flaws in market 
dynamics and showing competitiveness became a core question of operational 
importance for PSB management in the context of dual-system growth, that is, 
systems comprised of a public service sector and a private commercial sector 
competing in media markets (Nissen, 2006). Much of central importance in 
the decades since the 1980s has to do with deciding the appropriate balance 
between the two sectors. With personalisation technologies being applied more 
or less universally in today’s global social media platforms and services, it is 
time to revisit classic arguments for public service as such in media provision. 
As Nissen (2006: 69) observed, “influencing the listener’s or viewer’s choices, 
and thus media consumption pattern, is the very reason why public media were 
established and why their existence has been upheld even in times of abundant 
media supply”.
The history of shifting arguments for and against PSM has been well treated 
in a large body of scholarship in the field of political economy. At one end of 
an axis of argumentation is the market-compensation perspective that suggests 
PSM is a remedy for market failure but distorts the competitive possibilities 
for commercial media. Here, the focus is often on arguments that suggest PSM 
should only fill the non-profitable gaps in a commercial market. At the other 
end of the axis, discussion prioritises the importance of social cohesion to em-
phasise PSM’s role as a mediator in democratic processes, and (more rarely) 
in mediating periods of national crisis. Here, economic arguments do not hold 
true, because the logic is less about economic concerns and rests primarily on 
the self-interested need for sustainability of nation-states. These arguments 
can be well explained with Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Foucault 
& Pasquino, 1991). 
In Figure 1, the economic-organisational arrangements of PSM can be pre-
sented as one axis that is anchored by market logic at one end and governmen-
tality at the other. A bisecting axis is anchored by universalism of audiences at 
one end and users as individuals at the other. The point of departure is grounded 
by Hasebrink and Domeyers’s (2010) typology that discerns four layers of an 
individual’s information needs: 1) undirected information needs; 2) thematic 
interests; 3) group-identity related information needs; and 4) specific personal 
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 Market logic Governmentality
 Competitive Personalised 
 public media enlightenment
Users – individuals
be addressed by various platforms, including mass media and social media. Each 
can address various layers of information need. This perspective encourages 
looking at the objective of PSM from a perspective other than the traditional 
focus on PSM as institutions. That is helpful when the role and potential of 
personalisation technologies are examined in the PSM context.
Figure 1. Four purposes of public service media and public service broadcasting
Comment: Figure from Sørensen (2011), adapted for use in this chapter. 
Personalised recommender systems are often presented as tools to create a more 
personally relevant selection of content. According to software developers and 
computer scientists (Hongguang et al., 2005; Ricci et al., 2015; Singh et al., 
2015; Zimmerman et al., 2004), 1) the purpose is to satisfy the information 
needs and desires of the user as a “customer-king”, and 2) to protect the user 
from information overflow (Franck, 1998; Mitchell, 2005; Simon, 1971). 
Whether recommender systems actually deliver on these propositions – and 
whether information overflow actually exists – deserves critical consideration 
that will have to wait for another opportunity. Here, we note that personalisa-
tion technologies claim to work in the interests of the individual. While at first 
glance a centralised agenda-setting function seems to clash with the individuals’ 
search for and use of media content, recent scholarship (Schmidt et al., 2018) 
remind us that the same person can have different roles when using media. At 
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the same time, a user can be 1) a consumer searching for personal gratification; 
2) a person with individual rights (e.g., not being discriminated against); and 
3) a citizen belonging to a democratic society (e.g., being well-informed about 
the society). Our model encompasses users as citizens with needs and rights, 
and consumers with personal, group-identity–related or thematic information 
interests.
The intersection of the two axes suggests four types of objectives, purposes, 
or roles for PSM. In the upper-left quadrant, where market logic intersects 
with the classical idea of universalism, a primary objective of PSM is to pro-
vide market-failure compensation. The programming and services should fill 
unprofitable gaps in media markets, but nothing else. Programming is defined 
by normative ideas that prescribe what belongs to a nation’s culture and public 
life. PSM should take care of those concerns and stay away from anything that 
would “distort” competition for commercial media. Moving to the upper-right 
quadrant, the objective of PSM is defined by a commonwealth interest in soci-
etal cohesion and growing enlightenment, which ignores the economic logic of 
markets. The programming of monopoly PSB conformed largely to this type 
of “cohesion-enlightenment” PSB.
In the lower left quadrant, we have “competitive public media”. Here the 
objective is to demonstrate competitiveness while maintaining a distinctive ori-
entation and tone that aims to persistently achieve a public service practice in 
programming. This is not so easy, because aesthetics and topics will have simi-
larities with commercial media because production methods and strategies are 
shaped by competition. A quantifiable popularity is important for programme 
selection and scheduling, and publishing strategies are optimised accordingly. 
In the era of broadcasting, public service obligations were addressed by sched-
uling popular content to “lead” viewers into weightier public service fare. At 
the same time, as noted earlier, PSB niche channels were launched to satisfy the 
interests of targeted segments with thematic content. In today’s world of digital 
on-demand media, methods and tools are borrowed from commercial practice 
in personalised algorithmic recommender systems. Most PSM operators today 
are engaged in competitive public media.
In the fourth quadrant, where governmentality and individual users meet, 
there are no obvious examples yet. This suggests that new forms of PSM are 
possible, which I have earlier described as “personalised enlightenment” (Sø-
rensen, 2011: 304). In principle, one could expect to find enlightening and 
educational content that is tailored to fit individual needs and address the wider 
shared interests of society. The danger, of course, is that it might become a 
technologically updated version of the paternalistic orientation.
This would be compatible with ideals related to empowerment and agency 
that fuel de-liberalistic democratic PSM practice, it is possible that personalised 
enlightenment could be developed in appropriate ways. This would both require 
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and facilitate liberating the concept of universalism from the strict confines of 
the classical public sphere construct and simultaneously avoiding a paternalistic 
state perspective. The path forward would be a clear and persistent focus on 
the need to ensure that all citizens have ample opportunities to be equally well 
informed about topics of mutual importance. One must be careful not to erode 
appreciated individual freedoms and the right to form and express personal 
opinions (Helberger, 2012). That being accepted, there is the possibility for a 
“diversity diet” (Sørensen & Schmidt, 2016) as a mandate for PSM. Although 
admittedly complicated and unlikely to satisfy proponents of a radical degree of 
liberal media market “freedom”, as algorithms increasingly take over the role 
of curation in content selection, the opportunity to address this in practice is 
quite doable. If understood as exposure diversity, universalism in the twenty-first 
century digital media ecology might be largely about curating for enlightenment.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the relation between two apparently incompat-
ible concepts – universalism and personalisation. These concepts seem incompat-
ible in normative terms because the former insists on such an all-encompassing 
totality that the individual is at risk of disappearing into the undifferentiated 
masses, while the latter insists on a supremacy of the individual so that every-
thing other than custom-made products would be unsatisfactory. 
In fact, universalism has never been that in practice, but only an earnest 
effort in the context of PSM’s role in serving a national cultural sphere that 
has become increasingly narrowed by these organisations’ need to stand out as 
recognisable brands with clear competitive profiles. Moreover, the very idea of 
a national culture has been both criticised and embraced, the latter in largely 
mythical terms. The pursuit of national universalism remains important, but 
is under severe pressure from a much stronger and quite popular phenomenon 
of global universalism as the result of limited number of international media 
and technology companies that advance and adhere to an increasingly global 
set of digital technical standards. These standards now include algorithmic 
personalisation technologies. 
Perhaps ironically, personalisation technologies do not necessarily deliver the 
promised protection against information overload or guarantee the promised 
degree of customer sovereignty. In practice, they serve as technical tools for 
creating, managing and predicting audiences in much the same way as sched-
uling did in the broadcast era. In short, they serve the publishers’ interests as 
much, or more, than users’ interests. 
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Chapter 12
Datafication, fluidity,  
and organisational change 
Towards a universal PSM 3.0
Lizzie Jackson
Abstract 
This chapter reviews a range of the organisational structures necessary to deliver 
datafied, fully nuanced content to audiences. These structures can be found 
in high technology clusters worldwide, and with them, the delivery of digital 
content to a mass, group, or individual to suit personal preferences is possible 
via a wide range of platforms. Such fluidity of delivery is likely to increase the 
universal appeal of public service media (PSM) content and thereby raise the 
potential for a well-informed national (and international) citizenry. The Ca-
nadian Broadcasting Corporation’s response to the increasing datafication of 
media by significant commercial firms, such as Netflix and Amazon Prime, was 
to adopt a mobile-first policy in its Hamilton newsroom, a neighbouring urban 
community to Toronto. Although the transition was found to be highly disrup-
tive for producers and publics alike, local audiences substantially increased, 
including younger audiences. 
Keywords: datafication, fluidity, recombination, high technologies, clusters, public 
service media, universality
Introducing datafication to assist universality1
This chapter reviews a range of organisational structures found in high technol-
ogy clusters in North America and Europe for the production and distribution 
of content in large data flows via networked computing. Such datafication can 
enable the nuanced delivery of digital content to a mass, group, or individual 
via a wide range of platforms to suit individual preferences. Datafication can 
enable public service media (PSM) to deliver what Jakubowicz has previously 
imagined as “public service media 3.0”. This is PSM able to operate at national 
and international levels, to reflect multiculturalism and multimediality, able to 
offer universal access, and being technologically neutral (Jakubowicz, 2010). Such 
production requires creatives, technologists, audience analysts, and data scientists 
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to work collaboratively – an approach not widely found in contemporary PSM. 
Datafication offers opportunities to strengthen one of the core principles of 
PSM – universalism: “PSM must provide a range of programmes that inform, 
inspire, entertain and appeal to the diverse interests of the young and the old, 
the higher and less educated, across the community” (Van den Bulck & Moe, 
2018: 877). Without delivery systems that can reach increasingly diverse publics 
in a more fluid way, the potential to support the development of an informed 
citizenry will remain low.
Firms, such as Netflix and Amazon Prime, are able to exploit datafication. 
At a deep backend technological level (concerned with servers, applications, 
and databases) these companies are adopting new file standards to enable the 
recombinatory delivery of different kinds of media files to different frontend 
devices, where users interact directly. For example, Netflix swiftly adopted 
Interoperable Mastering Format (IMF) in 2018, a file standard developed that 
same year by the Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers (SMPTE) 
working with the UK’s Digital Production Partnership (DPP). The DPP was cre-
ated by the broadcast and film industry in the UK to encourage experimentation 
with emerging technologies. The IMF format enables the repackaging of content 
for different play-outs, audiences, platforms, and languages. For example, the 
same film can be automatically repackaged with a commentary in Hindi for 
India, or in Mandarin for China. An airline version of a programme can be 
automatically rendered alongside one for a tablet computer or mobile phone. 
IMF therefore enables the automatic reassembly of linear content for different 
platforms including any associated data such as commentary, or alternate or 
additional material – images, music, and text: 
The IMF framework is based on the Digital Cinema standard of component 
based elements in a standard container with assets being mapped together 
via metadata instructions. By using this standard, Netflix is able to hold a 
single set of core assets and the unique elements needed to make those assets 
relevant in a local territory. (Netflix Tech Blog, 2016) 
The potential reduction in production costs is obvious, but also personal 
preferences can be accommodated by the technology when coupled with a 
registration system, thereby potentially increasing universal appeal. Netflix 
was able to adopt the new file standard swiftly because they are fully datafied. 
They are adept at data management and have the right tools and data-literate 
employees. Such orientations and capacities are inherent in high technology 
firms, therefore this is of interest when considering the potential benefit for 
PSM evolution towards datafication.
To assist in the visualisation of what PSM 3.0 adaptation might actually 
look like an analysis and findings is provided on the typical activities under-
taken by high technology firms in one particular situation: Toronto-based high 
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technology clusters. In a four-year international study, I and Michał Głowacki 
collected data in 2015–2019 from ten city-based high-technology clusters in 
North America and Europe (Jackson & Głowacki, 2019). 
The methodology involved 150 in-depth interviews with personnel from high 
technology firms and local PSM organisations in conjunction with photographs 
from “observational walkabouts” in offices and neighbourhoods, and analysis 
of grey literature (company reports and city strategies).2
The case study explored in more detail here are the operations in the Toronto 
area of Canada of the CBC. CBC’s experiment with a “mobile first – river of 
content” is possibly one of the first large-scale PSM experiments into datafica-
tion (personal interview with CBC senior manager, Toronto, 2016). In this case, 
the CBC newsroom entirely replaced their previous orientation of media-type 
(television and radio) presentation to a mixed-media data-flow approach. News 
stories were now selected on both merit and suitability for consumption via 
mobile phones and other digital devices. 
Theorising PSM 3.0
Karol Jakubowicz’s thinking on a new model for PSM emerged a decade ago. 
His analysis of European public service broadcasting (PSB) underlined the need 
for a new conceptualisation and the reforming of operations connected with 
the PSM universalist mission, which he argues has
encompassed two main periods: the time up until the 1980s, before it faced 
commercial competition (PSB 1.0) and the period of great upheavals and 
change since then (PSB 2.0). [Public service broadcasting] (PSB) also needed 
to find its bearings in a multi-channel broadcasting landscape, leading to ‘a 
significant level of commercialisation, where differences with commercial 
television are, in general, relatively small’ (León, 2007: 98). Now is the time 
for PSB 3.0 – the twenty-first-century version that we would probably invent 
if we were to create PSB today, necessarily very different from the one we 
have inherited. (Jakubowicz, 2010: 9) 
Jacubowicz imagined PSM 3.0 as being able to operate at national and inter-
national levels. It would also reflect multiculturalism and multimediality, reach 
a level of universal appeal, be technologically neutral, teach the new digital 
literacies, and engage a participatory public for the greater good. PSM would 
act as an umbrella for “a broad network of public and civic institutions and 
groups” (Jakubowicz, 2010: 9). More recently, Mira Burri (2015: viii) argues 
for the reframing of “PSM as producer, PSM as navigator, PSM as memory 
institution”. Key to such transformation is the process of datafication, that is, 
turning content, and any related information and communication, into data. 
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For Davenport (2014: 10) datafication is the act of making sense of data for 
“decision support, executive support, online analytical processing, business intel-
ligence, analytics”. Floridi (2014) terms adaptation to datafication the “fourth 
industrial revolution” and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) the “second machine 
age”. For Manovich datafication enables a logic of “permanent extendability” and 
“permanent innovation” (Manovich, 2013: 156). The flexibility of computer cod-
ing and data flows offers the imagining and development of new forms of linked 
content, conversations, games, or immersive experiences that can be expressed 
as recombinatory media and communications ecosystems. Through the work 
of these theorists we can conclude the production and maintenance of datafied 
media and communications requires an agile, fluid, approach that is alien to most 
producers accustomed to working in a linear way within television and radio. 
For Arie de Geus (1999) firms with longevity are those who are continually 
learning and adapting, what he terms a “living company”. The business strategy 
firm McKinsey also identifies a modern organisation as being a “living organism” 
(Aghina et al., 2018: para.15). Kung (2008: 128) notes strategies for media firms 
that involve technology are “challenging because that environment is never static. 
Rather like all complex systems it is in a constant state of flux”. Analysis of the 
collaborative organisational models found in high technology clusters, explored 
further on in this chapter, provide insights into fluid, non-linear, data-driven 
production. These models raise questions of whether PSM can adapt to such 
data-driven forms and, if so, how will this benefit the PSM mission to provide 
universal appeal and access? Also, what enables cross-cultural and cross-sector in-
novation, such as that between content producers and data-scientists, to succeed?
Datafication and media production 
For media producers any digital content becomes a data file. That data can then 
be tracked, monitored, and optimised, leading to new opportunities (Elliott, 
2013). For production purposes such remediation of digital content (Bolter & 
Grusin, 2000) offers opportunities to improve access, appeal, or visibility. Re-
combination can also be seen in audiences’ fluid swarming and media snacking 
of “spreadable media” identified by Jenkins and colleagues (2013). Manovich 
terms such adjustments to the structure of digital media “digital compositing”. 
Computer code and content-as-data can be rearranged to produce new creative 
forms such as immersive media (Manovich, 2001, 2013). 
Overall, we are living a “medialife” that is “constant communication and 
conversation” (Deuze, 2012: 3). Reconceptualising media and communica-
tions as recombinatory ecologies or eco-systems is becoming more logical. The 
concept of fluidity as a theoretical framework is therefore a useful lens for the 
analysis of modern management and production cultures in a contemporary 
211
DATAFICATION, FLUIDITY, AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
media ecology context. The idea that a certain level of organisational adaptiv-
ity is required to operate in such advanced datafied production environments 
is worthy of exploration. Greater organisational fluidity and agile production 
methods ensures a higher ability to respond to changing market conditions and 
audience preferences. Appropriately nuanced content and communications are 
more likely to ensure universal appeal, and the use of appropriate platforms 
will offer universal access.
For firms in high technology clusters the researchers found faster decision-
making, collaboration with a wider range of skilled creatives, and greater au-
tonomy for project-based production teams was strongly evident. To be clear, 
fluid production does not exclude moments of stasis, for example, the staged 
releases commonly found in digital making (version 1.0, version 2.0, etc.). A 
web page also offers structure within which flows of media updates can reside. 
Agile project management uses “sprints” of activity. Each sprint is interspersed 
with in-depth reviews, and these moments of stasis allow for adjustment. The 
concept of levels of appropriate fluidity can therefore assist us to see what is 
happening in combinatory media ecosystems. 
Public service media and universal appeal
Adapting to a networked media landscape has been slow and challenging for 
PSM (Lowe & Steemers, 2012; Głowacki & Jaskiernia, 2017). The next chal-
lenge is datafication which requires a more large-scale, holistic, adaptation 
across the organisation. Petros Iosifidis (2010: 16) commented that “PSB has so 
far failed to respond, in its organisation, management structures and relations 
with civil society, to the rise of networked, non-hierarchical forms of multi-
stakeholder governance and social relations”. 
For C. S. Nissen (2014) two cultures have long been observable in PSM; 
a management culture and a production culture. Nissen’s analysis of produc-
tion culture also evidenced a marked distinction between television and radio 
producers, with television often seen as a career promotion from an older, less 
wealthy medium. From the late 1990s PSM organisations began to open “new 
media” departments, introducing a third culture imported by digitally able 
workers hired from commercial firms. A fourth phase of cultural adaptation 
is now suggested as data analysts and scientists become part of contemporary 
media and communications. 
Datafication could assist PSMs to achieve universal appeal and greater po-
tential to deliver an educated citizenry by increasing the visibility, availability, 
access, and personalisation of quality media selections. To be clear, universality 
firstly “refers to universal appeal. PSM must provide a range of programmes that 
inform, inspire, entertain and appeal to the diverse interests of the young and the 
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old, the higher and less educated, across the community [emphasis original]” (Van 
den Bulck & Moe, 2018: 877). Further “PSM must cater to every specific taste, 
even outside the mainstream” (Van den Bulck & Moe, 2018: 877). Interoper-
able Marketing Format (IMF) has been suggested as one high-end technology 
standard adopted by Netflix that is proving able to deliver recombinatory content 
selections to different publics via a wide range of platforms. Hence, overall, an 
audience-centric position has to be taken in tandem with such high technology.
The dependency on PSM achieving datafication is partly financial, partly 
strategic, and partly policy-related. But it is also about being able to engage 
with other production cultures such as those evident in high-technology firms. 
This indicates the need for increased knowledge exchange mechanisms and an 
enhanced ability to sustain partnerships with datafied firms. At the same time, 
PSM organisations have strong – seemingly insurmountable – internal resist-
ance to change. The barriers to adaptation are therefore cultural, financial, 
technological, and regulatory. Alongside this is the need to increase the speed 
of innovation and exploration – that is for PSM to be more entrepreneurial. 
Developing new ventures or engaging with new ideas is not incompatible with 
the PSM mission. It is argued PSM could evolve more swiftly through increased 
engagement with local high-technology clusters. 
Investigating high-technology clusters
Historically, studies on industry clusters have produced analysis of the fabric 
of such aggregations, notably Porter (1998), but have not attempted to look at 
the internal culture of the firms within each cluster. Studies of media clusters 
have taken the same approach (Karlsson & Picard, 2011). Komorowski iden-
tifies seven types of aggregation within clusters, one of which is pooling. For 
Komorowski (2019: 56) pooling is “the organization of interaction between 
firms through, for example, the provision of networking events, the facilitation 
of education and training, the image-strengthening of its members or direct 
services”. In 2015, the National Science Centre (NCN) in Poland funded a four-
year international project: Organisational Culture of Public Service Media in 
the Digital Mediascapes: People, Values and Processes (Głowacki & Jackson, 
2019). The project is the first to look at the internal organisational culture of 
high-technology clusters in North America and Europe. 
The rationale for the study was the challenging national conditions facing 
the Polish PSM organisations Telewizja Polska (TVP) and Polskie Radio (PR). 
Both are currently operating within an exceptionally challenging political 
environment, largely orchestrated by the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) 
government. In 2016 they fired the Polish PSM senior management team in 
order to have more control. 
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Toronto’s high-technology clusters
The third-largest technology sector in North America is in Toronto, in Canada’s 
most populated province, Ontario. The Toronto high-technology cluster is in 
fact several linked clusters each with a slightly different nuance. They include 
firms and organisations involved in health, financial services, information tech-
nology, media, and creative industries. This is augmented by smaller firms in a 
range of other sectors. The clusters in Toronto encompass 14,000 technology 
companies and 65 business incubators. According to Canadian federal govern-
ment sources small- to medium-sized businesses (firms with fewer than 250 
employees) comprise 98 per cent of the activity. The typical size of most high-
technology firms is very small (less than five employees). Only 1.8 per cent of 
businesses are considered medium-sized, and only 0.3 per cent are large-sized 
companies (Government of Canada, 2016). The small- and medium-sized en-
terprises (SMEs) are an important source of innovation due to their ability to 
“start up” and test the viability of new services in a cyclical fashion. According 
to the World Bank (2020, n.p.): “SMEs account for the majority of businesses 
worldwide and are important contributors to job creation and global economic 
development. They represent about 90% of businesses and more than 50% of 
employment worldwide”.
For the analysis of the Toronto high-technology cluster, the focus is the 
enterprise incentives supported by the Toronto municipal government and 
the Ontario provincial government (most of the departments are based within 
the City of Toronto). Both levels of government put in place policies and pro-
grammes to encourage SME growth, which has also resulted in the develop-
ment of an enterprise corridor, located in centres from Toronto to Waterloo 
(100 kilometres to the west of Toronto, with the city of Hamilton in between). 
The Toronto-Waterloo enterprise corridor, it is argued, helped create a suitable 
climate to assist PSM change, specifically in the case of the CBC. 
Toronto’s high-technology clusters contain different forms of co-working 
spaces designed to amplify entrepreneurialism and cross-sector, cross-skill col-
laboration. This is achieved through training, socialisation (in cafes, chill-out 
spaces, and associated social media), and targeted knowledge-exchange sessions. 
These sites of pooling (Komorowski, 2019) range from grassroots co-working 
spaces to those run by incorporated public-private consortia run by universities, 
private businesses, and the government. We also found several large interna-
tional co-working franchises such as WeWork and Techstars in the Toronto 
setting that also provide co-working spaces across North America and Europe. 
 To illustrate the significance of the co-working model, in a pre–Covid-19 
world, the MaRS complex in downtown Toronto aggregates around 500 
government, industrial, educational, and community firms under its public-
private partnership structure (MaRS, 2018b). Academic partners include the 
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University of Toronto, York University Toronto, Ryerson University, and the 
Ontario College of Art and Design. Corporate partners include American 
Express, IBM, Microsoft Ventures, Rogers, and Siemens. The Ontario pro-
vincial government and the Canadian federal government support this MaRS 
Discovery District.
MaRS describes itself as “a curated community of entrepreneurs, investors, 
corporates, academics and government partners” (MaRS, 2018b: para. 1). 
They claim their aggregated organisations employ over 12,800 people in small, 
medium, and large high-technology businesses – in a series of linked glass-sided 
buildings resembling the headquarters of a global corporation. MaRS claims 
to have raised over CAD 4.8 billion in capital investment (from 2008–2017) 
and generated over CAD 3.1 billion in revenue (2008–2017):
We bring together educators, researchers, social scientists, entrepreneurs and 
business experts under one roof. Founded by civic leaders, we have a mission 
that is equal parts public and private – an entrepreneurial venture designed to 
bridge the gap between what people need and what governments can provide 
(MaRs, 2018a: para. 2).
Our research found several co-working spaces developing specifically for the 
media and creative industries within the cities in this study. A cross-city find-
ing from the project is that there are few mechanisms for PSM to engage with 
SMEs. Co-working and the close collaboration found between high-technology 
firms is significantly different from PSM’s model of commissioning content from 
creative outlets. The lack of ongoing innovation-oriented partnership working 
between high technology SMEs and PSM is a missed opportunity. Interviews 
with personnel across the sectors illustrate a very strong commitment in the 
SME population to the development of services in the public good.3 
In Toronto the CBC’s adaptation to datafication has been challenging, situ-
ated as it is within the CBC’s community media offerings centring on the cities 
neighbouring Toronto. Experiments began in 2012 with a “radio with digital 
components” approach in the Kitchener-Waterloo area of Ontario (personal 
interview with senior manager, CBC Toronto, 2016). In 2014, local web pages 
were launched in Hamilton, Ontario, cutting the morning drive-time radio 
news show to fund development. The audience response was highly negative 
as the chosen media was inappropriate for their consumption preferences and 
there was little consultation. In 2016, a further experiment was conducted in 
London, Ontario; a digital-only, mobile-first approach to news stories. 
The newsroom was reorganised, and television and radio replaced with a 
media-neutral approach. The best stories led, regardless of whether they were 
audio or video, and they were delivered first to mobile phones: “We changed 
our operating methods, the philosophy” (personal interview with senior man-
ager, CBC Toronto, 2016). 
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Content is now delivered from CBC’s Ontario newsrooms as a “river of 
data”. This has resulted, according to the CBC, in a 70 per cent increase in 
consumption: “We’re now seeing a threefold or triple digit increase in the volume 
of daily visits to mobile” (personal interview with senior manager, CBC To-
ronto, 2016). There is still, however, a cultural orientation within CBC towards 
departmentalism; other CBC personnel refer to digital services as something 
apart from television and radio. Digital and social media were still framed as 
being “new” in some instances:
We’re writing our journalistic policies right now to accommodate a computer-
to-computer sort of approach. […] We’re trying to figure how it fits into the 
workflow and how we translate this information into stories that resonate 
with people. (personal interview with senior director of digital media, CBC 
Toronto, 2016) 
The presence of high technology companies in Toronto and wider Ontario 
undoubtedly have an influence on CBC, not least because they have the advan-
tage of being less regulated. Over the last few years, Netflix has established a 
solid customer base, and they are not at all constrained by the Canadian 1991 
Broadcasting Act, unlike CBC. 
A key issue holding back datafication, identified by Professor Charles Davis 
of Ryerson University in Toronto during an interview in 2016, is that film and 
television companies are strong in product innovation and project manage-
ment, but “they’re much weaker in all the customer-facing parts of the fit, like 
marketing and targeting customers, and distribution and business models”. 
Discussion: Organisational change
The project seeks to identify those structures, practices, and values observable 
in successful high-technology firms that might be useful for PSM organisa-
tional and cultural adaptation. Given that results showed observable differ-
ences between PSM organisations and other technology businesses, six paired 
concepts derived from them might improve SME-PSM exchange (Głowacki 
& Jackson, 2019).
Aggregation versus isolation
High-technology clusters aggregate firms where symbiotic action is beneficial to 
advance business through innovation. Public-private partnerships were highly 
evident, largely as jointly-operated incubation or acceleration facilities, such as 
co-working spaces, where universities and commercial firms wish to increase 
bidirectional knowledge flow. 
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The PSM organisations in the study were found to be more likely to partner 
with cultural and educational institutions rather than firms in high-technology 
clusters, probably because they have a similar non-commercial orientation. 
The PSM outlets were much more internally focused. PSM staff had a far 
lower awareness of the need for change. Change was associated with change 
management practices rather than adopting a continuous – but varying – level 
of organisational fluidity. There is also evidence of a residual culture of entitle-
ment within PSM organisations, which amplifies isolationism. 
Entrepreneurialism versus islands of innovation
Successful high technology enterprises (particularly the smaller firms) embed 
entrepreneurialism within the organisational culture. Most firms interviewed 
were mission-led, working for the common good or tackling global issues goals 
such as the circular economy, health and wellness, or climate change. This is 
highly compatible with PSM values. 
A far lower level of entrepreneurialism was evident in PSM with active in-
dividuals isolated in small research and development departments – several of 
the smaller PSMs had no such department. These interviewees felt they were 
working in “islands of innovation”. Small experiments were often not taken 
forward due to a lack of in-house incubation or acceleration programmes. 
Agility versus rigidity
High-technology firms have more fluid organisational structures relying instead 
on trust relationships developed through community of practice programmes 
such as training, networking, and events. These firms orientate towards pro-
cesses supporting continuous change. Decision-making is swift within teams 
who have higher levels of autonomy, increasing the ability to pivot in response 
to external technological, cultural, and societal changes. 
The rigid departmentalised structures of PSM make decision-making much 
slower than in high technology firms. Content and technology departments 
are often separated and they have low autonomy. There was evidence that the 
common PSM practice of “referring upwards” during decision-making either 
inhibits progress or it can be used to slow down unpopular development. 
Advanced versus emerging pro-social workplaces
There was strong evidence that social science is being used to design collaborative 
workspaces in high-technology firms and co-working spaces to support knowl-
edge exchange and relationship building. Trust relationships are developed in 
kitchens, project spaces, communication booths, roof gardens, chill-out spaces, 
and reading or discussion corners. 
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Several PSM organisations in the study had adapted their offices to provide 
pro-social spaces; however, this appeared to be a form of “dressing”, as the 
underlying processes to support the incubation of any resulting project were 
not universally evident. 
Communities of practice versus contractual frameworks
Co-working spaces aggregate pools of SMEs who start up and are then often 
acquired by larger firms (Google’s business model). In the case of each cluster, 
these pools of SMEs are where most of the innovation lies. Each co-working 
space we visited across North America and Europe considered the community 
manager to be the most critical employee. These skilled individuals run the 
networking evenings, bagel breakfasts, Friday beers, and after work parties, 
and it is the community manager who often selects which SMEs have desk 
space. Trust relationships are seeded in these face-to-face interactions. On new 
projects, face-to-face engagement is prioritised. When production is going well, 
one interviewee commented, project management and communication can move 
online. This enables projects to be facilitated and managed in the Cloud or on 
dedicated servers to which all parties have access. In a post–Covid-19 industrial 
environment, good virtual working is likely to significantly rise in importance. 
PSM organisations have no role equivalent to a community manager. The 
PSM-independent production company relationship is overseen by a commis-
sioning editor. 
Technology-oriented neighbourhoods versus corporate headquarters
High-technology clusters are almost exclusively found in city regeneration areas. 
In the case of Toronto this is due to proactive stimulation by Toronto City Hall, 
aiming to grow business-growth corridors or districts. This held true across 
all the cities, and these initiatives almost always also included encouraging an 
active relationship with a university science or technology department. 
Although around 30 per cent of the PSM organisations in this study are oper-
ating in close proximity to a high-technology cluster there was very little formal 
interaction. Other PSM organisations were further afield, located in corporate 
headquarters outside of the city centre, or situated closer to the city’s cultural 
and civic districts. The location – and in several cases, also the external appear-
ance of the PSM – was clearly signaling early twentieith-century industrial and 
societal orientations. Several of the larger PSM organisations in the study are 
addressing this, notably MediaCityUK which has the BBC, Salford University, 
and several large cultural institutions and commercial producers as co-located 
partners. MediaHub Brussels launched in June 2018, this is a collaboration 
that includes three universities (Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Université Libre de 
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Bruxelles, and Université Saint-Louis Bruxelles) plus independent production 
companies and local government. There are longer-term aspirations to create 
a media district, Mediapark.brussels, also referred to as Brussels Media City, 
on a 41,000 square-metre site outside the capital. VRT, the Flemish PSM, aims 
to open facilities there. These media clusters are more likely to change PSM’s 
organisational culture by reducing isolationism and increasing the potential for 
collaboration with high-technology firms. 
Conclusions on universality through  
datafication and fluidity 
The question this chapter asks through its collection of current academic work 
is how to ensure the universal appeal of PSM content in a media landscape that 
is increasingly characterised by the ubiquity of datafied platforms. Datafication 
enables selections of content to be delivered to individual users, groups, and 
mass audiences when they want it and how they want it, increasing potential 
access and appeal. PSM has, however, been slow to adapt, partly due to the 
departmentalism and rigidity evident in its organisational structures and pro-
duction processes. 
The results of the Canadian element of this large international study suggest 
relationships with a wider creative sector, particularly high-technology firms, 
are highly likely to benefit PSM. Co-working spaces may offer a vehicle for 
SME–PSM knowledge exchange, but it is only one model – further research 
would be useful going forward. SMEs working in high-technology sectors are 
– like PSM – interested in developing platforms and services in the public good. 
The dependency for PSM is being able to operate with sufficient fluidity, to 
understand data flows and data management, and lastly, to adopt an increased 
audience-centric orientation. 
For the CBC the radical solution was to move towards the previously ex-
plained mobile-first, media-neutral strategy:
We have a concept of the news river, where everything that goes into mobile 
goes into the news river… The programmes are clients of the news river, so 
they take stuff out, do their own business, add their own dimension, and put 
it back in the river for people downstream. (personal interview with senior 
manager, CBC Toronto, 2016) 
We concluded there is a distinct difference in organisational culture between 
high-technology clusters and PSM largely relating to PSM’s orientation to da-
tafication and close-partnership working. The lack of advanced datafication in 
PSM results in a correspondingly reduced ability to nuance content for delivery 
to increasingly diverse publics via constantly changing receiving devices. This in 
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turn reduces public access, hence also universal appeal. These deficiencies have 
very serious implications when considering universal access for – and appeal 
to – young audiences who preference mobile phones. Overall, PSM organisa-
tions have a lower ability to adapt to external market conditions and reduced 
opportunities to support the development of an informed citizenry. 
Towards PSM 3.0
At the beginning of this chapter the questions under review were whether 
PSM can adapt to data-driven media forms, and if so, how will this benefit 
the PSM mission to provide universal access and appeal for increasingly di-
verse publics? Also, what enables cross-cultural and cross-sector innovation 
to succeed? Through the investigations it’s become clear the most critical 
element is whether PSM can adapt to datafication. Streaming, social media, 
and other forms of recombinatory content (Bolter & Grusin, 2000) require 
high cognizance and practical ability with databases, data analytics, and data 
management. Thus, returning to the questions in our research we can attempt 
answers as follows.
How will datafication benefit the PSM mission to provide  
universal access and appeal? 
Organisations that are datafied can more easily produce recombinatory con-
tent. Datafication also enables the nuancing of content to different audiences 
at different times on different devices, which could support PSM’s mission of 
providing universality. Accessibility could also be increased alongside stronger 
potential to support an informed citizenry.
Can PSM adapt to data driven media forms?
Encouragingly, PSM is already experimenting with data-driven media. The Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), the Japanese PSM, has developed early warn-
ing systems such as tsunami alerts that aggregate available geolocated data to 
pinpoint safe and unsafe areas, to assist the public. The European Broadcasting 
Union’s two-year MediaRoad project (2017–2019) encouraged PSMs to engage 
with SMEs involved in emerging technologies by running Sandbox Workshops. 
In this study, the example of CBC and its mobile-first data strategy for local 
content in the cities of Hamilton and London, Ontario, has been successfully 
expanded to all their newsroom content. Their audience figures for mobile have 
risen dramatically (by 70%) as a result. This is significant as young audiences 
rely on mobile phones for news. CBC now refers to news content as being a 
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river of data of different kinds (visual, audio, and text). The material can be 
recombined to suit different communities, regions, or time zones. 
What enables cross-cultural and cross-sector innovation to succeed?
The co-working model typically found in high-technology clusters enables 
a wider range of creatives to work together in trust relationships. These en-
able agile production teams to work together more quickly, to work virtually 
online, and to deliver projects faster due to fewer decisions being required as 
a consequence of having more autonomy. “Living” companies such as high-
technology SMEs benefit from continuous knowledge exchange or pooling. 
Larger companies can benefit from these sites of acceleration and incubation 
by partnering with SMEs. Organisational structures facilitating public-private 
partnerships would be highly useful to accelerate innovation in the PSM project. 
Finally, returning to Jakubowicz’s imagining of PSM 3.0, one would look 
towards a PSM organisation that is: 1) able to operate at national and inter-
national levels providing a public sphere reflecting multiculturalism and mul-
timediality; 2) able to offer universal access; 3) able to teach the new digital 
literacies and engage a participatory public for the greater good; and, 4) able 
to act as an umbrella for “a broad network of public and civic institutions and 
groups” (Jakubowicz, 2010: 18). 
To achieve Jacubowicz’s imagining of PSM 3.0 substantial new production 
and managment literacies have to be achieved. Organisational structures have 
to be adapted and – perhaps more significantly, as suggested in the Toronto 
research related to the CBC and SME cultures – offer new collaborations with 
a much wider constituency. These relationships will need to be both forged 
and sustained. 
Notes
 1. This chapter presents findings from an international study, Organisational Culture of Public 
Service Media in the Digital Mediascapes: People, Values and Processes, which was funded 
by the National Science Center (NCN) (project website: www.creativemediaclusters.com). 
 2. The other comparative cities were: Austin (US), Boston/Cambridge (US), Brussels (Belgium), 
Copenhagen (Denmark), Detroit (US), London (UK), Tallinn (Estonia), Toronto (Canada), 
Vienna (Austria), and Warsaw (Poland). The PSM organisations considered were: National 
Public Radio (NPR) station KUT in Austin; Public Radio Exchange (PRX) in Boston; Vlaamse 
Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) in Belgium; Danmarks Radio (DR) in Denmark; 
public radio station WDET and Detroit Public TV in the US; the British Broadcasting Corpo-
ration (BBC) in the UK; Eesti Rahvusringhääling (ERR) in Estonia; the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) in Canada; Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF) in Austria; and Polskie 
Radio (PR) and Telewizja Polska (TVP) in Poland. The project was funded by the National 
Science Centre of Poland (NCN).
 3. The European Broadcasting Union’s MediaRoad project (2017–2019) sought to address 
this lack of interaction between SMEs and PSM organisations by offering a “sandbox” for 
collaborative technical experimentation (MediaRoad, 2017). The project, supported by a 
Horizon 2020 European grant, also offered the opportunity for the development of policy. 
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TRANSNATIONAL OTHERING • GLOBAL DIVERSITIES
This anthology addresses complex, interconnected issues, such as the rise of extremism and terrorism, diver-
sity and minority rights, as well as the situation for freedom of expression in eight different countries, most of 
them with a Muslim majority population. Extremists recruit terrorists through social media, and target minori-
ties as well as freedom loving people by utilizing their freedom of expression to threaten the rights of others. 
This happens not least in countries with a long experience of dictatorship. Journalists face huge challenges 
when reporting on these issues. The contributors are both academics and journalists, conveying their expe-
riences from transnational research co-operation as well as reporting from the ground in conflict areas. Thus, 
this volume addresses itself to journalism students as well as professional journalists and others who need to 
navigate in a world in which both extremists and authoritarian states may stifle gender and minority rights, as 
well as the right to report and express oneself freely.
Elisabeth Eide, (Dr. Art.) is professor of journalism studies at Oslo Metropolitan University, and has worked 
at Oslo and Bergen Universities, as well as Punjab University and Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris. She has 
worked as an academic, writer and journalist, and published a large number of books and research articles 
on conflict journalism; climate journalism; gender and journalism; journalism and diversity and has received 
several awards for her work. She has worked and travelled much in South Asia and the Middle East. 
Kristin Skare Orgeret, (Dr. Art.) is professor of journalism and media studies at Oslo Metropolitan University, 
Norway. She has published extensively within the field of journalism in conflict situations, safety of journalists, 
global journalism and media and gender. She has worked as a researcher and lecturer in several countries in 
Africa and Asia and is currently coordinating the Norhed project ”Bridging Gaps” – a cooperation between 
journalism schools in Uganda, Nepal, Norway and South Sudan.
Nil Mutluer, (PhD) is the Einstein Foundation Senior Scholar at Humboldt University of Berlin, Germany. From 
2016 to 2018 she was awarded the Philipp Schwartz Research Fellowship of Humboldt Foundation. She has 
published extensively in the areas of gender, (ethnic and religious) diversity, nationalism, migration, memory 
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INEQUALITIES are the unwanted companions of media and communication. 
Tradi tional analogue mass media were criticized for creating inequalities by  
being biased, serving hegemonic interests, and accumulating far too much power 
in the hands of mighty industrial conglomerates. Under the digital regime, most 
inequalities survived, and new ones occurred. Knowledge gaps transformed into 
digital divides, news journalism is challenged by social networking sites, and 
global corporate monopolies outperform national media companies. Algorith-
mic selection, surveillance, Big Data and the Internet of Things are creating new  
inequalities which follow traditional patterns of class, gender, wealth and educa-
tion. This book revisits old and new media and communication inequalities in 
times of digital transition. It has been written in a collective effort by the members 
of THE EUROMEDIA RESEARCH GROUP.
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The Global Audiences of Danish Television Drama 
Following the surprising and unprecedented international export of Danish television 
drama in the early 2010s, this anthology explores the reception of these series among 
global audiences by tracing the travel of the series to seven different countries: Australia, 
Brazil, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Turkey, and the UK. Each contribution differs in terms 
of its theoretical and methodological position and reflects the diverse backgrounds of the 
researchers and types of data collected. As a whole, the anthology provides insights on 
global audience research in an age of multi-platform and multi-directional media flows, as 
well as on the complex nature of contemporary audiences located in different parts of the 
world. The anthology offers a novel contribution to research on Danish television drama, 
the international circulation of audiovisual content produced in non-Anglophone contexts, 
and the phenomenon of Nordic Noir for both students and scholars.
Pia Majbritt Jensen is Associate Professor at the Department of Media Studies and  
Journalism, Aarhus University.



























Nordicoms huvudlogotyp består av namnet 
”Nordicom”. Logotypen är det enskilt viktigaste 
elementet i Nordicoms visuella identitet och den 
ska finnas med i allt material där Nordicom står 
som avsändare. Använd alltid godkända original, 
de kan laddas ner här. 
Logotypens tre versioner
Nordicoms logotyp finns i tre godkända 
grundversioner. 
• Logotyp. 
• Logotyp med undertext. 
• Logotyp på platta. 
Logotyp med undertext ska användas i lite större 
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Since the start of telephony and later in broadcasting, the pursuit of universal service has legitimated the ownership and operation of media as 
a public trust. Until the 1980s, this principle was the bedrock for the broadcast-
ing mission and is still a mandated requirement for public media companies 
today. But in practice, the universalism ideal was largely abandoned in the 
1980s as media deregulation promised more competition, innovation, and 
vigorous economic growth. Some of this came true, but at a worrisome cost. 
Growing distrust in media today is partly rooted in the illusion that more me-
dia in more platforms would inevitably ensure better media in all platforms. 
There is now more of everything on offer except social responsibility. This 
collection interrogates the historic universalism mission in public service 
broadcasting and explores its contemporary relevance for public service 
media. Taking a critical perspective on media policy and performance, the 
volume contributes to a much-needed contemporary reassessment that 
clarifies the importance of universalism for equity in access and provision, 
trustworthy content, and inclusive participation in the context of advancing 
digitalisation and globalisation. The collection situates universalism as an  
aspirational quest and inspirational pursuit. Researchers and policy makers will 
find the collection valuable for conceptualisation and strategic managers will 
find it helpful as a principled basis in the pursuit of improved reach and value.  
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